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Game theory deals with models of competition and cooperation. Since the appear-
ance of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), many game theorists have tried to
capture economic behaviour and other situations in which agents (or rather, play-
ers) interact in formal models, with the purpose of analysing them in a coherent and
systematic way.
The competitive nature of interaction is the topic of noncooperative game theory.
There, players are considered as individual utility-maximisers playing a game against
each other. The term game in this context is interpreted as any interactive situation
in which a player’s payoff depends not only on his own choice of actions, but also
on the actions of his opponents. One can think of parlour games (eg, chess) or more
worldly games like firms competing in an oligopolistic market. The main focus in
noncooperative game theory is on formalising notions of rationality, the main one
being the concept of equilibrium.
In cooperative game theory, which is the subject matter of this thesis, coopera-
tion between the players is studied. By working together in coalitions, players can
generate benefits. A typical example is that of a number of firms cooperating in
order to save costs. Not only is it interesting to know how players can cooperate
in an optimal way, but also the problem of allocation arises. The central question
in cooperative game theory is how the proceeds of cooperation can or should be
divided among the players in a fair way. To assess this, one has to come up with
properties on the basis of which allocation rules can be compared.
Cooperative game theory comprises many different models. By far the most
popular of these is the model of transferable utility games. One can think of a
transferable utility game as an allocation problem in which an amount of money is
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to be divided and where one abstracts from the fact that the players involved might
put different value on the monetary payoffs they may receive. Transferable utility
games were already introduced in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and have
since formed the main pillar of cooperative game theory.
The second main model in cooperative game theory is that of nontransferable
utility games, introduced by Aumann and Peleg (1960). Such a game arises when
the objects to be divided are not valued in the same way by all the players. As one
might imagine, such situations are much harder to analyse than transferable utility
games. Eg, the well-known characterisation of nonemptiness of the core of a trans-
ferable utility game in terms of balancedness by Bondareva (1963) has only recently
been extended to the context of nontransferable utility games by Predtetchinski and
Herings (2003).
In the first few chapters of this thesis, we consider some well-known concepts in
transferable utility theory and extend them to the context of nontransferable utility.
Convexity is the subject of Chapter 3. Convexity for transferable utility games was
already introduced in Shapley (1971) and has various equivalent definitions (cf. Ichi-
ishi (1981)), each having its own interpretation. The most direct interpretation is in
terms of increasing marginal contributions: a game is convex if the marginal contri-
bution of a player to a coalition increases when the coalition that he joins becomes
larger. This nice marginalistic interpretation, however, has not been central in the
extensions of convexity to nontransferable utility games up till now. Vilkov (1977)
and Sharkey (1981) generalise convexity on the basis of its so-called supermodular
interpretation, yielding ordinal convexity and cardinal convexity, respectively.
In Chapter 3, we define three new types of convexity for nontransferable utility
games that are based on the marginalistic interpretation: coalition merge convex-
ity, individual merge convexity and marginal convexity. The main message of this
chapter is that although in the case of transferable utility, all convexity notions boil
down to the same, for nontransferable utility they are different. We investigate all
the relations between the five types of convexity and consider them in the light of
some special classes of games and of some rules.
In both transferable and nontransferable utility theory, various concepts of mono-
tonicity have been studied. An interesting contribution in this field is Sprumont
(1990), who introduces the concept of population monotonic allocation scheme. In
a convex transferable utility game, each extended marginal vector is such a scheme
3
and in his concluding remarks, Sprumonts asks the question whether this result
can be extended to games with nontransferable utility. In Chapter 4 we answer this
question in the affirmative by showing that individual merge convexity is a sufficient
condition for each extended marginal vector to constitute a population monotonic
allocation scheme.
In the same chapter, we also introduce a new type of monotonicity, drop out
monotonicity, which we analyse in the context of sequencing situations (cf. Curiel
et al. (1989)). A sequencing rule is said to be drop out monotonic if all remaining
players become better off if one of them leaves the queue. This natural property is
not satisfied by many well-known sequencing rules. We show that, in fact, there is at
most one drop out monotonic rule that is stable, ie, always yielding a core element.
This so-called µ rule, which is a marginal vector of the corresponding sequencing
game, turns out to be drop out monotonic on the simple class of sequencing games
with linear cost functions. For many other classes of regular cost functions, no stable
drop out monotonic rule exists.
Myerson (1977) introduces a cooperative model in which cooperation between
the players is modelled by a communication network as well as a transferable utility
game. This underlying game models the benefits that the coalitions can generate if
they cooperate, whereas the communication network models the extent to which this
cooperation is possible. These two ingredients result in a so-called graph-restricted
game, which reflects both the underlying possibilities of the players and the extent
to which these can come to fruition. For such communication situations, Van den
Nouweland and Borm (1991) and Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001) analyse
the problem of inheritance of properties. In short, what conditions must a commu-
nication network satisfy so that for every underlying game that satisfies a certain
property, the resulting graph-restricted game satisfies the same property? In Chap-
ter 5, we extend this analysis to nontransferable utility games and point out some
differences between the two models.
The distinction between cooperative and noncooperative behaviour is not always
clear-cut (cf. Van Damme and Furth (2002)). In many economic situations, both
elements are present and a unified approach is called for. In a noncooperative model,
like the Cournot oligopoly model, one might want to explicitly model the possibility
of collusion. Or the other way around, in a cooperative model, one might want to
incorporate some strategic elements in order to come to a more realistic or fairer
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solution.
In Chapter 6, we introduce the class of spillover games. This is basically a
transferable utility model with an extra ingredient: spillovers. Whenever a coalition
of players decides to cooperate, they do not only generate a payoff to themselves,
but also to the players outside that coalition. Such spillovers can arise if, eg, the
coalition inflicts externalities as a result of pollution. In Chapter 6 we present this
new model and extend some well-known concepts for transferable utility games to
this new class.
Not only can economic externalities result in spillovers, also in operations re-
search problems, such spillovers can occur. In the case of minimum cost spanning
trees, a coalition building a public network obviously influences the possibilities and
hence the payoffs of the other players in the game. We analyse this public-private
connection problem using our new model, which results in an elegant depiction of
the problem of free riding.
As mentioned before, cooperation and allocation are inextricably linked. An
allocation problem arises whenever a bundle of goods is held in common by a group
of individuals and must be alloted to them individually. The purest allocation
problem is a bankruptcy situation, as modelled by O’Neill (1982). In a bankruptcy
situation, there is a sum of money, the estate, available to be divided among a group
of players, each having a single claim on the estate. This simple division problem
has inspired many allocation proposals, each having its own appealing properties.
Although there has been a recent upsurge in attention for bankruptcy situations (see,
eg, the survey article by Thomson (2003)), still a lot has to be explored. Solving this
easy problem may and should help us understand more difficult allocation problems.
An interesting variation on the bankruptcy model is provided by Pulido et al.
(2002). In their model, the players do not only have a claim on the estate available,
but in addition there is also an objective criterion to compute a reference amount
for each player. Obviously, this extra information should be used to find a fair
allocation of the estate. In Chapter 7, we analyse these bankruptcy situations with
references and propose a compromise method to divide the estate.
In Chapter 8, we take a broader view on bankruptcy. Instead of each player having
a single claim on the estate, we consider the situation in which there are multiple
issues on the basis of which the estate is to be divided. These issues are equally
valid, so the asymmetry which we can exploit in the case of claims and references
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is not present here. The resulting model of multi-issue allocation situations can
be seen as a general framework for division problems, to which, depending on the
context, many methods of solution can be applied.
Related to this new type of allocation problem, we define two transferable util-
ity games and obtain the nice theoretical result that this class of games coincides
with the class of all nonnegative exact games. We propose two rules, based on
the run-to-the-bank rule that was already introduced by O’Neill (1982), where the
interdependency between the various issues is reflected by compensation payments.
O’Neill uses a property of consistency to characterise the run-to-the-bank rule.
In this thesis, we frequently draw on this consistency principle to provide character-
isations of run-to-the-bank-like rules. In Chapter 8, we give the first of these.
The main part of Chapter 9 considers a further extension of the run-to-the-bank
rule in the context of multi-issue allocation situations, which unlike the extensions in
Chapter 8 always yields a core element. This new extension is based on a two-stage
approach, where the issues and the players are treated in subsequent order rather
than simultaneously. Also this new rule is characterised by a consistency property,
called issue-consistency.
Our final model related to bankruptcy is the subject of Chapter 10. In many eco-
nomic situations where players can cooperate, one can a priori partition the players
into groups. These so-called a priori unions were first analysed by Owen (1977),
who adapted the Shapley value to take these unions into account. Whereas Owen
considers a general transferable utility framework with a priori unions, in Chap-
ter 10 we study the more specific context of bankruptcy situations. In a bankruptcy
situation, the players can often be partitioned into a priori unions on the basis of the
nature of their claim. The main focus of the chapter is on extending the constrained
equal award rule for bankruptcy situations to take the union structure into account.
We introduce and characterise two such extensions.
Geometry plays a minor, though interesting role in cooperative game theory.
Many set-valued solutions for transferable utility games have a nice geometric struc-
ture and various rules can be described in terms of geometric principles. The best-
known example is the Shapley value, which is the barycentre of the Weber set. In
Chapter 11, we characterise an adaptation of the compromise value, the τ ∗ value,
as the barycentre of the edges of the core cover. The proof requires some intricate





The set of all natural numbers is denoted by N, the set of real numbers by R, the
set of nonnegative (nonpositive) reals by R+ (R−) and the set of positive (negative)
reals by R++ (R−−). For a finite set N , we denote its power set, ie, the collection of
all its subsets, by 2N and its number of elements by |N |. By RN we denote the set of
elements of R|N | whose entries are indexed by N , or equivalently, the set of all real-
valued functions on N . An element of RN is denoted by a vector x = (xi)i∈N . For
S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, we denote the restriction of x on S by xS = (xi)i∈S. For x, y ∈ RN ,
y ≥ x denotes yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ N , y > x denotes yi > xi for all i ∈ N and y 	 x
denotes y ≥ x, y 6= x.
For a finite set N and a subset S ⊂ N , we denote by eS the vector in RN defined
by eSi = 1 for all i ∈ S and eSi = 0 for all i ∈ N\S. If S = {i}, we denote the
corresponding unit vector by ei. By 0N we denote the zero vector in RN .
An ordering of the elements in N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , |N |} → N , where σ(i)
denotes which element in N is at position i. The notation σ = (a1, a2, . . . , an) is
used as shorthand for σ(1) = a1, σ(2) = a2, . . . , σ(n) = an. The set of all |N |!
orderings of N is denoted by Π(N).
2.2 TU games
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game, is a pair (N, v), where
N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic
function, assigning to every coalition S ⊂ N of players a value, or worth, v(S),
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representing the total payoff to this coalition of players when they cooperate. By
convention, v(∅) = 0. We denote the class of all TU games with player set N by
TUN . Where no confusion can arise, we denote a game (N, v) ∈ TUN by v.
The subgame of (N, v) with respect to coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ is defined as the
TU game (S, vS) with vS(T ) = v(T ) for all T ⊂ S.
For a game v ∈ TUN , the imputation set I(v) is defined by
I(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), ∀i∈N : xi ≥ v({i})}.
The core C(v) is defined by
C(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N




A core element is stable in the sense that if such a vector is proposed as allocation
for the grand coalition, no coalition will have an incentive to split off and cooperate
on their own.
A game is called balanced if its core is nonempty and totally balanced if the core
of each of its subgames is nonempty.
A game v ∈ TUN is called superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that
S ∩ T = ∅ we have
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
The marginal vector mσ(v) of a game v ∈ TUN corresponding to the ordering
σ ∈ Π(N) is defined by
mσσ(k)(v) = v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k − 1)})
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The Shapley value of a game v ∈ TUN , Φ(v), (cf. Shapley (1953)) is defined as







For a game v ∈ TUN , the utopia vector M(v) ∈ RN is defined by
Mi(v) = v(N)− v(N\{i})
for all i ∈ N , and the minimal right vector m(v) ∈ RN by










for all i ∈ N . A game v ∈ TUN is called compromise admissible (or quasi-balanced)
if m(v) ≤ M(v) and ∑i∈N mi(v) ≤ v(N) ≤
∑
i∈N Mi(v). We denote the set of all
compromise admissible games with player set N by CAN .
For a compromise admissible game the compromise value or τ value (cf. Tijs
(1981)) is defined as the linear combination of the utopia vector and the minimal
right vector that is efficient, ie, for all v ∈ CAN ,
τ(v) = λM(v) + (1− λ)m(v)
with λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ∑i∈N τi(v) = v(N).
For a game v ∈ TUN , the core cover is defined by
CC(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),m(v) ≤ x ≤ M(v)},
so a game is compromise admissible if and only if its core cover is nonempty. Tijs and
Lipperts (1982) show that C(v) ⊂ CC(v), so every balanced game is compromise
admissible. A game v ∈ TUN is called semi-convex (cf. Driessen and Tijs (1985)) if
it is superadditive and
mi(v) = v({i})
for all i ∈ N .
The excess of coalition S ⊂ N for imputation x ∈ I(v) is defined by




If x is proposed as an allocation vector, the excess of S measures to which extent
S is satisfied with x: the lower the excess, the more pleased S is with the proposed
allocation. The idea behind the nucleolus is to minimise the highest excesses in a
hierarchical manner.
Let x, y ∈ Rt. Then we say that x is lexicographically smaller than or equal to
y, or x ≤L y, if x = y or if there exists an s ∈ {1, . . . , t} such that xk = yk for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1} and xs < ys. For a finite set A, we denote x ≤∗L y with x, y ∈ RA,
if x′ ≤L y′ where x′ (y′) is the vector in R|A| containing the elements of x (y) in
decreasing order.
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Let v ∈ TUN be a game with a nonempty imputation set. The nucleolus of v,
ν(v), (cf. Schmeidler (1969) and Maschler et al. (1992)) is the unique point in I(v)
for which the excesses are lexicographically minimal, ie,
(E(S, ν(v)))S⊂N ≤∗L (E(S, x))S⊂N
for all x ∈ I(v).
2.3 NTU games
A cooperative game with nontransferable utility, or NTU game, is a pair (N, V ),
where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and V is the payoff map assigning to
each coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ a subset V (S) of RS. This set represents all the payoff
vectors that coalition S can obtain when they cooperate.
We impose some conditions on V : for all i ∈ N ,
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0]
and for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ we have
V (S) is nonempty and closed,
V (S) is comprehensive, ie, x ∈ V (S) and y ≤ x imply y ∈ V (S),
V (S) ∩ RS+ is bounded.
Furthermore, we assume that (N, V ) is monotonic:
∀S⊂T⊂N,S 6=∅∀x∈V (S)∃y∈V (T ) : yS ≥ x.
Note that we do not define V (∅). The class of NTU games with player set N is
denoted by NTUN . Again, we sometimes use V rather than (N, V ) to denote an
NTU game.
NTU games generalise TU games. Every TU game (N, v) gives rise to an NTU
game (N, V ) by defining V (S) = {x ∈ RS | ∑i∈S xi ≤ v(S)} for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
The subgame of (N, V ) with respect to coalition S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ is defined as the
NTU game (S, V S) with V S(T ) = V (T ) for all T ⊂ S, T 6= ∅.
The set of Pareto efficient allocations for coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, denoted by
Par(S), is defined by
Par(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | ¬∃y∈V (S) : y 	 x},
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its set of weak Pareto efficient allocations WPar(S) is defined by
WPar(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | ¬∃y∈V (S) : y > x}
and its set of individually rational allocations is defined by1
IR(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | ∀i∈S : xi ≥ 0} = V (S) ∩ RS+.
The imputation set of a game V ∈ NTUN , denoted by I(V ), is defined by
I(V ) = IR(N) ∩WPar(N).
The core of an NTU game (N, V ) consists of those elements of V (N) for which it
holds that no coalition S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ has an incentive to split off:
C(V ) = {x ∈ V (N) | ∀S⊂N,S 6=∅¬∃y∈V (S) : y > xS}.
Again, we call a game V ∈ NTUN balanced2 if it has a nonempty core and totally
balanced if all its subgames have a nonempty core.
An NTU game V ∈ NTUN is called superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N
such that S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅, S ∩ T = ∅ we have
V (S)× V (T ) ⊂ V (S ∪ T ).
This definition of superadditivity is a straightforward generalisation of the concept of
superadditivity for TU games. In addition, we define a weaker property concerning
only the merger between individual players and coalitions rather than between two
arbitrary disjoint coalitions. A game V ∈ NTUN is called individually superadditive
if for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ N\{i}, S 6= ∅ we have
V (S)× V ({i}) ⊂ V (S ∪ {i}).
Note that individual superadditivity is stronger than monotonicity.
The marginal vector Mσ(V ) of a game V ∈ NTUN corresponding to the ordering
σ ∈ Π(N) (cf. Otten et al. (1998)) is defined by
Mσσ(1)(V ) = 0
and
1Recall that we assumed zero-normalisation.
2In the case of (total) balancedness, we abuse standard terminology. Formally, balancedness is
a property of TU games, which in Bondareva (1963) is shown to coincide with nonemptiness of the
core. For both TU and NTU games, we refer to the latter property as balancedness.
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Mσσ(k)(V ) = max{xσ(k) | x ∈ V ({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)}),
∀i∈{1,...,k−1} : xσ(i) = Mσσ(i)(V )}
for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. We use the assumption of monotonicity to ensure that the
sets over which the maximums are taken are nonempty. By construction, Mσ(V ) ∈





The notion of convexity for cooperative games with transferable utility was intro-
duced by Shapley (1971) and is one of the most analysed properties in cooperative
game theory. Many economic and combinatorial situations give rise to convex (or
concave) cooperative games, such as airport games (cf. Littlechild and Owen (1973)),
bankruptcy games (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) and sequencing games (cf.
Curiel et al. (1989)).
Convexity for TU games can be defined in a number of equivalent ways. One
of these is by means of the supermodularity property, which has its origins outside
the field of game theory. Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) have extended this
property towards cooperative games with nontransferable utility to define ordinal
and cardinal convexity, respectively. The supermodular interpretation of convexity
also plays an important role in the context of effectivity functions (cf. Abdou and
Keiding (1991)).
Economically more appealing than the supermodular interpretation of convexity
are the definitions of convexity that are based on the concept of marginal contribu-
tions. In cooperative games with stochastic payoffs, this marginalistic interpretation
of convexity has already been successfully applied (cf. Timmer et al. (2000) and
Suijs (2000)). In this chapter, which is mainly based on Hendrickx et al. (2002), we
build on the work originated by Ichiishi (1993) and consider three types of convex-
ity for NTU games, which are based on three corresponding marginalistic convexity
properties for TU games.
Although all five convexity properties for NTU games coincide within the subclass
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of TU games, they are not equivalent on the whole class of NTU games. In this
chapter we analyse the relations between these convexity concepts.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we define the three marginalistic
types of convexity for NTU games. In section 3, we investigate how the various types
of convexity are related in general. In section 4, we analyse the relations between
the convexity types in three-player games, while in section 5 we do this for some
special classes of NTU games. Finally, in section 6, we study the relation between
the various types of convexity and some rules.
3.2 Convexity
A TU game v ∈ TUN is called convex if it satisfies the following four equivalent
conditions (cf. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)):
∀S,T⊂N : v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ), (3.1)
∀U⊂N∀S⊂T⊂N\U : v(S ∪ U)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ U)− v(T ), (3.2)
∀i∈N∀S⊂T⊂N\{i} : v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ), (3.3)
∀σ∈Π(N) : mσ(v) ∈ C(v). (3.4)
Condition (3.1), which is called the supermodularity property, was originally stated
in Shapley (1971) as the definition of convexity for TU games. Subsequently, Vilkov
(1977) and Sharkey (1981) generalised this property to ordinal and cardinal convex-
ity for NTU games, respectively. A game V ∈ NTUN is called ordinally convex if
for all S, T ⊂ N such that S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅ and for all x ∈ RN such that xS ∈ V (S)
and xT ∈ V (T ) we have
xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ) or xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). (3.5)
A game is called cardinally convex if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S 6= ∅, T 6=
∅ we have1
V ◦(S) + V ◦(T ) ⊂ V ◦(S ∩ T ) + V ◦(S ∪ T ), (3.6)
where V ◦(S) = V (S)× {0N\S} for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and V ◦(∅) = {0N}.
1Cardinal convexity is only defined for V ∈ NTUN for which V (N) is a convex set. Throughout
this chapter, this condition is implicitly assumed when dealing with cardinal convexity. All results
relating to the other types of convexity hold without this requirement.
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In contrast to these supermodular definitions of convexity by Vilkov (1977) and
Sharkey (1981), Ichiishi (1993) considers the marginalistic interpretation of convex-
ity. We analyse three types of convexity for NTU games, based on the marginalistic
properties (3.2)-(3.4).
First of all, we have coalition merge convexity2, which generalises property (3.2).
For U = ∅ and S = T , (3.2) is trivial and these cases can therefore be ignored when
defining an analogous property for NTU games. If S = ∅, (3.2) is equivalent to
superadditivity. Because we do not define V (∅) for NTU games, we require super-
additivity as a separate condition. For S 6= ∅, (3.2) states that for any coalition U ,
the marginal contribution to the larger coalition T is larger than the marginal con-
tribution to the smaller coalition S. In terms of allocations, this can be interpreted
as follows: given the situation in which coalitions S and T have agreed upon an indi-
vidually rational (and weak Pareto efficient) allocation of v(S) and v(T ) (say, p and
q, respectively), if coalition U joins the smaller coalition S, then for any allocation r
of v(S∪U) such that the players in S get at least their previous amount (rS ≥ p), it
is possible for U to join the larger coalition T using allocation s of v(T ∪ U), which
gives the players in T at least their previous amount (sT ≥ q) and makes all players
in U better off than in case they join S (sU ≥ rU). Using this interpretation of (3.2),
we can now define an analogous property for NTU games.
A game V ∈ NTUN is called coalition merge convex, if it is superadditive and it
satisfies the coalition merge property, ie, for all coalitions U ⊂ N such that U 6= ∅
and all S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S 6= ∅ the following statement is true: for all
p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), all q ∈ V (T ) and all r ∈ V (S ∪ U) such that rS ≥ p, there
exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ U) such that
{
si ≥ qi for all i ∈ T,
si ≥ ri for all i ∈ U. (3.7)
As a result of comprehensiveness, it makes no differences whether we require the
coalition merge property for all q ∈ V (T ) or only for q ∈ WPar(T ) ∩ IR(T ).
The extension of (3.3) towards NTU games goes in a similar manner: a game
V ∈ NTUN is called individual merge convex if it is individually superadditive and
it satisfies the individual merge property, ie, for all k ∈ N and all S $ T ⊂ N\{k}
such that S 6= ∅, the following statement is true: for all p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), all
2This notion is introduced for stochastic cooperative games in Suijs and Borm (1999). The
name coalition merge convexity and the subsequent names individual merge convexity and marginal
convexity are from Timmer et al. (2000).
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q ∈ V (T ) and all r ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) such that rS ≥ p there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k})
such that{
si ≥ qi for all i ∈ T,
sk ≥ rk. (3.8)
Finally, a game V ∈ NTUN is called marginal convex if for all σ ∈ Π(N) we have
Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ). (3.9)
One important aspect of the five convexity properties defined in this section is that
within the class of NTU games that correspond to TU games, they are all equivalent
and coincide with TU convexity. Another aspect of these properties is that if a game
satisfies some particular form of convexity, then all its subgames do.
3.3 Relations between the convexity notions
In this section we investigate the relations between the five types of convexity for
NTU games that were presented in the previous section. For 2-player NTU games,
all five types are equivalent to (individual) superadditivity. For general n-player
NTU games, equivalence between the five types of convexity does not hold. The
remainder of this section shows which relations do exist between these properties.
It follows immediately from the definitions that coalition merge convexity implies
individual merge convexity. The following example shows that the reverse need not
be the case.
Example 3.3.1 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} if S = {1, 2} or S = {3, 4},
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 0} for other S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,
V ({1, 2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,3} |x1 ≤ 1, x2 ≤ 1, x3 ≤ 0},
V ({1, 2, 4}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,4} |x1 ≤ 1, x2 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 0},
V ({1, 3, 4}) = {x ∈ R{1,3,4} |x1 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 1},
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V ({2, 3, 4}) = {x ∈ R{2,3,4} |x2 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 1},




This game is not superadditive and therefore not coalition merge convex3: take
S = {1, 2}, T = {3, 4}, then (1, 1) ∈ V (S) and (1, 1) ∈ V (T ), but (1, 1, 1, 1) /∈
V (S ∪ T ). This game does, however, satisfy individual merge convexity. First,
individual superadditivity can easily be checked to be satisfied. Next, let k ∈ N , let
S $ T ⊂ N\{k} be such that S 6= ∅ and let p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q ∈ V (T ) and
r ∈ V (S∪{k}) be such that rS ≥ p. Define s = (q, rk) ∈ RT∪{k}. If |T | = 3, then we
have T ∪ {k} = N . Because ∑i∈T qi ≤ 2 and rk ≤ 1 (which follows from |S| ≤ 2),
we have
∑
i∈N si ≤ 3 and hence, s ∈ V (N). If T = {1, 2} or T = {3, 4}, then we
have |S| = 1 and rk ≤ 0 and because of individual superadditivity, s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}).
Finally, for other coalitions T with |T | = 2, we have maxi∈T qi ≤ 0, rk ≤ 1 and
therefore s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}). Hence, V satisfies the individual merge property. /
The following theorem shows that individual merge convexity implies marginal con-
vexity.
Theorem 3.3.1 Let V ∈ NTUN . If V is individual merge convex, then it is
marginal convex.
Proof: Assume that V is individual merge convex and let σ ∈ Π(N). To simplify
notation, assume without loss of generality that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N . We prove
that Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ) by induction on the player set. For this, we define for k ∈
{1, . . . , n} the subgame (Nk, V k) where Nk = {1, . . . , k} and V k(S) = V (S) for all
S ⊂ Nk, S 6= ∅. Mσ,k(V k) denotes the marginal vector in (Nk, V k) that corresponds
to the ordering σ restricted to the first k positions. For k = 1, Mσ,k(V k) ∈ C(V k) by
construction. Next, let k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and assume that Mσ,k−1(V k−1) ∈ C(V k−1).
We show that Mσ,k(V k) ∈ C(V k), ie, no coalition has an incentive to leave the
“grand” coalition Nk. Define T = {1, . . . , k − 1} and let S $ T, S 6= ∅. Then it
suffices to show that coalitions S, T , {k}, T ∪ {k} and S ∪ {k} have no incentive to
split off:
3One can even construct an individual merge convex game that is superadditive, but which does
not satisfy the coalition merge property.
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• Because Mσ,k−1(V k−1) ∈ C(V k−1), by definition there does not exist a
y ∈ V (S) such that y > Mσ,k−1S (V k−1). By construction, Mσ,kS (V k) =
Mσ,k−1S (V
k−1), so there does not exist a y ∈ V (S) such that y > Mσ,kS (V k).
Hence, coalition S has no incentive to leave Nk when the payoff vector is
Mσ,k(V k). The same argument holds for coalition T .
• Player k will not deviate on his own, because individual merge convexity im-
plies individual superadditivity and hence, Mσ,k(V k) ∈ IR(V k).
• Because Mσ,k(V k) ∈ WPar(Nk), there exists no y ∈ V k(Nk) such that y >
Mσ,k(V k) and hence, the “grand” coalition T ∪{k} has no incentive to deviate.
• Finally, we show that coalition S ∪ {k} has no incentive to split off. Define
R = {r ∈ V (S∪{k}) | rS ≥ Mσ,kS (V k)} to be the set of allocations in V (S∪{k})
according to which the players in S get at least the amount they get according
to the marginal vector Mσ,k(V k) . If R = ∅, then S∪{k} will be satisfied with
the allocation Mσ,k(V k). Because Mσ,k(V k) ∈ IR(Nk), it follows from the
basic assumptions of an NTU game that R is closed and bounded, so if R 6= ∅,
we can compute max{rk | r = (rS, rk) ∈ R}. Let r ∈ R be a point in which
this maximum is reached. Because Mσ,k−1(V k−1) ∈ C(V k−1), we must have
Mσ,kS (V
k) /∈ V (S) or Mσ,kS (V k) ∈ WPar(S). Let p be the intersection point of
the line segment between 0 and Mσ,kS (V
k) and the set WPar(S) ∩ IR(S). By
construction, r ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) is such that rS ≥ p.
Next, take q = Mσ,k−1(V k−1) ∈ V (T ). As a result of individual merge convex-
ity and comprehensiveness, there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) such that sT = q
and sk ≥ rk. Because sT = Mσ,k−1(V k−1), it follows from the construction
of Mσ,k(V k) that Mσ,kk (V
k) ≥ sk. But then, Mσ,kk (V k) ≥ rk. We constructed
rk as the maximum amount player k can obtain by cooperating with coali-
tion S, while giving each player i ∈ S at least Mσ,ki (V k). Hence, we conclude
that there does not exist a y ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) such that yi > Mσ,ki (V k) for all
i ∈ S ∪ {k}.
From these four cases we conclude that Mσ,k(V k) ∈ C(V k) and by induction on k,
we obtain Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ). ¤
In Example 3.3.2 we show that the reverse implication of Theorem 3.3.1 need not
hold.
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Example 3.3.2 The following game with player set N = {1, 2, 3} is the NTU
analogue of Example 4.6 in Timmer et al. (2000), which is a cooperative game
with stochastic payoffs:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 + x2 ≤ 3},
V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,3} |x1 + x3 ≤ 2},
V ({2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{2,3} |x2 + x3 ≤ 6},









The marginal vectors of this games are stated in the following table.
σ (1, 2, 3) (1, 3, 2) (2, 1, 3) (2, 3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1)
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The core is given by









= 1, x1 + x3 ≥ 3, x1 + x3 ≥ 2, x2 + x3 ≥ 6}.
It is easy to check that Mσ(V ) ∈ C(V ) for all σ ∈ Π(N) and hence, V is marginal
convex. Next, we show that this game is not individual merge convex. Take k =
1, S = {2}, T = {2, 3} and take p = 0 ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q = (6, 0) ∈ V (T ) and
r = (3, 0) ∈ V (S ∪ {k}). Note that rS ≥ p. Suppose V is individual merge convex.
Then there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) such that (3.8) holds, ie, s2 ≥ 6, s3 ≥ 0 and
s1 ≥ 3. But s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) implies s16 + s210 + s314 ≤ 1, which gives a contradiction.
Hence, V is not individual merge convex. /
In the following example, we prove that ordinal convexity does not imply any of
the other four types of convexity. This example disproves Theorem 2.2.3 in Ichiishi
(1993), which states that in an ordinally convex NTU game, all marginal vectors
are in the core.
Example 3.3.3 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≤ 2},
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V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,3} |x1 + x3 ≤ 1},
V ({2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{2,3} |x2 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 0},




This game V is ordinally convex: let S, T ⊂ N be such that S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅ and
let x ∈ RN be such that xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ). We distinguish between four
cases. If S ⊂ T or T ⊂ S, then (3.5) is trivially satisfied. If S ∩ T = ∅, then (3.5)
is equivalent to superadditivity, which is satisfied by this game. If S = {1, 2} and
T = {1, 3}, then x1 ≤ 0 and hence, xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ). Otherwise,
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 2 and
hence, xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). From these four cases we conclude that (3.5) is satisfied
and V is ordinally convex.
However, this game is not marginal convex, because the marginal vector cor-
responding to σ = (1, 2, 3),Mσ(V ) = (0, 2, 0), does not belong to the core, be-
cause coalition {1, 3} has an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Using The-
orem 3.3.1, we conclude that V is neither coalition merge nor individual merge
convex. Furthermore, this game is not cardinally convex: (0, 2, 0) ∈ V ◦({1, 2}) and
(0, 0, 1) ∈ V ◦({1, 3}), but (0, 2, 0) + (0, 0, 1) = (0, 2, 1) /∈ V ◦({1}) + V ◦(N). /
Next, we show that ordinal convexity is not implied by any of the other four types
of convexity.
Example 3.3.4 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} for all S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS |
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ 4} for all S ⊂ N, |S| = 3,




First, we show that this game is not ordinally convex. Consider S = {1, 2, 3}, T =
{2, 3, 4} and x = (4,−3, 3, 4) ∈ RN . Then we have both xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ),
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but neither xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩T ) nor xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪T ). Hence, (3.5) is not satisfied and
V is not ordinally convex.
Next, we show that V is coalition merge convex. Let U ⊂ N, U 6= ∅ and let
S $ T ⊂ N\U be such that S 6= ∅. Let p ∈ WPar(S)∩ IR(S), let q ∈ V (T ) and let
r ∈ V (S ∪ U) be such that rS ≥ p. Define s = (q, rU). If |T | = 3 and |U | = 1, then∑
i∈T qi ≤ 4 and rU ≤ 3. If |T | = 2 and |U | = 2, then
∑
i∈T qi ≤ 2 and
∑
i∈U ri ≤ 4.
In both cases, we have
∑
i∈T∪U si ≤ 7 and hence, s ∈ V (T ∪ U) = V (N). In case
|T | = 2 and |U | = 1, we have ∑i∈T qi ≤ 2 and rU ≤ 1 and hence,
∑
i∈T∪U si ≤ 3,
implying s ∈ V (T ∪U). Noting that V is superadditive, we conclude that this game
is coalition merge convex, and hence, also individual merge and marginal convex.
Finally, we show that V is cardinally convex. Let S, T ⊂ N be such that S 6=
∅, T 6= ∅ and let xS ∈ V ◦(S), xT ∈ V ◦(T ). If S ⊂ T or T ⊂ S, then (3.6) is trivially
satisfied. If S ∩ T = ∅, then (3.6) follows from superadditivity. We distinguish
between three further cases. First, if |S| = |T | = 3, then |S∩T | = 2 and S∪T = N .







i − 2 ≤ 4 + 4 − 2 = 6. Hence, x ∈ V ◦(S ∪ T ). Second, if
|S| = 2, T = |3|, then |S ∩T | = 1 and S ∪T = N . Take xS∩T = 0N ∈ V ◦(S ∩T ) and
define x as before. Then
∑
i∈S∪T xi ≤ 2+4−0 = 6 and hence, x ∈ V ◦(S∪U). Third,
if |S| = |T | = 2, then |S ∩ T | = 1 and |S ∪ T | = 3. Take xS∩T = 0N ∈ V ◦(S ∩ T )
and define x as before. Then
∑
i∈S∪T xi ≤ 2 + 2− 0 = 4 and hence, x ∈ V ◦(S ∪ U).
From these three cases we conclude that V is cardinally convex. /
From the previous two examples we conclude that ordinal convexity is independent of
the other four types of convexity. The example below shows that cardinal convexity
does not imply any of the marginalistic types of convexity.
Example 3.3.5 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 + x2 ≤ 2, x2 ≤ 1},
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 0} for other S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,
V ({1, 2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,3} |x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 2, x3 ≤ 2},
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V ({1, 2, 4}) = {x ∈ R{1,2,4} |x1 + x2 + x4 ≤ 2, x4 ≤ 1},
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 0} for other S ⊂ N, |S| = 3,
V (N) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ 2, x3 ≤ 2, x4 ≤ 1}.
For the cardinal convexity property (3.6), only the case with S = {1, 2, 3} and T =
{1, 2, 4} is nontrivial. Let xS ∈ V ◦(S), xT ∈ V ◦(T ). Because (1, 1, 0, 0) ∈ V ◦(S∩T ),
















Hence, x ∈ V (N) and V is cardinally convex. For σ = (1, 2, 3, 4) we have Mσ =
(0, 1, 1, 0). The players of coalition {1, 2, 4} have an incentive to deviate from this






) ∈ V ({1, 2, 4}) gives them a strictly higher
payoff. Hence, Mσ(V ) /∈ C(V ) and V is not marginal convex, and therefore neither
coalition merge nor individual merge convex. /
Finally, we show that the three marginalistic convexity properties do not imply
cardinal convexity.
Example 3.3.6 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} for S ⊂ N, |S| > 1.
This game is a 1-corner game (see section 3.5.2) and it follows from Proposition 3.5.4
that V is coalition merge convex (and hence, individual merge and marginal convex
as well). This game is, however, not cardinally convex: take S = {1, 2}, T = {2, 3}
and take (1, 1, 0) ∈ V ◦(S), (0, 1, 1) ∈ V ◦(T ). Then (1, 1, 0) + (0, 1, 1) = (1, 2, 1) /∈
V ◦(S ∩ T ) + V ◦(S ∪ T ). /
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Summarising all the results in this section, the five types of convexity for NTU
games are related as is depicted in Figure 3.1. Cardinal convexity is abbreviated
to card-convex, coalition merge convexity to cm-convex, individual merge convexity
to im-convex, ordinal convexity to ord-convex and marginal convexity to m-convex.
An arrow from one type of convexity to another indicates that the former implies






Figure 3.1: Relations between the convexity notions
3.4 Three-player games
The results in Figure 3.1 hold for general n-player NTU games. In this section, we
consider the relations between the five types of convexity for 3-player NTU games.
First, we prove that in 3-player NTU games, individual merge convexity implies
coalition merge convexity.
Proposition 3.4.1 Let V ∈ NTUN such that |N | = 3. If V is individual merge
convex, then it is coalition merge convex.
Proof: Assume that V is individual merge convex. Then V is individually super-
additive, and because there are only three players, superadditive. For the coalition
merge property, if |U | = 1, then (3.7) is equivalent to (3.8). For |U | > 1, we cannot
find coalitions S and T such that S $ T ⊂ N\U and S 6= ∅. Hence, the coalition
merge property is satisfied. ¤
Next, we show that in 3-player games, coalition merge convexity implies ordinal
convexity.
Proposition 3.4.2 Let V ∈ NTUN such that |N | = 3. If V is coalition merge
convex, then it is ordinally convex.
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Proof: Assume that V is coalition merge convex. Let S1, S2 ⊂ N be such that
S1 6= ∅ and S2 6= ∅. If S1 ⊂ S2 or S2 ⊂ S1, then (3.5) is trivially satisfied. If
S1∩S2 = ∅, then (3.5) is satisfied because V is superadditive. Otherwise, let x ∈ RN
be such that xS1 ∈ V (S1) and xS2 ∈ V (S2) and suppose xS1∩S2 /∈ V (S1 ∩ S2). Then
xS1∩S2 > 0 because |S1 ∩ S2| = 1. Next, define U = S2\S1, S = S1 ∩ S2 and T = S1
and take p = 0 ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q = xS1 ∈ V (T ) and r = xS2 ∈ V (S ∪ U).
Then rS = xS1∩S2 > 0 = p. Because V is coalition merge convex, there exists
an s ∈ V (T ∪ U) = V (N) such that s ≥ (q, rU) = (xT , xU) = xS1∪S2 . Hence,
xS1∪S2 ∈ V (N) = V (S1 ∪ S2) and V is ordinally convex. ¤
The following example shows that in 3-player NTU games, marginal convexity need
not imply ordinal convexity.
Example 3.4.1 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V (S) = {x ∈ RS | max
i∈S
xi ≤ 1} for all S ⊂ N, |S| = 2,




The marginal vectors of this game are
σ (1, 2, 3) (1, 3, 2) (2, 1, 3) (2, 3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (3, 2, 1)
Mσ (0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0)
and the core is
C(V ) = {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)}.
This game is marginal convex. For ordinal convexity, consider S = {1, 2}, T = {2, 3}
and x = (1, 1, 1) ∈ RN . Then we have both xS ∈ V (S) and xT ∈ V (T ), but neither
xS∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ) nor xS∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). Hence, V is not ordinally convex. /
Finally, we show that in 3-player games, cardinal convexity is stronger than coalition
merge convexity.
Proposition 3.4.3 Let V ∈ NTUN be such that |N | = 3. If V is cardinally convex,
then it is coalition merge convex.
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Proof: Assume that V is cardinally convex. Then it is superadditive. For the
coalition merge property, let U ⊂ N be such that U 6= ∅ and let S $ T ⊂ N\U
be such that S 6= ∅. Let p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q ∈ V ◦(T ) and r ∈ V ◦(S ∪ U) be
such that rS ≥ p. Because |S| = 1, we have p = 0 and hence, rS ≥ 0. Next, define
Ŝ = S ∪ U . Then q + r ∈ V ◦(Ŝ) + V ◦(T ) and because of cardinal convexity, there
exists an s ∈ V ◦(Ŝ ∩T )+V ◦(Ŝ ∪T ) such that s ≥ q + r. Because |Ŝ ∩T | = |S| = 1,
V ◦(Ŝ ∩ T ) = R− × 0N\(Ŝ∩T ) and hence, s ∈ V ◦(Ŝ ∪ T ) = V (N) = V (T ∪ U).
Furthermore, sT = (sS, sT\S) ≥ (rS + qS, qT\S) ≥ q and sU ≥ rU . So s satisfies (3.7)
and V is coalition merge convex. ¤
As a corollary, we obtain that in 3-player NTU games, cardinal convexity implies
individual merge, marginal and ordinal convexity as well.
Combining the results of this section with some results of the previous section, in
Figure 3.2 we depict all the relations between the five types of convexity for 3-player
games. To keep the picture clear, the arrows from cardinal convexity to ordinal and













Figure 3.2: Relations between the convexity notions, three players
3.5 Special classes of games
In this section, we look at our convexity notions in some specific classes of NTU
games.
3.5.1 Hyperplane games
A hyperplane game is an NTU game V ∈ NTUN such that for all coalitions S ⊂
N, S 6= ∅ we have
V (S) = {x ∈ RS |x>aS ≤ bS} (3.10)
for certain aS ∈ ◦∆S = {x ∈ RS | ∑i∈S xi = 1, x > 0} and bS ∈ R. Note that every
entry of aS must be positive to ensure boundedness of V (S) ∩ RS+. We denote the
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class of all hyperplane games with player set N by HN . A property of hyperplane
games that we are going to use later on, is that these games possess a convex core.
Lemma 3.5.1 Let V ∈ HN . Then C(V ) is a convex set.
Proof: Let aS, bS for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ be as in (3.10). Then








{x ∈ RN |x>S aS ≥ bS} ∩ {x ∈ RN | x>aN = bN}.
C(V ) is the intersection of a finite number of convex sets and is hence convex. ¤
A parallel hyperplane game is a hyperplane game V ∈ HN such that the projection
of aN onto
◦
∆S equals aS for all coalitions S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. A parallel hyperplane game
can be viewed as a TU game in which each player’s utility is multiplied by a certain
positive factor. We denote the class of parallel hyperplane games with player set N
by PN .
The next lemma shows that parallel hyperplane games are the only hyperplane
games that can be individually superadditive. As a result, hyperplane games that
are not parallel cannot be coalition merge, individual merge, ordinal or cardinal
convex.
Lemma 3.5.2 Let V ∈ HN . If V is individually superadditive, then it belongs to
PN .
Proof: Assume that V is individually superadditive and for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅, let
aS, bS be as in (3.10). Let S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. Take p ∈ V (S) and let i, j ∈ S. Construct




ej − ei), where ej and ei are unit vectors in
RS. Then
p>αa




= p>aS + α(
aSi
aSj
aSj − aSi )
= p>aS
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≤ bS
for all α ∈ R and hence, pα ∈ V (S). Next, define qα = (pα, 0N\S) for all α ∈ R.
Applying individual superadditivity |N\S| times yields qα ∈ V (N). Hence,
q>α a
N = p>aNS + α(
aSi
aSj
(ej)>aNS − (ei)>aNS ) ≤ bN
for all α ∈ R. The inequality can only hold for all α ∈ R if the expression between






. Hence, aS is the projection of aN onto
◦
∆S and V ∈ PN . ¤
The following lemma relates the five convexity properties within the class of parallel
hyperplane games.
Lemma 3.5.3 Within PN , coalition merge, individual merge, marginal, ordinal and
cardinal convexity coincide.
Proof: First of all, note that all five convexity properties are scale invariant: if V
satisfies some form of convexity, then so does V w for every vector of scale factors
w ∈ RN++, where V w(S) = {(wixi)i∈S | x ∈ V (S)} for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. In a parallel
hyperplane game V ∈ PN , one can choose w in such a way that V w corresponds to
a TU game. From this the assertion follows. ¤
The relations between the various forms of convexity for hyperplane games are sum-
marised in Figure 3.3. For simplicity, the double arrow between cardinal and ordinal
convexity and the arrow from cardinal to marginal convexity have been omitted. It
follows from Lemmas 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 that within the class HN , coalition merge, indi-
vidual merge, ordinal and cardinal convexity coincide. Because there are hyperplane
games that are marginal convex, but not parallel, marginal convexity is weaker than


















Figure 3.3: Relations between convexity notions, hyperplane games
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3.5.2 1-corner games
An NTU game is called a 1-corner game if V (S) = {x ∈ RS |x ≤ uS} for some
uS ∈ RS for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. We denote the class of 1-corner games with player
set N by CN . Monotonicity implies that for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N,S 6= ∅ we must have
uTS ≥ uS. From this, superadditivity readily follows.




{x ∈ V (N) |x ≥ Mσ(V )} (3.11)
In the following proposition we show that all 1-corner games are coalition merge
convex.
Proposition 3.5.4 Let V ∈ CN . Then V is coalition merge convex.
Proof: Let U ⊂ N be such that U 6= ∅, let S $ T ⊂ N\U be such that S 6= ∅ and
let p ∈ WPar(S) ∩ IR(S), q ∈ V (T ) and r ∈ V (S ∪ U) be such that rS ≥ p. Then
it suffices to show that (q, rU) ∈ V (T ∪ U). First, q ∈ V (T ), so q ≤ uT . Similarly,
r ≤ uS∪U and hence, rU ≤ uS∪UU . Because of monotonicity, we have q ≤ uT∪UT and
rU ≤ uT∪UU . Therefore, (q, rU) ≤ uT∪U and (q, rU) ∈ V (T ∪ U). ¤
It can be shown in a similar fashion that every 1-corner game is ordinally con-
vex. However, a 1-corner game need not be cardinally convex, as is illustrated by
Example 3.3.6.
3.5.3 Bargaining games
A bargaining situation is a pair (F, d) where F ⊂ RN is a closed, convex and com-
prehensive set of attainable utility vectors and d ∈ F is a disagreement point such
that there exists a y ∈ F with y > d.
A bargaining situation with d = 0 gives rise to the bargaining game V with
V (S) = RS− for all S $ N, S 6= ∅ and V (N) = F . We denote the class of bargaining
games with player set N by BN .
Proposition 3.5.5 Let V ∈ BN . Then V satisfies all five convexity properties.
Proof: Define the game W ∈ CN by W (S) = RS− for all coalitions S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅.
Then W trivially satisfies all five convexity properties. Because V (S) = W (S) for
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all S $ N,S 6= ∅ and V (N) % W (N), it follows from the definitions (3.5)-(3.9) that
V satisfies all five convexity properties as well. ¤
3.6 Relations between convexity and some rules
In this section we investigate how some rules and set-valued solutions on subclasses
of NTUN relate to our convexity notions.
3.6.1 The MC value
The marginal based compromise value or MC value was introduced in Otten et al.
(1998) and is defined by




where αV = max{α ∈ R+ |α
∑
σ∈Π(N) M
σ(V ) ∈ V (N)}.
Proposition 3.6.1 Let V ∈ NTUN . If V is marginal convex and belongs to HN ,
CN or BN , then MC(V ) ∈ C(V ).
Proof: Assume that V is marginal convex. For V ∈ HN and V ∈ CN , the statement
follows from Lemma 3.5.1 and equation (3.11), respectively. If V ∈ BN , then it is
easily seen that the core includes the set on the right hand side of (3.11), from which
MC(V ) ∈ C(V ) follows. ¤
3.6.2 The compromise value and semi-convexity
The compromise value for NTU games is introduced in Borm et al. (1992) and is an
extension of the τ value for TU games (cf. Tijs (1981)). The compromise value is
a compromise between two payoff vectors. The first one is the utopia vector K(V ),
defined by
Ki(V ) = sup{t ∈ R | ∃a∈RN\{i}+ : (a, t) ∈ V (N),@b∈V (N\{i}) : b > a}
for all i ∈ N . The second one is the minimal right vector k(V ), defined by
ki(V ) = max
S:i∈S
ρSi (V )
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for all i ∈ N , where ρSi (V ) is the remainder for player i after giving the other
members in S their utopia payoff:
ρSi (V ) = sup{t ∈ R | ∃a∈RS\{i} : (t, a) ∈ V (S), a > KS\{i}(V )}.
The following lemma comes from Borm et al. (1992).
Lemma 3.6.2 Let V ∈ NTUN with x ∈ C(V ). Then k(V ) ≤ x ≤ K(V ).
A game V ∈ NTUN is called compromise admissible if k(V ) ≤ K(V ), k(V ) ∈ V (N)
and there does not exist a b ∈ V (N) such that b > K(V ). In view of Lemma 3.6.2,
every NTU game with a nonempty core is compromise admissible. For a compromise
admissible game, the compromise value T (V ) is defined by
T (V ) = λV K(V ) + (1− λV )k(V ),
where
λV = max{λ ∈ [0, 1] |λK(V ) + (1− λ)k(V ) ∈ V (N)}.
A game V ∈ NTUN is called semi-convex if k(V ) = 0.4 For TU games, semi-
convexity is implied by convexity and the next lemma states the corresponding
result for NTU games.
Lemma 3.6.3 Let V ∈ NTUN . If V is marginal convex, then it is semi-convex.
Proof: Assume that V is marginal convex. Let i ∈ N and let σ ∈ Π(N) be such
that σ(1) = i. By construction, Mσi (V ) = 0. Because of Lemma 3.6.2, we have
ki(V ) ≤ Mσi (V ) = 0. On the other hand, ki(V ) = maxS:i∈S ρSi (V ) ≥ ρ{i}i (V ) = 0.
We conclude that ki(V ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and V is semi-convex. ¤
As a corollary, we obtain the following proposition, in which compromise admissi-
bility follows from nonemptiness of the core.
Proposition 3.6.4 Let V ∈ NTUN . If V is marginal convex, then it is compromise
admissible and the compromise value is proportional to the utopia payoff vector.
4Contrary to the TU case (cf. Driessen and Tijs (1985)), we do not require superadditivity in
the definition of semi-convexity.
3.6. Relations between convexity and some rules 31
3.6.3 The bargaining set
The bargaining set for a game V ∈ NTUN is defined as (cf. Aumann and Maschler
(1964))
M(V ) = {x ∈ I(V ) | ∀i,j∈N∀S⊂N,i∈S,j /∈S∀y∈WPar(S),y>xS
∃T⊂N,i/∈T,j∈T∃z∈WPar(T ) : z ≥ (yS∩T , xT\S)}.
The bargaining set consists of those imputations x such that whenever player i
raises an objection against player j by cooperating with coalition S and promising
the members of S more than they get according to x, player j can counter this
objection by cooperating with coalition T , giving each player in S ∩ T at least the
amount they are promised by i.
It is a well-known result that in TU games, this set is always nonempty and
contains the core. For convex TU games, the bargaining set coincides with the core
(cf. Maschler et al. (1972)). In NTU games, the bargaining set still contains the
core, but there are games in which M(V ) is empty. In the next example we show
that even a strong form of convexity does not ensure M(V ) = C(V ).
Example 3.6.1 Consider the same game as in Example 3.3.6, which is coalition




, 1) does not belong to the core, but we
show that x ∈ M(V ). By symmetry, we only have to look at objections of player
1 against player 3. Player 1 cannot object on his own, but only through coalition
S = {1, 2}. The maximum payoff vector player 1 can promise is y = (1, 1). But
player 3 can counter this objection through coalition T = {2, 3} and payoff vector
z = (1, 1). Hence, x ∈ M(V ) although x /∈ C(V ) and V is coalition merge convex.
/
Of course, there might be some subclass of NTUN for which coalition merge con-
vexity (or even a weaker form of convexity) implies M(V ) = C(V ). The proof in
Solymosi (1999) for the corresponding TU result uses excess games and it might be
interesting to investigate how this result can be extended to NTU games, and in





In cooperative game theory, many monotonicity properties have been introduced
to analyse and characterise various rules. Roughly, a rule on a class of games or
economic situations is monotonic if a certain change in some of the parameters (eg,
player set or payoff function) completely determines the direction of change in a
player’s payoff.
For example, a rule f : TUN → RN is called strongly monotonic (cf. Young
(1985)) if for all u, v ∈ TUN and i ∈ N such that v(S)−v(S\{i}) ≤ u(S)−u(S\{i})
for all S ⊂ N, i ∈ S, we have fi(u) ≥ fi(v). So, if we have a game v ∈ TUN and take
a second game u ∈ TUN in which all of player i’s marginal contributions are higher,
then according to f , player i should get a higher payoff. Young (1985) uses this
monotonicity property, together with efficiency, to characterise the Shapley value.
An overview of various types of monotonicity can be found in Levinský (2000).
In this chapter, we consider two types of monotonicity. First, we generalise a
well-known TU result on population monotonic allocation schemes to NTU games.
The bulk of this chapter deals with sequencing situations, for which we introduce
the concept of drop out monotonicity.
The concept of population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) was introduced
in Sprumont (1990). A pmas of a game is a scheme consisting of a set of allocations,
one for each subgame. These allocations are all core elements of their corresponding
subgames, and moreover, each player’s payoff increases as the coalition to which he
belongs increases in size. As a result of this monotonicity property, the allocation
33
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for the grand coalition can be seen as fair, since each coordinate is bounded from
below by core elements of the subgames.
Sprumont (1990) shows that for convex TU games, every extended marginal vec-
tor is a pmas and poses the question, whether this result can be extended to NTU
games. In section 2 of this chapter, which is based on Hendrickx (2003), we use
the extensions of TU convexity that we presented in the previous chapter to answer
this question. We show that in an individual merge convex game, each extended
marginal vector is indeed a pmas, while marginal convexity is not sufficient.
In the remainder of this chapter, which is based on Fernández et al. (2002),
we introduce and analyse the concept of drop out monotonicity in the context of
sequencing situations. We say that a rule on a certain class of situations is drop out
monotonic if applying the rule to a reduced situation, in which one of the players
has left, yields an allocation, which, depending on the context, either makes all
remaining players better off or all of them worse off than in the original situation.
We link this concept of drop out monotonicity to stability. A rule is called stable
if it always generates a core element of the corresponding TU game.
If the games corresponding to the reduced situations are subgames of the original
game, then a stable and drop out monotonic rule generates a pmas for the original
game (cf. Sprumont (1990)). In the cases of linear production situations (cf. Owen
(1975)), airport situations (cf. Littlechild and Owen (1973)) and holding situations
(cf. Tijs et al. (2000)), the game corresponding to a reduced situation after one player
drops out is a subgame of the original game. So here, the existence of stable and
monotonic rules boils down to the existence of a pmas. Such pmas-es do not always
exist for linear production games. However, for airport situations, the Shapley value
induces one of many stable and drop out monotonic rules. For holding games, the
rule which gives all gains to the so-called holding house keeper is a pmas.
The property of drop out monotonicity introduced here is inspired by the fairness
condition introduced in Ambec and Sprumont (2002). They study the problem of
water management from a game theoretical point of view: given a river of certain
capacity flowing through a number of countries with certain demand for water, how
should the water of the river be allocated?
The fairness condition states that whenever one of the countries ceases to demand
water (drops out), all other countries should be better off. Contrary to the examples
mentioned before, the reduced situation after a player drops out does not give rise to
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a subgame of the original game. Ambec and Sprumont show that there is a unique
allocation rule which satisfies both stability (ie, generates a core element) and the
fairness condition. This rule (the µ rule) is the marginal vector corresponding to
the ordering of the countries along the river (from upstream to downstream).
As stated before, we study the drop out monotonicity property in the context
of sequencing situations, as introduced in Curiel et al. (1989), in which there is
also a natural ordering of the players. Indeed, in the most basic class of sequencing
situations (with linear cost functions), a result similar to Ambec and Sprumont is
established. Within a more general class of sequencing situations (with regular cost
functions), it turns out that there is at most one stable and drop out monotonic
rule, which must be the (analogue of the) µ rule. Finally, we introduce a class of
sequencing situations with linear cost functions, in which one of the players faces a
due date. It turns out that in this class, the µ rule is indeed stable and drop out
monotonic if the processing times of the agents are equal.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we consider pmas-es for NTU
games and show that individual merge convexity is sufficient to ensure that each
extended marginal vector is a pmas. In section 3, we introduce the basic sequencing
model and define the µ rule. In section 4, we define drop out monotonicity for
sequencing situations and show that if the cost functions are regular, there can be
at most one stable and drop out monotonic rule. In section 5, we show that in the
class of sequencing situations with linear cost functions in which one of the players
faces a due date, the µ rule is stable and drop out monotonic.
4.2 Population monotonic allocation schemes
A population monotonic allocation scheme or pmas for a TU game v ∈ TUN is a




ySi = v(S) (4.1)
and
ySi ≤ yTi (4.2)
for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ T ⊂ N and all i ∈ S. A pmas for an NTU game V ∈ NTUN is
a collection of vectors (yS)S⊂N,S 6=∅ satisfying monotonicity condition (4.2) and the
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following efficiency condition, which generalises (4.1):
yS ∈ WPar(S) (4.3)
for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
As is the case for TU games, also in an NTU game a pmas induces a core element
in every subgame, as is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.1 Let V ∈ NTUN and let (yS)S⊂N,S 6=∅ be a pmas for V . Then yS ∈
C(V S) for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅.
Proof: Let S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. Then by definition, yS ∈ V S(S). Suppose that there
exists a coalition T ⊂ S, T 6= ∅ and an allocation x ∈ V S(T ) such that x > yST .
Then by (4.2), x > yT , which contradicts yT ∈ WPar(T ). Hence, yS ∈ C(V S) ¤
The extended marginal vector of V with respect to ordering σ ∈ Π(N) is the collec-
tion of vectors (Mσ|S(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅, where σ|S ∈ Π(S) is such that σ−1(i) < σ−1(j)
implies σ−1|S (i) < σ
−1
|S (j) for all i, j ∈ S.
Sprumont (1990) shows that for TU games, convexity implies that each of the ex-
tended marginal vectors consitutes a pmas. In his concluding paragraph, Sprumont
poses the question whether this result can be generalised to NTU games. Moulin
(1989) shows that in an ordinally convex NTU game, the extended marginal vec-
tor need not constitute a pmas. In the following example, we show that marginal
convexity is not sufficient either.
Example 4.2.1 Consider the following NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
V ({i}) = (−∞, 0] for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} | 10x1 + x2 ≤ 10},
V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,3} |x1 + 10x3 ≤ 10},
V ({2, 3}) = {x ∈ R{2,3} |x2 + x3 ≤ 1},




It is readily verified that this game is marginal convex. Take σ = (3, 1, 2) and
S = {1, 2}. Then Mσ2 (V ) = 1 and M
σ|S
2 (V
S) = 10, so the extended marginal vector
corresponding to σ is not a pmas. (However, each of the five other extended marginal
vectors does constitute a pmas.) /
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Although in a marginal convex game not every extended marginal vector need be
a pmas, it is still an open question whether for each marginal convex game a pmas
exists.
Individual merge convexity does turn out to be sufficient for the extended
marginal vector to be a pmas, as is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let V ∈ NTUN be an individual merge convex game and let σ ∈
Π(N). Then (Mσ|S(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V .
Proof: First note that property (4.3) is satisfied by construction. For monotonicity
condition (4.2), let S ⊂ T ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and let i ∈ S. Define S̄ = {j ∈ S |σ−1(j) <




by distinguishing between three cases:
• If S̄ = T̄ , then Mσ|Si (V S) = M
σ|T
i (V
T ) by construction.




T ) ≥ 0.
• Otherwise, apply the individual merge property to i, S̄ and T̄ . Because V is
individual merge convex, the game V and all its subgames are also marginal




(V S), so M
σ|S
S̄
(V S) lies on or above the weak Pareto boundary of V (S̄).
Hence, there exists a p ∈ WPar(S̄)∩ IR(S̄) such that Mσ|S
S̄




(V T ) ∈ V (T̄ ) and r = Mσ|S
S̄∪{i}(V
S) ∈ V (S̄∪{i}), the individual merge
property states that there exists an s ∈ V (T̄ ∪ {i}) such that si ≥ Mσ|Si (V S)
and sT̄ ≥ Mσ|TT̄ (V T ). The latter inequality together with the construction of
a marginal vector imply M
σ|T
i (V




From these three cases it follows that (4.2) is satisfied as well and hence,
(Mσ|S(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V . ¤
An immediate consequence of the TU equivalent of Theorem 4.2.2, as noted by
Sprumont (1990), is that for convex TU games, the extended Shapley value is a
pmas.
Using the MC value, as defined by (3.12), the result in Sprumont (1990) can be
extended to the class of NTU games where the core of each subgame is a convex set.
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Proposition 4.2.3 Let V ∈ NTUN be an individual merge convex game such that
C(V S) is convex for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. Then (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V .
Proof: Because the core of every subgame of V is a convex set, the MC value
equals the average of the marginal vectors in each subgame. Using Theorem 4.2.2,
the assertion readily follows. ¤
Without the extra condition on C(V S), the extended MC value need not be a pmas.
As was the case for the extended marginal vectors, marginal convexity is not
sufficient for the extended MC value to be a pmas, even if the core of every subgame
is a convex set.
Example 4.2.2 Consider the 3-person game of Example 4.2.1. The MC value of






), while in the subgame consisting of players 1 and
2, the MC value equals (1
2
, 5). Monotonicity condition (4.2) is violated for player 2.
/
4.3 Sequencing situations
One-machine sequencing situations were introduced in Curiel et al. (1989). Follow-
ing the standard notions and notation of the ensuing literature (see, eg, the survey
article of Borm et al. (2001)), there is a queue of players, each with one job, in front
of a machine. Each player must have his job processed on this machine. The finite
set of players is denoted by N = {1, ..., n}. The positions of the players in the queue
are described by a bijection σ : N → {1, . . . , n}, where σ(i) = j means that player i
is at position j in the queue. The set of all such bijections is denoted by ΠN .
1 We
assume that the initial order on the jobs before the processing of the machine starts
is σ0 ∈ ΠN , defined by σ0(i) = i for all i ∈ N . The processing time pi > 0 of the job
of player i is the time the machine takes to handle this job. For each player i ∈ N ,
the costs of spending time in the system is described by a cost function ki : R+ → R,
where ki(t) represents the costs of player i if his job is completed in t time units.
Costs are assumed to be additive: the total costs of a coalition S ⊂ N equal the
sum of the individual costs of the members of S. Furthermore, the cost functions
1In sequencing it is more convenient to use these bijections rather than the orderings in Π(N),
which are defined the other way around.
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are regular, ie, for all i ∈ N , ki(t) is increasing in t and ki(0) = 0. A sequencing
situation is described by a triple (N, p, k) with p = (pi)i∈N and k = (ki)i∈N . We
denote the class of all sequencing situations with player set N by SEQN .
We pay special attention to the class of sequencing situations with linear cost
functions, ie, ki(t) = αit for all t ∈ R+ with αi ≥ 0. A sequencing situation with
linear cost functions is denoted by (N, p, α) with α = (αi)i∈N . We denote all such
sequencing situations with player set N by LSEQN .
The completion time C(σ, i) of the job of player i if the jobs are processed (in a





A processing order is called semi-active if there does not exist a job which could be
processed earlier without altering the processing order, ie, if there are no unnecessary
delays. The total costs of all players if the jobs are processed according to the order
σ equal
∑
i∈N ki(C(σ, i)). Clearly, because ΠN is finite, there exists an order for
which total costs are minimised.
In the linear case, a processing order that minimises total costs of N is an order
in which the jobs are processed in decreasing order with respect to the urgency index




Example 4.3.1 Consider a linear one-machine sequencing situation (N, p, α) ∈
LSEQN , where N = {1, 2, 3}, p = (2, 2, 1) and α = (4, 6, 5). Then the urgen-
cies for the players are u1 = 2, u2 = 3 and u3 = 5, respectively. Hence, the optimal
processing order is (3, 2, 1) with total costs 5 · 1 + 6 · 3 + 4 · 5 = 43. /
Note that an optimal order can be obtained from the initial order by consecutive
switches of neighbours i, j with i directly in front of j and ui < uj. This process
will be referred to as the Smith algorithm.
For a sequencing situation (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN the costs CS(σ) of coalition S
with respect to a processing order σ equal CS(σ) =
∑
i∈S ki(C(σ, i)). We want to
determine the minimal costs of a coalition S when its members decide to cooperate.
For this, we have to define which rearrangements of the coalition S are admissible
with respect to the initial order. A bijection σ ∈ ΠN is called admissible for S (cf.
Curiel et al. (1989)) if it satisfies the following condition:
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P (σ, j) = P (σ0, j)
for all j ∈ N\S, where for any τ ∈ ΠN the set of predecessors of a player j ∈ N
with respect to τ is defined as P (τ, j) = {k ∈ N | τ(k) ≤ τ(j)}.2
This condition implies, in particular, that the starting time of each player outside
the coalition S is equal to his starting time in the initial order and the players of S
are not allowed to “jump” over players outside S. The set of admissible orders for
a coalition S is denoted by A(S).
We define the sequencing game (N, c) corresponding to the sequencing situation






for all S ⊂ N . Contrary to the standard definition of a game, the coalitional value
c(S) reflects the costs of coalition S rather than its worth. As a result, some of the
definitions in section 2.2 change accordingly.
In case the cost functions are linear, expression (4.4) can be rewritten in terms
of gij = max{0, αjpi − αipj}, which equals the cost savings attainable by player i
and j when i is directly in front of j, regardless of the exact position in the order.
A coalition S is called connected with respect to σ if for all i, j ∈ S and ` ∈ N such
that σ(i) < σ(`) < σ(j) it holds that ` ∈ S. The Smith algorithm and (4.4) imply
the following proposition (cf. Curiel et al. (1989)).
Proposition 4.3.1 Let (N, p, α) ∈ LSEQN be a linear sequencing situation and let
c be the corresponding sequencing game. Then for any coalition S that is connected














2This notion of admissibility is standard in the sequencing literature. Relaxations have been
studied in Van Velzen and Hamers (2003) and Slikker (2003).
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where T\σ0 is the set of components of T , a component of T being a maximally
connected subset of T .
The core of a cost game c is defined by
C(c) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N




Analogous to benefit games, a core element is stable in the sense that if such a
vector is proposed as cost allocation for the grand coalition, no coalition will have
an incentive to split off and cooperate on their own.
A sequencing rule is a function f : SEQN → RN+ assigning to every sequencing
situation (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN a vector f(N, p, k) ∈ RN+ such that
∑
i∈N fi(N, p, k) =
c(N). A rule f is called stable if f(N, p, k) ∈ C(c) for every sequencing situation
(N, p, k) ∈ SEQN . In this chapter, we investigate one specific rule for the class
of sequencing games with regular cost functions, the µ rule, which is the marginal
vector corresponding to the initial order σ0:
µj(N, p, k) = c(Pj)− c(Pj−1)
for all j ∈ N , where Pj = P (σ0, j) = {1, . . . , j}. In case the cost functions are linear,
we can use Proposition 4.3.1 to rewrite this as




According to this rule, the gain gij goes fully to player j, who is behind i in the
queue.
Since every sequencing game is σ0-component additive (cf. Curiel et al. (1995)),
the µ rule is stable.3 So letting the players at the front of the queue pay the highest
costs and attributing the gains to the players at the back of the queue results in a
stable outcome.
4.4 Drop out monotonicity
Suppose that one player in the queue decides to wait no longer and drops out.
One natural question in this situation is how the costs of the other players will be
affected by this. It seems natural that none of the players should be worse off if one
3For sequencing games arising from linear cost functions, concavity of these games can be used
to establish stability of the µ rule (cf. Curiel et al. (1989)).
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of them drops out of the queue. Formally, a rule f : SEQN → RN+ is called drop out
monotonic if for all sequencing situations (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN and all q ∈ N we have
fj(N, p, k) ≥ fj((N, p, k)−q)
for all j ∈ N\{q}, where (N, p, k)−q = (N\{q}, (pi)i∈N\{q}, (ki)i∈N\{q}) and the initial
order in (N, p, k)−q is σ0 restricted to N\{q}.
Proposition 4.4.1 µ is drop out monotonic on the class of sequencing situations
with linear cost functions.
Proof: Let (N, p, α) ∈ LSEQN be a sequencing situation with linear cost functions,
let q ∈ N and let j ∈ N\{q}. If j < q, then µj(N, p, α) = c({j}) −
∑
i∈N :i<j gij =
µj((N, p, α)
−q). If j > q, then µj((N, p, α)−q) = (
∑j
i=1 pi − pq)αj −
∑





i∈N :i<j gij) + (gqj − pqαj) = µj(N, p, α)−min{pjαq, pqαj} ≤
µj(N, p, α). ¤
Proposition 4.4.1 shows that the µ rule is drop out monotonic in case the cost
functions are linear. The question now arises whether this is the only rule satisfying
this property. In the following theorem, we show that within the class of sequencing
situations with regular cost functions (not necessarily linear), the µ rule is the only
possible stable and drop out monotonic rule.
Theorem 4.4.2 Let f be a rule on the class of sequencing situations with regular
cost functions. If f is stable and drop out monotonic, then f equals the µ rule.
Proof: Let (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN be a sequencing situation with regular cost functions
and let f be a stable and drop out monotonic rule. Denote the corresponding
sequencing game by c and denote fSi = fi(S, (pj)j∈S, (kj)j∈S) and µi = µi(N, p, k)
for all i ∈ N and S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. We show that f = µ by an inductive argument.
First, from drop out monotonicity it follows that fN1 ≥ f {1}1 . From stability we have
fN1 ≤ c({1}) = f {1}1 . Hence, fN1 = f {1}1 = c({1}) = µ1.
Next, let j ∈ {2, . . . n}. Assume that fNi = fPj−1i = µi for all i ∈ Pj−1. From drop

















i = c(Pj) and, using the induction




i = c(Pj)− c(Pj−1) = µj.
Hence, we conclude that f = fN = µ. ¤
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It follows from Proposition 4.4.1 and Theorem 4.4.2 that drop out monotonicity and
stability together characterise the µ rule on the class of sequencing situations with
linear cost functions.
Theorem 4.4.2 states that if the cost functions are regular, then there exists at
most one stable drop out monotonic rule, which must be the µ rule. However, not
for every class of regular cost functions the µ rule is drop out monotonic. It is
readily seen that for concave cost functions, drop out monotonicity of µ does not
hold. Hence, for such situations no stable drop out monotonic rule exists.
For convex cost functions, the next proposition establishes drop out monotonicity
of µ in case there are three players involved.
Proposition 4.4.3 µ is drop out monotonic on the class of 3-player sequencing
situations with convex cost functions.
Proof: Let (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN be such a situation. To avoid unnecessarily
complicated notation, we only show that µ3 ≥ µ−13 , where µ3 = µ3(N, p, k) and
µ−13 = µ3({2, 3}, (p2, p3), (k2, k3)). The other cases can be shown in a similar way.
Let σ̂ be an optimal order for N . Then, denoting by σ̂S the order on the players in
















= k1(C(σ̂, 1))− k1(C(σ̂{1,2}, 1)) + k2(C(σ̂, 2))− k2(C(σ̂{1,2}, 2)) +
k3(C(σ̂, 3))







where the second inequality follows from regularity and convexity of the cost func-
tions. ¤
A type of cost function that has been studied in the literature (cf. Moore (1968))
arises when the players face a due date. Suppose player i ∈ N must have his job
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completed before a certain due date di ≥ 0. If he manages to do this, waiting is
costless and if he is tardy, he has to pay a penalty of one unit. So,
ki(t) =
{
1 if t > di,
0 if t ≤ di. (4.5)
Finding an optimal order for these cost functions boils down to minimising the
number of tardy jobs. An efficient algorithm for this is provided by Moore (1968).
The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 4.4.4 The µ rule is drop out monotonic on the class of sequencing
situations with cost functions as in (4.5).
4.5 Sequencing with a single due date
In this section, we consider a mixture of the two main types of cost functions, linear
cost functions and step functions as in (4.5), that were analysed in the previous
section. One of the players, i∗ ∈ N , faces a due date, and the players in N\{i∗}
have linear cost functions. Player i∗ also has a linear cost parameter αi∗ , but if his
job is completed after a certain due date d, he also has to pay a fixed penalty γ > 0.
Note that the cost functions in this framework are regular, so we can apply
Theorem 4.4.2 to conclude that there is at most one stable and drop out monotonic
rule, which must be the µ rule. Contrary to the situation with only linear cost
functions, however, the µ rule may not be drop out monotonic, as is shown in the
next example.
Example 4.5.1 Consider the sequencing situation (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN with N =
{1, 2, 3}, processing times p1 = 1, p2 = 5 and p3 = 1 and cost functions k1(t) = 1000t,
k2(t) =
{
100 if t > 5,
0 if t ≤ 5,
and k3(t) = 10t. For the grand coalition, the optimal order is (1, 3, 2) with costs
1000+100+20=1120, while for coalition {1, 2}, the optimal order is (1, 2) with costs
1000+100=1100. So, according to the µ rule, player 3 should pay 20.
Now, consider the situation in which player 1 has dropped out of the queue. The
optimal order for coalition {2, 3} is then (2, 3) with costs 0+60=60 and the costs for
4.5. Sequencing with a single due date 45
coalition {2} equal 0. So, in this reduced situation, player 3 has to pay 60 according
to the µ rule, which is more than in the original situation. Hence, the µ rule is not
drop out monotonic. /
In the remainder of this section, we restrict ourselves to sequencing situations with
a single due date and equal processing times (which without loss of generality we
assume to be 1). It turns out that for this class of situations, drop out monotonicity
of the µ rule can be established.
A sequencing situation with a single due date is represented by a 5-tuple
(N, α, i∗, d, γ) with player set N = {1, . . . , n}, a vector of cost parameters α ∈ RN+ ,
player i∗ ∈ N facing the due date d ∈ N and penalty γ > 0. Such a situation is a
sequencing situation (N, p, k) ∈ SEQN with pi = 1 for all i ∈ N , ki(t) = αit for all
i ∈ N\{i∗} and
ki∗(t) =
{
αi∗t if t ≤ d,
αi∗t + γ if t > d.
Let (N, α, i∗, d, γ) be a sequencing situation with a single due date. With this
situation we associate two games, ĉ and c. The game ĉ is the formal sequencing
game defined by applying (4.4) to the actual cost functions (ki)i∈N . The game c is
the auxiliary sequencing game that arises if γ is set to 0, ie, the game corresponding
to the linear sequencing situation (N, p, α) ∈ LSEQN with pi = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Games arising from linear sequencing situations are concave, ie, the reverse in-
equalities hold in (3.1)-(3.3). The single due date game ĉ need not be concave, as is
shown in the following example.
Example 4.5.2 Consider (N, α, i∗, d, γ) with N = {1, 2, 3}, α = (10, 2, 5), i∗ = 2,
d = 1 and γ = 10. Then ĉ(N)− ĉ({1, 2}) = 37− 22 > 26− 14 = ĉ({2, 3})− ĉ({2}).
/
Let j ∈ N and let σj ∈ ΠPj be the unique urgency order on Pj (recall Pj =
{1, . . . , j}), where ties are broken by some fixed order on the players, starting with
i∗. Then the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 4.5.1 The optimal order on Pj is either σj or the order in which the
completion time of job i∗ is exactly the due date and all other jobs are ordered in
decreasing urgency.
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In order to prove drop out monotonicity of the µ rule, we need to introduce some
auxiliary lemmas and notation. By βj we denote the cost of making player i
∗ in







αi − (σj(i∗)− d)αi∗ if d < σj(i∗) and i∗ ≤ j,
0 if σj(i
∗) ≤ d or i∗ > j.
Note that βj ≥ 0. From Proposition 4.5.1 it follows that
ĉ(Pj) = c(Pj) + Aj,
where Aj = min{γ, βj} represents the extra costs as a result of the due date.
For q ∈ N\{j}, we denote by β−qj and A−qj the corresponding costs in the situation
where player q has dropped out of the queue (for q = i∗, we define β−i
∗
j = 0). Next,
we define µj = µj(N, p, α) = c(Pj)− c(Pj−1) and µ̂j = µj(N, p, k) = ĉ(Pj)− ĉ(Pj−1)
and µ−qj and µ̂
−q
j accordingly.
From Proposition 4.4.1 we have µ−qj ≤ µj. To show that the µ rule is drop out
monotonic on the class of sequencing situations with a single due date, we have to
show that µ̂−qj ≤ µ̂j for all j 6= q. If player i∗ drops out of the queue, then it is
readily seen that this inequality is satisfied, so in the remainder we assume that
q 6= i∗. Rewriting the inequality, we have to show that for all q ∈ N\{i∗, j},
Aj − Aj−1 − (A−qj − A−qj−1) ≥ −min{αj, αq}, (4.6)
where the right hand side equals µ−qj − µj by the proof of Proposition 4.4.1.
First of all, we establish (4.6) for some easy cases.
Lemma 4.5.2 If q > j or i∗ > j, then Aj − Aj−1 − (A−qj − A−qj−1) ≥ 0 ≥
−min{αj, αq}.
Proof: If q > j, then A−qj = Aj and A
−q
j−1 = Aj−1. If i
∗ > j , then Aj = Aj−1 =
A−qj = A
−q
j−1 = 0. From this the assertion follows. ¤








αi − (σj(i∗)− d)αi∗ if d < σj(i∗),
0 if σj(i
∗) ≤ d.



































βj−1 if d < σj(i∗) < σj(q),
β−qj







αi − αj − αq − (σj(i∗)− d− 2)αi∗ if d < σj(q) < σj(i
∗),













αi − (σj(i∗)− d− 2)αi∗
if σj(q) ≤ d,
σj(j) ≤ d,
d + 2 ≤ σj(i∗),
0
if σj(i




∗) = d + 1.
Lemma 4.5.3 If i∗ ≤ j and q < j, then βj ≥ β−qj .
Proof: Assume that i∗ ≤ j, q < j. Distinguish between the following four cases:
a) σj(i
∗) < σj(q). Then βj = β
−q
j .
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b) d < σj(q) < σj(i
∗). Then βj − β−qj = αq − αi∗ ≥ 0.
c) σj(q) ≤ d < σj(i∗). Then βj − β−qj = ασ−1j (d) − αi∗ ≥ 0.
d) σj(q) < σj(i
∗) ≤ d. Then βj = β−qj = 0.
¤
As an immediate corollary, we have Aj ≥ A−qj for i∗ ≤ j, q < j. The case j = i∗ is
considered in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.4 If q < j, then Ai∗ − Ai∗−1 − (A−qi∗ − A−qi∗−1) ≥ 0 ≥ −min{αj, αq}.
Proof: Obviously, Ai∗−1 = A
−q
i∗−1 = 0, so the assertion follows from Lemma 4.5.3.
¤
As a result of the previous lemma, we only consider the case i∗ < j in the remainder.
Lemma 4.5.5 If i∗ < j, q < j and αj ≥ αq, then β−qj ≥ βj−1.
Proof: Assume that i∗ < j, q < j and αj > αq, then σj(j) < σj(q). (The proof for
αj = αq is similar.) Distinguish between the following seven cases:
a) d < σj(i
∗) < σj(j) < σj(q). Then β
−q
j = βj−1 = 0.
b) d < σj(j) < σj(i
∗) < σj(q). Then β
−q
j − βj−1 = αj − αi∗ ≥ 0.
c) σj(j) ≤ d < σj(i∗) < σj(q). Then β−qj − βj−1 = ασ−1j (d) − αi∗ ≥ 0.
d) d < σj(j) < σj(q) < σj(i
∗). Then β−qj − βj−1 = αj − αq ≥ 0.
e) σj(j) ≤ d < σj(q) < σj(i∗). Then β−qj − βj−1 = ασ−1j (d) − αi∗ ≥ 0.
f) σj(j) < σj(q) ≤ d < σj(i∗). Then β−qj − βj−1 = 0.
g) σj(i
∗) ≤ d. Then β−qj = βj−1 = 0.
¤
Similarly, one can prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.5.6 If i∗ < j, q < j and αj ≤ αq, then βj−1 ≥ β−qj .
In Lemmas 4.5.7 and 4.5.8, we establish (4.6) for the cases not covered in Lem-
mas 4.5.2 and 4.5.4.
Lemma 4.5.7 If i∗ < j, q < j and αj ≥ αq, then Aj −Aj−1− (A−qj −A−qj−1) ≥ −αq.
Proof: Assume that i∗ < j, q < j and αj ≥ αq. It follows from Lemmas 4.5.3
and 4.5.5 that βj ≥ β−qj ≥ βj−1 ≥ β−qj−1. Define ` = Aj − Aj−1 − (A−qj − A−qj−1).
Distinguish between the following five cases:
a) γ ≤ β−qj−1. Then ` = 0.
b) β−qj−1 < γ ≤ βj−1. Then ` = β−qj−1 − γ.
c) βj−1 < γ ≤ β−qj . Then ` = −βj−1 + β−qj−1.
d) β−qj < γ ≤ βj. Then ` = γ − βj−1 − (β−qj − β−qj−1).
e) βj < γ. Then ` = βj − βj−1 − (β−qj − β−qj−1).
From these five cases it follows that ` ≥ −βj−1 + β−qj−1, so it suffices to show βj−1 −
β−qj−1 ≤ αq. Assume that αj > αq, then σj(j) < σj(q). (The proof for αj = αq is
similar.) Distinguish between the following six cases:
a) σj(i
∗) < σj(q). Then βj−1 = β
−q
j−1.
b) d < σj(j) < σj(q) < σj(i
∗). Then βj−1 − β−qj−1 = αq − αi∗ ≤ αq.
c) σj(j) ≤ d < σj(q) < σj(i∗). Then βj−1 − β−qj−1 = αq − αi∗ ≤ αq.
d) σj(q) ≤ d ≤ σj(i∗)− 2. Then βj−1 − β−qj−1 = ασ−1j (d+1) − αi∗ ≤ αq.
e) σj(q) ≤ d = σj(i∗)− 1. Then βj−1 = β−qj−1.
f) σj(i
∗) ≤ d. Then βj−1 = β−qj−1 = 0.
¤
Similarly, one can prove the following lemma, using Lemma 4.5.6.
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Lemma 4.5.8 If i∗ < j, q < j and αq ≥ αj, then Aj −Aj−1− (A−qj −A−qj−1) ≥ −αj.
From Lemmas 4.5.2, 4.5.4, 4.5.7 and 4.5.8 one readily concludes the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 4.5.9 µ is drop out monotonic on the class of sequencing situations with
a single due date.
Since the resulting sequencing games are σ0-component additive, the µ rule also
satisfies stability (cf. Curiel et al. (1995)). As a result, the µ rule is the unique




In cooperative game theory the central question is how to divide the value of the
grand coalition in a fair way, given the values of all subcoalitions. The value of a
coalition is interpreted as the (monetary) amount the members of that coalition can
obtain if they cooperate. Often, however, this hypothetical maximum is based on
some simplifying assumptions on the underlying problem. Eg, in linear production
situations (cf. Owen (1975)), it is assumed that all the players in a coalition are
physically able to pool their resources. But one can imagine that as a result of
transportation difficulties, cooperation between certain players is restricted.
Myerson (1977) models such a problem as a communication situation, which
consists of an underlying game (eg, linear production game) and an undirected
graph representing the players’ communication possibilities (eg, transport routes).
A communication situation gives rise to a graph-restricted game, in which the value
of a coalition of players reflects their underlying theoretical possibilities as well as
their ability to realise them. A recent overview of communication situations and
related models is provided by Slikker and Van den Nouweland (2001).
The literature on communication situations mainly focuses on the case in which
the underlying game is a transferable utility game, which then gives rise to a TU
graph-restricted game. In section 3, we indicate a disadvantage of modelling the
communication restrictions in this way. To address this, in this chapter, which
is based on Hendrickx (2002), we consider nontransferable utility communication
situations and compare the two approaches.
Myerson (1977) proposes the Shapley value of the graph-restricted game (later
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called the Myerson value) as solution concept for TU communication situations. We
use the MC value, which is an NTU generalisation of the Shapley value (cf. Otten
et al. (1998)), to extend the Myerson value to the class of NTU communication
situations.
Van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) and Slikker (2000) study the inheritance
of properties in TU communication situations, ie, given a certain property of TU
games, they provide necessary and sufficient conditions which a graph must satisfy
such that for every game satisfying that property, the graph-restricted game satisfies
the same property. We extend their analysis to NTU communication situations and
relate the TU and NTU models.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we introduce some notation
and basic definitions. In section 3, we define graph-restricted games, discuss the
models of TU and NTU communication situations and extend the Myerson value.
Finally, in section 4, inheritance of properties is analysed.
5.2 Notation and definitions
For a finite set S, the comprehensive convex hull of a set A ⊂ RS is defined by





where ∆t = {λ ∈ Rt+ |
∑t
i=1 λi = 1}.
For x ∈ R we define





Z̄S,x = {y ∈ RS |
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ x, ∀i∈S : yi ≤ x}.
Using this notation, a TU game v ∈ TUN gives rise to an NTU game V ∈ NTUN
by defining
V (S) = ZS,v(S) (5.1)
for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
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A communication network is an undirected graph (N, E), where the vertices N =
{1, . . . , n} represent the players and the edges E ⊂ {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} represent
the (bilateral) communication links between the players.
Let (N,E) be a communication network. For all S ⊂ N we define
E(S) = {{i, j} ∈ E | i, j ∈ S},
the set of links between members of S.
A path in (N,E) is a sequence of players (x1, . . . , xt) such that {xi, xi+1} ∈ E
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}. A cycle is a path (x1, . . . , xt) where t ≥ 4, xt = x1 and
x1, . . . , xt−1 are all distinct points. Two players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j are connected if there
exists a path (x1, . . . , xt) with x1 = i and xt = j.
A network (N, E) is called
• empty if E = ∅;
• complete if E = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j};
• connected if each pair i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is connected;
• cycle-free if it does not contain a cycle;
• cycle-complete if for every cycle (x1, . . . , xt), {xi, xj} ∈ E for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . , t}, i 6= j;
• a star if there exists an i ∈ N such that E = {{i, j} | j ∈ N\{i}}.
For S ⊂ N we denote the components of S with respect to (N, E) by S/E, ie,
S/E = {S1, . . . , Sm} such that
• (Si, E(Si)) is connected for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m};
• Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i 6= j;
• (Si ∪ Sj, E(Si ∪ Sj)) is not connected for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, i 6= j;
• Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Player i ∈ N is called a dummy player in the game V ∈ NTUN if
V (S ∪ {i}) = V (S)× V ({i})
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for all S ⊂ N\{i}, S 6= ∅.
To avoid confusion, we denote the set of weak Pareto optimal allocations for a
coalition S in a game V ∈ NTUN by WPar(V, S) rather than WPar(S) throughout
this chapter. Similarly, we write IR(V, S) instead of IR(S).
To round off this section, a TU communication situation is a triple (N, v, E),
where v ∈ TUN is an underlying TU game and (N,E) is a communication network
with the same player set. Similarly, an NTU communication situation is a triple
(N, V, E) with V ∈ NTUN . The classes of TU communication situatons and NTU
communication situations with player set N are denoted by TUCN and NTUCN ,
respectively.
5.3 Graph-restricted games
In this section, we define graph-restricted games, starting with TU games. We point
out why TU graph-restricted games might not be a satisfactory way of modelling
the role of the communication restrictions. To address this, we define NTU graph-
restricted games and compare the two models.
Let (N, v, E) ∈ TUCN . The game v ∈ TUN represents the underlying possibili-
ties of the players. However, these possibilities cannot come all to fruition because
of the communication restrictions represented by the network (N, E). The graph-
restricted game vE ∈ TUN (cf. Myerson (1977)) takes these restrictions into account





for all S ⊂ N .
The resulting graph-restricted game is again a TU game and hence, side payments
between the players through binding contracts are assumed to be possible, even
between players that cannot communicate. When solving the subsequent graph-
restricted game, this possibility should be carefully taken into account, eg, by only
considering component decomposable solution concepts. A solution f is component
decomposable (cf. Myerson (1977)) if applying f to a communication situation and
applying f to all its components separately leads to the same outcome for each
player.
Another way to address this element of the model is to exclude side payments
between noncommunicating players a priori and consider NTU games. So, let
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(N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN . The graph-restricted game V E ∈ NTUN (cf. Slikker and





for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. Note that the graph-restricted game V E is again an element
of NTUN , satisfying all the basic assumptions as stated in section 2.3.
In particular, NTU graph-restricted games can be constructed for NTU games
that arise from TU games (as in (5.1)). So, a TU communication situation
(N, v, E) ∈ TUCN gives rise to two graph-restricted games: vE and V E.1 But
whereas side payments between players that cannot communicate are still possible
in vE, they are ruled out in V E. In the remainder of this section, we study the
relation between these two graph-restricted games.
The difference between the two games is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.3.1 Consider the communication situation (N, v, E) ∈ TUCN with
N = {1, 2, 3}, v(S) = 1 for all S ⊂ N, |S| ≥ 2 and E = {{1, 2}}, so players 1 and 2
can communicate, while player 3 cannot communicate with either of them.
In the TU graph-restricted game vE, the value of the grand coalition equals
vE(N) = v({1, 2}) + v({3}) = 1 + 0 = 1,
while in the NTU graph-restricted game V E,
V E(N) = V ({1, 2})× V ({3}) = {x ∈ RN | x1 + x2 ≤ 1, x3 ≤ 0}.
So, whereas in the TU graph-restricted game (0, 0, 1) is a feasible (though unattrac-
tive) payoff vector, in the NTU graph-restricted game a positive payoff to player 3
is ruled out ex ante. /
Although the two graph-restricted games need not be the same, they have the same
core, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3.1 Let (N, v, E) ∈ TUCN . Then C(vE) = C(V E).
1By V E we denote the game that is obtained from v by first taking the corresponding game V
(as in (5.1)) and then applying (5.3). Reversing the order, ie, first applying (5.2) and then taking
the corresponding NTU game would result in a different graph-restricted game, which does not
essentially differ from the TU restricted game vE .
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Proof: “⊂” Let x ∈ C(vE). Because ∑i∈N xi = vE(N) and vE(N) =∑









vE(C) = v(C) for all C ∈ N/E, so ∑i∈C xi = v(C) for all C ∈ N/E. From this it






i∈S xi ≥ vE(S) =
∑
C∈S/E v(C), there can
exist no y ∈ V E(S) such that y > xS. Hence, x ∈ C(V E).
“⊃” Let x ∈ C(V E). For all C ∈ N/E, @y∈V E(C) : y > xC implies
∑
i∈C xi =








C∈N/E v(C) = v
E(N).
Next, let S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. Then for all C ∈ S/E, @y∈V E(C) : y > xC implies∑








C∈S/E v(C) = v
E(S).
Hence, x ∈ C(vE). ¤
Not only do the cores of the two graph-restricted games coincide, but also the Shap-
ley/MC solutions. To show this, we first prove equality between the corresponding
marginal vectors.
Lemma 5.3.2 Let (N, v,E) ∈ TUCN and let σ ∈ Π(N). Then mσ(vE) = Mσ(V E).
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N . Define
Si = {1, . . . , i} for all i ∈ N . First, Mσ1 (V E) = 0 = mσ1 (vE). Next, let k ∈ N\{n}
and assume that Mσj (V
E) = mσj (v
E) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let Tk ⊂ Sk be such
that Tk ∪ {k + 1} ∈ Sk+1/E and define T̄k = Tk ∪ {k + 1}. Then,
Mσk+1(V
E) = max{x | (MσSk , x) ∈ V E(Sk+1)}



















The Shapley value of the TU graph-restricted game is called the Myerson value of
the communication situation (cf. Myerson (1977)). This value µ : TUCN → RN is
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defined as
µ(N, v,E) = Φ(vE).
Theorem 5.3.3 Let (N, v, E) ∈ TUCN . Then µ(N, v,E) = MC(V E).









where βV = max{β ∈ R+ | β
∑
σ∈Π(N) M
σ(V ) ∈ ZN,vE(N)}. By construction,∑




C,v(C). Then, from the definition of MC(V E) and V E(N) ⊂
ZN,v
E(N), the assertion follows. ¤
5.4 Inheritance of properties
In this section we study the inheritance of properties in NTU communication sit-
uations. Ie, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that a network (N, E)
must satisfy so that for every game V ∈ NTUN that satisfies a certain property, the
graph-restricted game V E satisfies the same property. Most of our results are based
on their TU counterparts in Van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) and Slikker (2000)
and in many proofs, counterexamples with NTU games arising from TU games are
used. It turns out that the necessary and sufficient conditions on the network are
the same for TU and NTU games for many properties, with the notable exception
of (individual merge) convexity.
First of all, we characterise when balancedness is inherited.
Theorem 5.4.1 Let (N, E) be a communication network. Then the following two
statements are equivalent.
(i) (N, E) is connected or empty.
(ii) For all balanced V ∈ NTUN , V E is balanced.
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Proof: “(i)⇒(ii)” Assume that (i) holds. If (N,E) is empty, then for all V ∈
NTUN , V E(S) = Z̄S,0 for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and hence, V E is balanced. So, assume
that (N, E) is connected and let V ∈ NTUN be balanced. Let x ∈ C(V ). Because
(N,E) is connected, x ∈ V E(N) = V (N). Let S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. Because x ∈ C(V ),
there does not exist a y ∈ V (C) such that y > xC for any C ∈ S/E. But since
V E(S) =
∏
C∈S/E V (C), there does not exist a y ∈ V E(S) such that y > xS. Hence,
x ∈ C(V E) and V E is balanced.
“(ii)⇒(i)” Assume that (ii) holds. If |N | ≤ 2, the statement is trivial, so assume
that |N | ≥ 3 and suppose (N, E) is not connected. Take V (S) = ZS,−1 for all S ⊂
N, 1 < |S| < |N | and V (N) = ZN,0. Then V is balanced, since (0, . . . , 0) ∈ C(V ).
By assumption, V E is balanced as well, so let y ∈ C(V E). Then yi ≥ V E({i}) = 0




i∈C yi. Since for each component
C ∈ N/E it holds that ∑i∈C yi is at most either 0 or -1, it follows from y ≥ 0
that N/E can only contain components C with
∑
i∈C yi = 0. Since (N, E) is not
connected, it must be empty. ¤
Contrary to balancedness, total balancedness is always inherited, as is shown in the
following proposition. We denote the subgame of a restricted game V E with respect
to coalition S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ by V E,S.
Proposition 5.4.2 Let (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN . If V is totally balanced, then V E is
totally balanced.
Proof: Assume that V is totally balanced. Let T ⊂ N, T 6= ∅. Then there exists
an xC ∈ C(V C) for all C ∈ T/E. Define x ∈ RT by xC = xC for all C ∈ T/E. It
suffices to show that x ∈ C(V E,T ).
Since xC ∈ V C(C) = V E,T (C) for all C ∈ T/E, we have x ∈ V E,T (T ). Next, let
S ⊂ T, S 6= ∅. Suppose there exists a y ∈ V E,T (S) such that y > xS. Let D ∈ S/E
and let C ∈ T/E be such that D ⊂ C. Then yD > xD and yD ∈ V E,T (D) = V C(D)
contradict xC ∈ C(V C). Hence, there exists no y ∈ V E,T (S) such that y > xS and
so, V E is totally balanced. ¤
Superadditivity is also inherited for every communication network.
Proposition 5.4.3 Let (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN . If V is superadditive, then V E is
superadditive.
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Proof: Assume that V is superadditive. Let S, T ⊂ N,S ∩ T = ∅, S, T 6= ∅. Note
that (S/E) ∪ (T/E) is a finer partition of S ∪ T than (S ∪ T )/E. Now,









V (C) = V E(S ∪ T ),
where the inclusion follows from combining the components of (S/E) ∪ (T/E) and
using superadditivity of V . ¤
In a similar way, one can prove that individual superadditivity is always inherited.
Lemma 5.4.4 Let (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN . If V is individually superadditive, then
V E is individually superadditive.
Van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) show that TU convexity is inherited for all
cycle-complete graphs. The following lemma shows that cycle-completeness is also
necessary for individual merge convexity in NTU games (see section 3.2).
Lemma 5.4.5 Let (N, E) be a network which is not cycle-complete. Then there
exists an individual merge convex game V ∈ NTUN such that V E is not individual
merge convex.
Proof: Van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) show that there exists a convex game
v ∈ TUN such that vE is not convex. Let v ∈ TUN be such a game and let V be
the corresponding NTU game. Then V is individual merge convex. Because a TU
game is convex if and only if all its marginal vectors belong to the core, there exists
a σ ∈ Π(N) such that mσ(vE) /∈ C(vE). But then, because of Proposition 5.3.1 and
Lemma 5.3.2, Mσ(V E) /∈ C(V E). Hence, V E is not marginal convex and therefore
not individual merge convex. ¤
However, cycle-completeness is not sufficient for inheritance of individual merge
convexity, as is shown in the following example.
Example 5.4.1 Consider (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN with N = {1, 2, 3, 4},
V (S) = Z̄S,1 if S ∈ {{1, 3}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}},
V ({1, 2, 3}) = cc({(1, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 1)}),
V ({1, 3, 4}) = Z̄{1,3,4},2,
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V (N) = cc(Z̄N,2 ∪ {(0, 2, 0, 1)}),
V (S) = Z̄S,0 for other S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅
and E = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}.
This game is individual merge convex. The graph-restricted game V E is given
by
V E(S) = Z̄S,1 if S ∈ {{3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}},
V E({1, 2, 3}) = cc({(1, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 1)}),
V E({1, 3, 4}) = cc({(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}),
V E(N) = cc(Z̄N,2 ∪ {(0, 2, 0, 1)}),
V E(S) = Z̄S,0 for other S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
The graph-restricted game is not individual merge convex: take k = 2, S = {1, 3}
and T = {1, 3, 4}, and take p = (0, 0) ∈ WPar(V E, S) ∩ IR(V E, S), q = (0, 1, 0) ∈
V E(T ) and r = (0, 2, 0) ∈ V E(S∪{k}). Then there does not exist an s ∈ V E(T∪{k})
such that s2 ≥ 2 and s3 ≥ 1. Hence, V E is not individual merge convex.
For later purposes, note that if we take E ′ = E ∪ {{2, 4}}, we get the same
graph-restricted game V E
′
= V E and hence, V E
′
is not individual merge convex. /
It turns out that for NTU games, individual merge convexity is inherited for graphs
whose components are either complete or a star.
Theorem 5.4.6 Let (N,E) be a communication network. Then the following two
statements are equivalent.
(i) For all C ∈ N/E, (C, E(C)) is complete or a star.
(ii) For all individual merge convex V ∈ NTUN , V E is individual merge convex.
Proof: “(i)⇒(ii)” Assume that (i) holds. Let V ∈ NTUN be an individual merge
convex game. Then it follows from Lemma 5.4.4 that V E is individually superad-
ditive. For the individual merge property, let k ∈ N , S $ T ⊂ N\{k}, S 6= ∅,
and let p ∈ WPar(V E, S) ∩ IR(V E, S), q ∈ V E(T ) and r ∈ V E(S ∪ {k}) be such
that rS ≥ p. Let Ck ∈ N/E be such that k ∈ Ck and denote Sk = S ∩ Ck and
T k = T ∩ Ck. Then it suffices to show that (qT k , rk) ∈ V E(T k ∪ {k}).
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First, suppose Ck is complete. Then Sk ∈ S/E, T k ∈ T/E and Sk ∪ {k} ∈ (S ∪
{k})/E, so pSk ∈ WPar(V, Sk)∩IR(V, Sk), qT k ∈ V (T k) and rSk∪{k} ∈ V (Sk∪{k}).
Since V is individual merge convex, (qT k , rk) ∈ V (T k ∪ {k}) = V E(T k ∪ {k}).
Second, suppose that Ck is a star. If k is at the centre of this star, then (Sk, E(Sk))
and (T k, E(T k)) are empty and (qT k , rk) ∈ V E(T ∪{k}) by individual superadditiv-
ity. If k is not at the centre, but a member of Sk is, then the same argument as in
the case where Ck is complete can be used. If neither k nor a member of Sk is at
the centre, then rk = 0 and (qT k , rk) ∈ V E(T ∪ {k}) by individual superadditivity.
“(ii)⇒(i)” Assume that (ii) holds. It follows from Lemma 5.4.5 that (N, E) is cycle-
complete. Suppose there exists a component C ∈ N/E which is not complete or a
star. If (C, E(C)) does not contain a cycle, then there exist four players in C, with-
out loss of generality M = {1, . . . , 4} ⊂ C, such that E(M) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}.
Otherwise, it follows from Lemma 4.2 in Slikker (2000) that there exists, without loss
of generality, M = {1, . . . , 4} ⊂ C, such that E(M) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {2, 4}}.
Take V ∈ NTUN such that the subgame (M, V M) equals the game in Example 5.4.1
and the players in N\M are dummy players. This game is individual merge con-
vex, but the graph-restricted game V E is not. This contradicts (ii), so every every
component must be complete or a star. ¤
Although cycle-completeness is not sufficient to ensure inheritance of individual
merge convexity for arbitrary NTU games, it is sufficient for NTU games arising
from TU games.
Proposition 5.4.7 Let (N, E) be a communication network. Then the following
two statements are equivalent.
(i) (N, E) is cycle-complete.
(ii) For every convex game v ∈ TUN , V E is individual merge convex.
Proof: “(i)⇒(ii)” Assume that (i) holds. Let v ∈ TUN be a convex game. Then
the corresponding NTU game V is individually superadditive and by Lemma 5.4.4,
V E is individually superadditive as well.
For the individual merge property, let k ∈ N , S $ T ⊂ N\{k}, S 6= ∅ and let p ∈
WPar(V E, S)∩IR(V E, S), q ∈ V E(T ), r ∈ V E(S∪{k}) be such that rS ≥ p. Define
C = {C ∈ S/E | ∃i∈C : {i, k} ∈ E}, C ′ = (S/E)\C, D = {D ∈ T/E | ∃i∈D : {i, k} ∈
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E} and D′ = (T/E)\D. Because p ∈ WPar(V E, S), we have that ∑i∈C pi = v(C)
for all C ∈ S/E. Also, ∑i∈D qi ≤ v(D) for all D ∈ T/E, rk +
∑
i∈SC∈C C ri ≤
v({k} ∪⋃C∈C C) and
∑
i∈C ri ≤ v(C) for all C ∈ C ′. From the proof of Theorem 1






















































where in the last step we use rS ≥ p. Then, because








we have that (q, rk) ∈ V E(T ∪ {k}) and hence, V E is individual merge convex.
“(ii)⇒(i)” Follows from the proof of Lemma 5.4.5. ¤
As is the case for TU games, existence of a population monotonic allocation scheme,
or pmas (see section 4.2), is always inherited for NTU games, as is shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.4.8 Let (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN . If V has a pmas, then V E has a
pmas.
Proof: Assume that V has a pmas (yS)S⊂N,S 6=∅. For i ∈ S, denote by Ci(S) the
component in S/E to which i belongs. Define xSi = y
Ci(S)
i for all S ⊂ N, i ∈ S.
Because yC ∈ WPar(V, C) for all C ∈ S/E, we have that xS ∈ WPar(V E, S).
Furthermore, for all i ∈ S ⊂ T ⊂ N ,
xSi = y
Ci(S)
i ≤ yCi(T )i = xTi ,
because Ci(S) ⊂ Ci(T ) and (yS)S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas. Hence, (xS)S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas
for the game V E. ¤
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Now we turn our attention to the MC value (see section 3.6.1). One interesting
question is whether the MC value is an element of the core. The following proposition
shows the relationship between an NTU game and its graph-restricted game in terms
of this question.
Proposition 5.4.9 Let (N, E) be a communication network. Then the following
two statements are equivalent.
(i) (N, E) is complete or empty.
(ii) For every V ∈ NTUN with MC(V ) ∈ C(V ), MC(V E) ∈ C(V E).
Proof: “(i)⇒(ii)” Trivial.
“(ii)⇒(i)” Assume that (ii) holds. Suppose (N, E) is not complete or empty. Then,
along the lines of Theorem 4.1 in Slikker (2000), for the game V described in the
proof of Theorem 5.4.1, we have that MC(V ) ∈ C(V ), but MC(V E) /∈ C(V E).
This contradicts (ii), so (i) must hold. ¤
Another interesting question is whether the MC allocation scheme (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅
is a pmas for the NTU game V . To characterise when this property is inherited, we
need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.10 Let V ∈ NTUN and let i ∈ N be a dummy player. Then
MCi(V ) = 0 and MCN\{i}(V ) = MC(V N\{i}).





i (V ) = 0. Furthermore, M
σ
j (V ) = M
σ|N\{i}
j (V
N\{i}) for all j ∈
N\{i}, σ ∈ Π(N) and V (N\{i}) = V N\{i}(N\{i}), so MCN\{i}(V ) = MC(V N\{i}).
¤
For TU games, the property that the Shapley allocation scheme is a pmas is inherited
for graphs whose components are all complete. This is also necessary for NTU games,
as is illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.4.2 Consider (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN with N = {1, 2, 3}, E =
{{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, V (S) = ZS,2 for S ⊂ N, |S| = 2 and V (N) = ZN,3. It is read-
ily checked that the MC allocation scheme (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V .
However, in the graph-restricted game V E,
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MC1(V






However, completeness of every component is not sufficient, as is shown in the
following example.
Example 5.4.3 Consider (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN with N = {1, . . . , 4}, E =
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and
V ({1, 2}) = Z{1,2},1,
V ({3, 4}) = {x ∈ R{3,4} |x3 ≤ 1, x4 ≤ 1},
V (S ∪ {i}) = V (S)× V ({i}) for S ∈ {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, i ∈ N\S,
V (N) = ZN,4,
V (S) = Z̄S,0 for other S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
It is readily checked that (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for (N, V ). However, in the
graph-restricted game (N, V E),
MC3(V





where αV E,{3,4} = 1 and αV E =
1
24
. Note that the MC value is not component
decomposable: in the grand coalition, players 3 and 4 suffer from the presence of
players 1 and 2 in the sense that the maximum α is restricted by coalition {1, 2}.
Moreover, because the MC allocation scheme is a pmas, MC(V S) ∈ C(V S) for
all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. However, the MC value of the graph-restricted game is not even
a core element:












) /∈ C(V E).
/
Proposition 5.4.11 Let (N,E) be a communication network. Then the following
two statements are equivalent.
(i) If C ∈ N/E, |C| > 1, then (C, E(C)) is complete and |D| = 1 for all D ∈
N/E, D 6= C.
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(ii) For all V ∈ NTUN such that (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V ,
(MC(V E,S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V E.
Proof: “(i)⇒(ii)” Assume that (i) holds. If |C| = 1 for all C ∈ N/E, then (ii)
holds trivially. So, let C ∈ N/E, |C| > 1, and let V ∈ NTUN be such that the MC
allocation scheme is a pmas. By Lemma 5.4.10, MCi(V
E,S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N, i ∈
S\C and MCC(V E) = MC(V E,C). Because C is complete, MC(V E,S) = MC(V S)
for all S ⊂ C, S 6= ∅. So, since (MC(V S))S⊂C,S 6=∅ is a pmas for (C, V C), it is also a
pmas for (C, V E,C) and (ii) holds.
“(ii)⇒(i)” Assume that (ii) holds. Suppose that there is a component C ∈ N/E
such that (C, E(C)) is not complete. Then there exists, without loss of generality,
M = {1, 2, 3} ⊂ C such that E(M) = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. Take V ∈ NTUN such
that (M, V M) is the game in Example 5.4.2 and the players in N\M are dummy
players. Then, as a result of Lemma 5.4.10, (MC(V E,S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is not a pmas for
V E, although (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for V . Contradiction, so there is no
incomplete component.
Next, suppose there exist two complete components with more than one player.
Then, without loss of generality, there exists M = {1, . . . , 4} ⊂ N such that E(M) =
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. Take V ∈ NTUN such that (M,V M) is the game in Example 5.4.3
and the players in N\M are dummy players. Then (MC(V S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is a pmas for
V , but (MC(V E,S))S⊂N,S 6=∅ is not a pmas for V E. This contradicts (ii), so (i) must
hold. ¤
Finally, we consider the MC values of all subgames. Slikker (2000) shows that
for TU games, the property that the Shapley value of each subgame lies in its
corresponding core is inherited for graphs with complete or star components. In the
following example, we show that for NTU games, completeness of each component
is necessary.
Example 5.4.4 Consider (N, V, E) ∈ NTUCN with N = {1, 2, 3}, E =
{{1, 2}, {2, 3}} and
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R{1,2} |x1 ≤ 1, x2 ≤ 2},
V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R{1,3} |x1 ≤ 2, x3 ≤ 0},
V ({2, 3}) = Z{2,3},1,
V (N) = ZN,3.
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It is readily checked that MC(V S) ∈ C(V S) for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. However, in the
graph-restricted game V E,










which is not a core element because of coalition {1, 2}. /
Furthermore, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.12 Let (N, V,E) ∈ NTUCN and let i ∈ N be a dummy player. Then
C(V ) = {(x, 0) ∈ RN |x ∈ C(V N\{i})}.
Using this, we can state our final result of this chapter.
Proposition 5.4.13 Let (N,E) be a communication network. Then the following
two statements are equivalent.
(i) If C ∈ N/E, |C| > 1, then (C, E(C)) is complete and |D| = 1 for all D ∈
N/E, D 6= C.
(ii) For all V ∈ NTUN such that MC(V S) ∈ C(V S) for all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅,
MC(V E,S) ∈ C(V E,S) for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
Proof: “(i)⇒(ii)” Follows immediately from Lemmas 5.4.10 and 5.4.12.
“(ii)⇒(i)” Assume that (ii) holds. Suppose that there exists a C ∈ N/E which is
not complete. Then the game in Example 5.4.4 can be used to contradict (ii). If
there is more than one component with more than one player, Example 5.4.3 can
be used. Hence, (i) must hold. ¤
To round of this chapter, we summarise our inheritance results in the following table,
together with the corresponding results for TU games from Van den Nouweland and
Borm (1991) and Slikker (2000).
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Property TU inheritance condition NTU inheritance condition
Balancedness connected or empty connected or empty
Total balancedness no condition no condition
Superadditivity no condition no condition
Individual merge con-
vexity
cycle-complete every component complete
or star
Existence of pmas no condition no condition

















In standard noncooperative game theory it is assumed that players cannot make
binding agreements. That is, each cooperative outcome must be sustained by Nash
equilibrium strategies. At the other end of the spectrum, in cooperative game theory,
players have no choice but to cooperate. The standard transferable utility (TU)
model assumes that all players involved want to come to an agreement and the
main task is to propose socially acceptable solutions. Noncooperative theory tries
to predict the outcome of strategic situations using equilibrium concepts that at
least require the predicted strategy combinations to be robust against unilateral
deviations.
Both approaches seem to be diametrically opposed. Many real life situations,
however, exhibit both cooperative and strategic features. Neither approach suffices
in these cases. Examples of these situations can be found in parliaments where
governments are based on multiple-party coalitions. Here noncooperative theory
obviously does not work, since agreements have to be made. Also TU theory is not
sufficiently rich, since typically not all parties represented in parliament are part of
the government. Furthermore, TU theory does not take into account the spillover
effects from coalitions on the parties outside. These spillovers measure the impact
of government policy on the opposition parties and thus reflect in some way the
parties’ relative positions in the political spectrum.
This kind of spillovers is present in many situations. For example, one can think
of a situation where a group of people needs to be connected to a source, like in
a telecommunication network. In the literature, many solution concepts have been
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introduced (cf. Bird (1976) and Feltkamp (1995)), but these do not take into account
the strategic considerations of players not to join the public enterprise. However,
spillovers occur if one assumes that publicly accessible networks can be built by
smaller groups, hence creating a special type of free-rider effect. In order to find a
fair solution, these possible spillovers should be taken into account.
From these examples one can conclude that in many cooperative situations, a
socially acceptable solution concept should incorporate the strategic options that
result from spillovers. Essentially, spillovers induce a noncooperative aspect in co-
operative situations. They provide incentives for players to join or to stay out of a
coalition. In TU games, these spillovers are not taken into account, but one implic-
itly assumes that players do not have a better alternative than to stay in the group.
As mentioned before, in the government example, this is typically not the case.
To capture spillovers in a cooperative model, this chapter, which is based on
Thijssen et al. (2002), introduces a new class of games, namely spillover games.
This class of games builds on ideas introduced in Van der Rijt (2000) for government
situations. In a spillover game, each coalition is assigned a value, as in a TU game.
In addition, all the players outside the coalition are separately assigned a value as
well, capturing the spillovers from the coalition to the outside players. We restrict
ourselves to a coalitional structure where there is one coalition (eg, a government or
a group building a public network) and a group of singletons outside. This allows
us to redefine some basic concepts of TU theory, while not assuming ex ante that
all players are fully cooperating.
The model of spillover games is explicitly aimed at analysing the influence of a
coalition S on the payoffs of the players outside S. In this sense, spillover games
differ fundamentally from games in partition function form (cf. Bloch (1996) and Yi
(1997)), where for each coalition S the influence of the possible coalition structures
on the player set outside S on the payoff to coalition S is analysed. Hence, the
causality of spillovers in spillover games is reversed compared to partition function
form games.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2 the class of spillover
games is introduced. In section 3 we extend various TU notions (eg, core, nucle-
olus, convexity) to this new class of games and generalise some basic results. In
section 4 we use a government formation example to introduce marginal vectors and
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a Shapley value. Section 5 takes a closer look at public-private connection prob-
lems and discusses some other classes of OR games where our spillover model seems
appropriate.
6.2 The model
A spillover game is a tuple G = (N,W , v, z), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of
players, W ⊂ 2N is a set of coalitions that can cooperate and v and z are payoff
functions, to be specified below.
One main feature of our model is the assumption that exactly one coalition of
players will cooperate. Contrary to TU games, however, we do not impose that the
resulting coalition is the grand coalition. In the example of government formation,
the grand coalition would be a very extreme outcome.
The set W ⊂ 2N contains those coalitions of players who can actually cooperate.
An element of W is called a winning coalition. In a government situation, a natural
choice for W is the collection of coalitions that have a majority in parliament.
We assume that W satisfies the following properties:
• N ∈ W .
• S ⊂ T, S ∈ W ⇒ T ∈ W (monotonicity).
The first property ensures that the game is not trivial, in the sense that there is
at least one winning coalition. The second property states that if a small group of
players S can cooperate (eg, have a majority), then a larger coalition T ⊃ S is also
winning.
The (nonnegative) payoff function v : 2N → R+ assigns to every coalition S ⊂ N
a value v(S). If S ∈ W , then v(S) represents the total payoff to the members of S
in case they cooperate. For S /∈ W we simply impose v(S) = 0.
Suppose that the players in S cooperate. Then the members of S do not only
generate a payoff to themselves. Their cooperation also affects the players outside
S. The payoffs to the other players, which are called spillovers (with respect to S),
are given by the vector zS ∈ RN\S+ . Again, we simply put zS = 0 for S /∈ W . Note
that whereas the members of S still have the freedom to divide the amount v(S)
among themselves, the payoffs to the players outside S are individually fixed.
Spillovers (with respect to S) are called positive if the total payoff to every coali-
tion U ⊂ N\S is higher than what U can earn on its own, so if
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∑
i∈U
zSi ≥ v(U) (6.1)
for every U ⊂ N\S. Likewise, spillovers are negative if for every U ⊂ N\S the
reverse inequality holds in (6.1). Note that if for different coalitions U not the same
inequality holds, spillovers are neither positive nor negative.
A set of winning coalitions W ⊂ 2N is called N-proper (cf. Feltkamp (1995)) if
S ∈ W implies N\S /∈ W . In the context of coalition formation in politics, this
property relates to the fact that a coalition and its complement can not have a ma-
jority at the same time.
6.3 Some basic results
In this section, we define and analyse some rules for and properties of spillover
games. These notions are based on their well-known analogues for TU games.
A payoff vector x ∈ RN is individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . The
S-imputation set of a spillover game G = (N,W , v, z) for S ∈ W , IS(G), consists
of those individually rational payoff vectors in RN+ which allocate v(S) among the
members of S, while giving the members of N\S their spillovers, ie,
IS(G) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈S
xi = v(S), xN\S = z
S,∀i∈N : xi ≥ v({i})}.





It follows from individual rationality that every imputation vector is nonnegative.
A payoff vector in the S-imputation set belongs to the S-core if for every coalition,
the total payoff to the members of that coalition exceeds its value. So, for S ∈ W
we define the S-core by
CS(G) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈S




xi ≥ v(T )},
or equivalently,
CS(G) = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
i∈S




xi ≥ v(T )}.
6.3. Some basic results 73
An element of the S-core is stable in the sense that there is no other winning coalition
T that objects to the proposed allocation on the basis of it being able to obtain more
if it forms. The core of G consists of all Pareto efficient payoff vectors in the union





where Par(A) = {x ∈ A | ¬∃y∈A : y 	 x}. It follows immediately from the defini-
tions that CS(G) ⊂ IS(G) for all S ∈ W and C(G) ⊂ I(G).
Example 6.3.1 Consider the spillover game G = (N,W , v, z) with N = {1, 2, 3},
W = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, N} and the following payoffs:
S {1} {1, 2} {1, 3} N
v(S) 1 5 2 6
zS (1, 1) 3 5
Then
C{1}(G) = ∅,
C{1,2}(G) = Conv({(1, 4, 3), (5, 0, 3)}),
C{1,3}(G) = Conv({(1, 5, 1), (2, 5, 0)}),
CN(G) = Conv({(6, 0, 0), (5, 0, 1), (1, 4, 1), (2, 4, 0)}),




convex hull of A ⊂ RN .
Because the sum of the value and the spillovers is highest for {1, 2}, the core
elements corresponding to this coalition cannot be dominated, so C{1,2}(G) ⊂ C(G).
Also, we have C{1,3}(G) ⊂ C(G), since the payoff to player 2 is strictly higher than
in the core elements corresponding to the other winning coalitions. The N -core,
however, does not fully belong to the core of the game. Eg, (1, 4, 1) is dominated
by (1, 4, 3) ∈ C{1,2}(G) and (2, 4, 0) by (2, 5, 0) ∈ C{1,3}(G). The core of this game is
as follows:
C(G) = Conv({(1, 4, 3), (5, 0, 3)}) ∪ Conv({(1, 5, 1), (2, 5, 0)}) ∪
Conv({(6, 0, 0), (5, 0, 1), (1, 4, 1), (2, 4, 0)})\
(
Conv({(1, 4, 1),
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For TU games, Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) characterised nonemptiness of
the core by means of the concept of balancedness. We establish a similar result for
the class of W-stable spillover games. A game G = (N,W , v, z) is called W-stable if








The idea behindW-stability is that there can exist no two disjoint winning coalitions
with positive mutual spillovers. For, if two such coalitions are present, the game
would have no stable outcome in the sense that both these coalitions would want
to form. Note that positive spillover games and spillover games with N -proper W
belong to the class of W-stable games.
A mapping λ : W → R+ is called S-subbalanced if
∑
T∈W
λ(T )eTS ≤ eSS.
We denote the set of all S-subbalanced mappings by BS. A game G = (N,W , v, z)











Suppose a winning coalition S forms, giving its members a total payoff of v(S). Next,
consider a winning coalition T and consider the situation where T forms. The payoff
to T would then be v(T ), but some of its members would have to forego the spillovers
resulting from the formation of S. So, after subtracting these opportunity costs, the
net payoff to T equals the expression inside the brackets. A game is S-subbalanced
if dividing the net payoffs of all winning coalitions T in an S-subbalanced way yields
a lower payoff than v(S).
Theorem 6.3.1 Let G = (N,W , v, z) be a W-stable spillover game. Then C(G) 6= ∅
if and only if there exists an S ∈ W such that G is S-subbalanced.
Proof: Let S ∈ W . Then
CS(G) 6= ∅
⇔ {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
i∈S




xi ≥ v(T )} 6= ∅
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xi | ∀T∈W :
∑
i∈T
xi ≥ v(T ),∀i∈S : xi ≥ 0, xN\S = zS}






























λ(T )eT = eS, λ, µ, ψ ≥ 0}























































The equivalence (*) follows from duality theory. Note that nonemptiness of the
primal feasible set follows from W-stability and that the dual feasible set is always
nonempty. Since C(G) 6= ∅ if and only if there exists an S ∈ W such that CS(G) 6= ∅,
the assertion follows. ¤
A well-known rule for the class of TU games with nonempty imputation set is the
nucleolus (see section 2.2). The nucleolus has the appealing property that it lies in
the core whenever the core is nonempty (cf. Schmeidler (1969)). For spillover games,
we establish a similar result.
The excess of coalition T ⊂ N for imputation x ∈ I(G) is defined by




If x is proposed as allocation (corresponding to some winning coalition), the excess
of T measures to which extent T is satisfied with x: the lower the excess, the more
pleased T is with the proposed allocation. The idea behind the nucleolus is to
minimise the highest excesses in a hierarchical manner.
Let G = (N,W , v, z) be a game with nonempty imputation set and let S ∈ W
76 CHAPTER 6. SPILLOVER GAMES
be such that IS(G) 6= ∅. We define the S-nucleolus of G, νS(G) to be the set of
S-imputations for which the excesses are lexicographically minimal, ie,
νS(G) = {x ∈ IS(G) | ∀y∈IS(G) : (E(T, x))T⊂N ≤∗L (E(T, y))T⊂N}.
Because IS(G) is compact and convex, there exists a unique lexicographic minimum.
The nucleolus of G, ν(G), is the lexicographic minimum of all (well-defined) S-
nucleoli, which is equivalent to
ν(G) = {x ∈ I(G) | ∀y∈I(G) : (E(T, x))T⊂N ≤∗L (E(T, y))T⊂N}.
Because the imputation set is the finite union of all S-imputation sets, the lexico-
graphic minimum exists. It need not be unique, however, since I(G) itself need not
be convex.
As stated before, the TU nucleolus always belongs to the core whenever this
set is nonempty. The same holds for spillover games, as is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.3.2 Let G = (N,W , v, z) be such that C(G) 6= ∅. Then ν(G) ⊂
C(G).
Proof: First note that since C(G) 6= ∅, the game has a nonempty imputation set
and ν(G) is well-defined. Let y ∈ ν(G) and let Sy ∈ W be such that νSy(G) = {y}.
Let x ∈ C(G). Then the inequalities in the core definition imply E(T, x) ≤ 0 for
all T ⊂ N . But then we must also have E(T, y) ≤ 0 for all T ⊂ N and hence,
y ∈ CSy(G).
To show that y is Pareto efficient, suppose there exists a z ∈ ⋃S∈W CS(G) such that
z 	 y. Then E(T, z)  E(T, y) for all T ⊂ N . This contradicts (E(T, z))T⊂N ≥∗L
(E(T, y))T⊂N and hence, y ∈ C(G). ¤
A spillover game G = (N,W , v, z) is called superadditive if




for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N . If a game is superadditive, then it is beneficial to form a large
coalition: the payoff to S and the individual players in T\S is larger if these two
groups merge into one coalition rather than stay separate. Note that if spillovers are
positive, this condition is stronger than the TU definition v(T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T\S),
ie, if spillovers are positive, the coalitions have a bigger incentive not to merge.
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A weaker version of superadditivity is individual superadditivity:






for all T ⊂ N, i ∈ T . As we did in Chapter 3 for NTU games, we extend the concept
of TU convexity to the class of spillover games in various ways.
G is convex if











for all S, T ⊂ N .








for all U ⊂ N, S ⊂ T ⊂ N\U . Coalition merge convexity can be interpreted in
terms of increasing marginal contributions: if a large coalition T decides to join U ,
then its marginal contribution, being the value of the resulting coalition minus the
opportunity costs of staying separate, is larger than the marginal contribution (to
U) of a smaller coalition S.












for all k ∈ N, S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{k}.
Like their TU analogues, convexity and coalition merge convexity turn out to be
equivalent, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3.3 Let G = (N,W , v, z) be a spillover game. Then G is convex if
and only if G is coalition merge convex.
Proof: “⇒” Let U ⊂ N,S ⊂ T ⊂ N\U . Take A = S ∪ U and B = T . Then,
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“⇐” Let A,B ⊂ N . Take S = A ∩B, T = B and U = A\B. Then,
v(A ∪B) = v(T ∪ U)



















As in TU games, (coalition merge) convexity is stronger than superadditivity.
Proposition 6.3.4 Let G = (N,W , v, z) be a convex game. Then G is superaddi-
tive.
Proof: Let A ⊂ B. Then,

















In a similar way, individual merge convexity implies individual superadditivity.
It follows immediately from the definitions that every coalition merge convex
game is individual merge convex. The reverse is not true, as is shown in the following
example.
Example 6.3.2 Consider the spillover game of Example 6.3.1. This game is in-
dividual merge convex. However, it is not superadditive: take S = {1, 2} and
T = {1, 2, 3}, then v(T ) = 6 < 5 + 3 = v(S) + zS3 . /
6.4 A Shapley value
In this section, we introduce a Shapley value that can be used to provide an indi-
cation of the relative power of the players in a game. On the basis of a government
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example we introduce the concept of marginal vector for spillover games. Con-
trary to its TU counterpart, strategic considerations play an important role in our
definition of marginal vector.
Example 6.4.1 Consider a parliament with four parties1: the communists (COM),
socialists (SOC), Christian democrats (CD) and liberals (LIB). The seats are divided
as follows:
party COM SOC CD LIB
share of seats 0.1 0.3 0.25 0.35
This gives rise to a spillover game with N = {COM, SOC, CD, LIB} and an N -
proper set W of coalitions having a majority:
W = {{SOC, CD}, {SOC, LIB}, {CD, LIB}, {COM,SOC, CD},
{COM, SOC, LIB}, {COM, CD,LIB}, {SOC,CD, LIB}, N} .
For the winning coalitions the payoffs could look as follows (the first entry in the
two-dimensional zS-vectors corresponds to COM):
S v(S) zS
{SOC, CD} 12 (4, 3)
{SOC, LIB} 10 (2, 7)
{CD, LIB} 15 (0, 4)
{COM,SOC, CD} 19 0
{COM, SOC, LIB} 13 6
{COM, CD,LIB} 14 4
{SOC,CD, LIB} 18 1
N 16
Obviously, COM and LIB do not have much in common, which is reflected by a
relatively low payoff to coalitions in which both are involved. The central position of
CD is reflected by the relatively high spillover it experiences when a coalition forms
in which it is not involved. If all four parties get together, the resulting coalition
will not be very homogeneous, which is reflected by a low value for N .
To construct a marginal vector, assume that first the largest party, LIB, enters.
Since this party on itself is not winning, its marginal contribution is zero. To keep
things simple, we assume that parties always join if the coalition in place is not yet
winning. Hence, the second largest party, SOC, joins, creating a winning coalition.
1This example is inspired by the model presented in Van der Rijt (2000).
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Its payoff equals the marginal contribution to the existing coalition, which equals
10-0=10. Next, the third largest, CD has the choice whether to join or not. If it
joins, its marginal contribution is 18-10=8. If it does not join, the worst that can
happen is that coalition {COM, SOC,LIB} eventually emerges, giving CD a payoff
(spillover) of 6. Hence, CD joins the existing coalition. Finally, COM decides not
to join, giving it a spillover of 1 rather than the marginal contribution of -2. So, the
resulting coalition will be {SOC, CD,LIB} with payoff 1 to COM , 10 to SOC, 8
to CD and 0 to LIB. /
The procedure described in the previous example resembles the well-known concept
of marginal vector for TU games. The crucial difference, however, is that contrary
to the TU case, in our context players do not have to join the existing coalition.
As long as there is a winning coalition in place and the worst that can happen if a
player does not join is better than joining, that player has the option to stay outside.
Let (N,W , v, z) be a spillover game. The marginal vector corresponding to σ,
σ ∈ Π(N), denoted by Mσ(N,W , v, z), is defined recursively. By Sσk we denote
the current coalition after the first k players have entered and we initialise Sσ0 = ∅.
Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We assume that player i = σ(k) has to join the coalition in
place, Sσk−1, if this coalition is not yet winning. Otherwise, he has to choose between
joining and staying out. As a result of monotonicity of W , once a winning coalition
is in place, a winning coalition will result regardless of whether the next player joins









k−1 ∪ {i})− v(Sσk−1).
If player i has the choice, he decides not to join Sσk−1 if the worst that can happen







k−1 ∈ W and mσi > cσi ,
Sσk−1 ∪ {i} otherwise
and
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k−1 ∈ W and mσi > cσi ,
cσi otherwise.
According to this procedure, the coalition Sσ = Sσn eventually results and in the
corresponding marginal vector, v(Sσ) is divided among the members of Sσ and the
players in N\Sσ get their corresponding spillovers.
The solution that is computed in Example 6.4.1 is the marginal vector that cor-
responds to the ordering based on the shares of the seats. Of course, this procedure
can be performed with all orderings on the parties, each leading to a marginal vector.
The Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)) is defined as the average of these marginal
vectors:




Mσ(N,W , v, z).
The Shapley value can be interpreted as an expected vector of power indices if the
orderings on the players are equally likely. The total power according to different
marginal vectors need not be the same. Contrary to each marginal vector separately,
the Shapley value is not “supported” by a single coalition.
Example 6.4.2 Recall from Example 6.4.1 that the marginal vector corresponding
to the order σ = (LIB, SOC, CD, COM) equals Mσ = (1, 10, 8, 0), with resulting
coalition {SOC, CD, LIB}. If we take the order τ = (CD,COM, LIB, SOC),
we obtain the marginal vector M τ = (0, 4, 0, 14) with corresponding coalition





Computing all marginal vectors and taking the average yields the Shapley value:
Φ(N,W , v, z) = 1
24
(24, 140, 172, 116).
It is readily seen that there exists no coalition for which the Shapley value is an
allocation. /
The procedure presented in the definition of marginal vector should not be viewed
as a description of how governing coalitions are or should be formed. Rather, these
marginal vectors are an indication of what could happen and through the Shapley
value, they provide an insight into the relative power of the players.
The strategic element in our definition of marginal vector is that a player can
choose not to join when it is in his interest to stay separate. We assume that players
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are cautious in that they only decide not to join when the worst that can happen
when doing so is better than the payoff if they join.2 This strategic element can
be extended in several ways. For example, one can assume that the players play a
sequential move extensive form game and the resulting marginal vector is the payoff
vector corresponding to a subgame perfect equilibrium.
6.5 Public-private connection problems
In many allocation decisions resulting from Operations Research (OR) problems
(cf. Borm et al. (2001)), spillovers occur naturally. In this section, we analyse
public-private connection (ppc) problems. We address two main questions: which
coalition will cooperate and how should the value of this coalition be divided among
its members? We conclude this section by indicating how our model can be used to
handle spillovers in other OR games.
Consider a group of players that can be connected to a source. If a player is
connected to the source, he receives some fixed benefit. On the other hand, by
creating connections costs are incurred. Each player can construct a direct link
between the source and himself, or he can connect himself via other players.
There are two types of connections: public and private. If a player constructs a
public link, other players can use this link to get to the source. A private connection
can only be used by the player who constructs it.
When constructing a network, players can cooperate in order to reduce costs.
We assume that if a group of players cooperate, the players within that coalition
construct an optimal public network, which by definition is open for use by other
players. Once this optimal public network for the coalition is constructed, the players
outside can decide whether or not to connect to the source, using the public network
in place, possibly complemented with private connections. The corresponding pay-
offs to these individual players are the spillovers that result from the formation of
this coalition. We call the resulting model a public-private connection (ppc) prob-
lem. Note that in principle every coalition can build the public network and hence,
W = 2N .
Before formally introducing ppc problems, we start with an example.
2This is quite standard practice in cooperative game theory. Usually, a noncooperative game
is turned into a TU game by assigning values to coalitions based on the maximin principle, ie, by
assuming that the players in a coalition maximise their payoff given that the other players try to
minimise this payoff.
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Example 6.5.1 Consider the ppc problem depicted in Figure 6.1, where * is the
source, the bold numbers indicate the players, the numbers between parentheses
represent the benefits if the players are connected to the source and the numbers on



























Figure 6.1: A ppc problem
First, consider the grand coalition. The best this coalition can do is to build a
public network connecting all players to the source, creating links {∗, 1}, {1, 2} and
{2, 3}. The net payoff equals 4 + 6 + 5− (3 + 2 + 2) = 8.
Next, consider coalition {2}.3 It is optimal for this coalition to create {∗, 1} and
{1, 2}, giving player 2 a payoff of 6− (2 + 3) = 1. The construction of these public
links results in spillovers for players 1 and 3. Player 1 can use the public network and
does not have to create an extra private link, so his spillover equals his benefit of 4.
Player 3 can also use the public network, complemented with the private connection
{2, 3}, giving him a spillover of 5− 2 = 3.
Next, consider {3}. Since every path to the source is more expensive that his
benefit, player 3 will not construct a network at all, giving him a payoff of 0. Player
1 then has to construct a private link {∗, 1} with spillover 1 and player 2, who cannot
use 1’s private link, will have to construct {∗, 1} and {1, 2} privately, giving him a
spillover of 1 as well.
Doing this for every possible coalition, we obtain a spillover game G = (N,W , v, z)
with N = {1, 2, 3}, W = 2N and the following payoffs:
S ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
v(S) 0 1 1 0 5 3 4 8
zS (1, 1, 0) (4, 2) (4, 3) (1, 1) 3 4 4
/
3It may seem strange that a single player or even the empty coalition can build a public network.
For the sake of expositional clarity, we do not a priori exclude this possibility.
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A public-private connection or ppc problem is a triple (N, ∗, b, c), where N =
{1, . . . , n} is a set of agents, ∗ is a source, b : N → R+ is a nonnegative benefit
function and c : EN∗ → R+ is a nonnegative cost function, where N∗ = N ∪ {∗}.
ES is defined as the set of all edges between pairs of elements of S ⊂ N∗, so that
(S,ES) is the complete graph on S:
ES = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ S, i 6= j}.
b(i) represents the benefits if player i ∈ N is connected to ∗ and c({i, j}) represents
the costs if a link between i ∈ N∗ and j ∈ N∗ is formed.
To avoid unnecessary diversions, we simply assume that the optimal public net-
work for each coalition is unique.
A network of edges is a set K ⊂ EN∗ . By N(K) ⊂ N we denote the set of players
that are connected to the source in network K.
A ppc problem (N, ∗, b, c) gives rise to a public-private connection game or ppc

















for all S ⊂ N, i ∈ N\S, where KS denotes the unique network K that maximises
(6.2), and IA(i) equals 1 if i ∈ A and 0 if i /∈ A.
Although the players outside S can use the public network created by S, the
spillovers need not be positive. This is caused by the assumption that only the play-
ers within the coalition that eventually builds the public network can cooperate,
whereas the players outside can only build private links. As a result, the costs of a
particular connection may have to be paid more than once by the players outside
the coalition and consequently, they could be worse off than when they cooperate.
Public-private connection games are superadditive, as is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.5.1 Let (N, ∗, b, c) be a ppc problem. Then the corresponding game
(N,W , v, z) is superadditive.
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Proof: Let S ⊂ T ⊂ N . Let KS be the optimal public network for S and for all
i ∈ T\S, let LN\Si be the optimal private network for i, given that KS is present.
























































Although public-private connection games are superadditive, they need not be con-



























Figure 6.2: A ppc problem
Example 6.5.2 Consider the ppc problem depicted in Figure 6.2. Let S = {1},




zUj = v(N)− z{2}1 − z{2}3
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= 3− 1− 1
< 3− 1
= v({1, 2})− z{2}1




Hence, this game is not (coalition merge) convex. /
Let us return to the ppc problem in Example 6.5.1. To find a suitable solution
for this problem, we first consider the core of the corresponding ppc game G. The
S-cores are given in the following table.
S CS(G)
∅ ∅
{1} {(1, 4, 2)}
{2} {(4, 1, 3)}
{3} ∅
{1, 2} Conv({(4, 1, 3), (1, 4, 3)})
{1, 3} Conv({(3, 4, 0), (1, 4, 2)})
{2, 3} Conv({(4, 4, 0), (4, 1, 3)})
N Conv({(4, 1, 3), (4, 4, 0), (3, 5, 0), (1, 5, 2), (1, 4, 3)})
Since the N -core (weakly) dominates all the other cores, we have C(G) = CN(G).
Note that there are some core elements that are supported by other coalitions as
well, all of which contain player 2. The core element (4, 1, 3) is even supported by
every coalition containing player 2.
In Figure 6.3 we depict the four S-cores that yield core elements and (therefore)
lie in the hyperplane with total payoff 8. The payoff to player 1 is in normal typeface,
the payoff to player 2 is italic and the payoff to player 3 is bold. The N -core CN(G)
is the shaded pentagon, C{1,2} is the line segment with the triangles, C{2,3} is the
line segment with the stars and C{2} is the point (4, 1, 3).
To solve the ppc problem, suppose for the moment that all players cooperate.
We have already seen that it is optimal for the grand coalition to connect all its
members to the source. Since the benefits of a coalition do not depend on the shape
of the network that is formed as long as everyone is connected, the optimal network
in this ppc problem, {{∗, 1}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}}, is actually a minimum cost spanning
tree (cf. Claus and Kleitman (1973)). In this context, Bird (1976) proposed that
each player pays the costs of the (unique) link that is adjacent to him and lies on
the path between him and the source. So, one way to solve a ppc problem is to






























































































































Figure 6.3: The core of G
assume that construction costs are divided using Bird’s rule and everyone gets his
own benefit. According to this Bird-like procedure, player 1 receives 4 − 3 = 1,
player 2 gets 6 − 2 = 4 and player 3 gets 5 − 2 = 3. This yields the core element
(1, 4, 3) as solution.
This procedure, however, has some elementary flaws. The nice properties of the
Bird rule for minimum cost spanning tree problems follow from the assumption that
all players have to cooperate and connect to the source. Moreover, this rule does not
take the spillovers into account. The strategic option of players not to participate in
a coalition undermines the Bird approach. Player 1 will never agree to the proposed
payoff vector (1, 4, 3), since he will be better off leaving the grand coalition, which
will lead to a payoff (spillover) of 4. Knowing this, player 3 can argue that he should
at least receive 3, his spillover when player 2 forms a coalition on his own. Taking this
into account, the payoff vector (4, 1, 3) seems a more reasonable outcome. Because
player 2 on his own will build a network that also connects player 1 to the source,
the latter player occupies a position of power in this ppc problem, which should
somehow be reflected in his payoff.
The payoff vector (4, 1, 3) is a core element of the corresponding ppc game and
is supported by all coalitions containing player 2. This payoff, however, is not
acceptable to player 2. He can argue that if he were to refuse to build his optimal
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public network, it would then be optimal for players 1 and 3 to work together, giving
player 2 a spillover of 4.
By considering this kind of strategic threats of the players not to cooperate, any
seemingly reasonable proposal can be dismissed. As a result, it is not clear which
coalition will eventually emerge and what the corresponding payoffs will be.
This phenomenon of free-riding is well-known in the context of public goods.
Although it is socially optimal for all the players to cooperate in order to provide a
public good, the players separately have the strategic incentive not to do so.
One way to solve this problem is to apply the Shapley value, as defined in the
previous section. In each marginal vector, the strategic aspects mentioned above are
taken into account. By averaging over all marginal vectors, some kind of “average”
influence of these noncooperative considerations is reflected in the payoff.
Example 6.5.3 Consider the ppc problem of Example 6.5.1. The Shapley value
equals




As was discussed in the previous section, the definition of marginal vector can be
adapted to reflect the level of strategic considerations one wants to incorporate in
the model.
Public-private connection situations are not the only class of OR problems in
which spillovers occur. A related phenomenon arises in travelling salesman situ-
ations (cf. Tamir (1989)). In a travelling salesman situation, there is a graph in
which the vertices represent the locations of the players (and the salesman) and the
edges represent the roads between them along which the salesman can travel. The
problem is to find a cheapest Hamiltonian circuit in this graph, where each edge has
a nonnegative cost associated with it.
Also, each subcoalition faces the same problem of finding a cheapest Hamiltonian
circuit through the vertices in which the players in this coalition and the salesman
are located. This gives rise to a cooperative cost game. As is the case in minimum
cost spanning tree situations, however, one does not take into account that there are
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spillovers involved. If a subcoalition of players decides to work together and invite
the salesman to travel to them according to their cheapest tour, the salesman might
come near some players outside the coalition, making it cheaper for them to have
him come to visit them as well.
In sequencing situations (see section 4.3), spillovers can also play a role. In a
sequencing situation, there is a queue of players waiting to be served. The players
in the queue might have different opportunity costs, so moving high-cost players to
the front while compensating the low-cost players through side payments can result
in a Pareto improvement.
Normally, in such situations, only pairs of players who are adjacent in the queue
are allowed to switch, so that a third player can never suffer. If we use our spillover
model, however, this restriction is unnecessary, since the effect of any pairwise switch






Bankruptcy problems were introduced by O’Neill (1982) and have been subsequently
analysed in a variety of contexts. In a bankruptcy situation, one has to divide a given
amount of money (estate) amongst a set of agents, each of whom has a claim on the
estate. The total amount claimed typically exceeds the estate available, so not all
the claims of the agents can be fully satisfied.
The example originally given by O’Neill (and which is inspired by some passages
in the Talmud) is that of a bequest: a man dies, leaving behind an estate which is
not sufficiently large to satisfy all promises made to his heirs in his will. Another
example is that of a firm going bankrupt, whose assets are insufficient to satisfy all
creditors’ outstanding claims.
O’Neill proposes a particular solution to this problem, which he calls the method
of recursive completion (also known as the run-to-the-bank rule). This solution
turns out to be the Shapley value of a corresponding bankruptcy game, which is a
transferable utility game where the value of each coalition is the amount of money
that is left of the estate after all the claims of the agents outside that coalition
are satisfied. Aumann and Maschler (1985) and Curiel et al. (1987) proposed and
characterised two further solutions that coincide with the nucleolus and compromise
value of the corresponding bankruptcy game, respectively.
O’Neill’s bankruptcy model has been applied to a wide array of economic prob-
lems, eg, taxation problems (cf. Young (1988)), surplus-sharing problems (cf. Moulin
(1987)), cost-sharing problems (cf. Moulin (1988)), apportionment of indivisible
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good(s) problems (cf. Young (1994)) and priority problems (cf. Moulin (2000) and
Young (1994)).
In some situations the claims of the players are not the only quantities that are
relevant for determining how to divide the estate. Pulido et al. (2002) analyse the
problem of dividing a sum of money to the various degree courses that are offered
at Miguel Hernandez University in Elche, Spain. Each course has a claim, which
reflects in some way the monetary needs of this course. These needs are determined
within a fixed set of rules and are verifiable to everyone involved. In addition to
these claims, the Valencian government (Generalitat Valenciana) provides a set of
rules of its own to indicate what each course should get, without taking into account
how much money is available. This allocation can be considered as an exogenous
reference point for determining a fair division of the estate.
Clearly, both the claims and the references form a relevant basis for the allocation
decision. The natural question is how these two criteria in such a bankruptcy situa-
tion with references should be combined in order to reach a fair outcome. In Pulido
et al. (2002), the special case is considered, in which the estate suffices to implement
the reference point. In this case, the references can be interpreted as rights. They
describe a two-stage procedure which first gives each claimant his reference amount
and then shares the remainder using a bankruptcy rule.
In this chapter, which is based on Pulido et al. (2003), we consider situations in
which the estate is not necessarily big enough to pay all reference amounts. Hence,
we do not regard these references as rights. As a result, our analysis extends the
analysis in Pulido et al. (2002), but we provide different answers on the class of
situations in which both models are applicable.
We consider two ways in which the claim and reference vectors are combined and
for either approach, we define a compromise solution. The underlying idea is the
following: for each player we combine the claim and reference vectors in such a way
that the resulting payoff to him is maximal. Doing this for every player, we obtain
an upper vector, which can be seen as a utopia point. On the other hand, we find for
each player that combination which gives him a minimal outcome, which results in
a lower vector. The compromise solution is then defined as the convex combination
of the upper and lower vector that is efficient with respect to the estate.
For both approaches we also define a corresponding bankruptcy game with ref-
erences. These games are exact, but not necessarily convex. Our two compromise
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solutions turn out to coincide with the compromise values of these games.
This chapter is organised as follows. First, in section 2 we introduce bankruptcy
situations and discuss some bankruptcy rules. In section 3, we introduce bankruptcy
situations with references. In section 4 we present our compromise solutions. In
section 5 we define and analyse the two corresponding games and show that the
compromise solutions coincide with their compromise values.
7.2 Bankruptcy situations and games
A bankruptcy situation (cf. O’Neill (1982)) is a triple (N,E, c), where N = {1, . . . , n}
is the set of players, E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided and c ∈ RN++ is the vector
of claims such that C ≥ E, where we define C = c(N).1 We denote the class of
bankruptcy situations with player set N by BRN . As with games, we sometimes
omit the player set and denote a bankruptcy situation by (E, c).
A bankruptcy rule is a function f : BRN → RN that assigns to every bankruptcy
situation (N, E, c) ∈ BRN a payoff vector f(N, E, c) ∈ RN such that
0 ≤ fi(N,E, c) ≤ ci for all i ∈ N (reasonability),∑
i∈N fi(N,E, c) = E (efficiency).
In the literature, many bankruptcy rules have been proposed. The most well-known
are summarised below.
• Proportional rule: PROP (N, E, c) = E
C
c, ie, each player gets a share of E
proportional to his claim.
• Constrained equal award rule: CEAi(N,E, c) = min{α, ci} for all i ∈ N ,
where α ∈ R is such that ∑i∈N CEAi(N,E, c) = E, ie, each player receives
the same amount, provided that this does not exceed his claim.
• Constrained equal loss rule: CELi(N, E, c) = max{ci − β, 0}, where β ∈ R
is such that
∑
i∈N CELi(N,E, c) = E, ie, each player loses the same amount
with respect to his claim, provided that he gets at least zero.





c) if C ≥ 2E,
c− CEA(N, C − E, 1
2
c) if C < 2E.
1Throughout this chapter, for a vector x ∈ RN we denote x(S) = ∑i∈S xi for all S ⊂ N .
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If the estate is small, then this amount is divided using the CEA rule after
halving the claims. Otherwise each player receives his claim and the difference
is taken back using CEA.
• Run-to-the-bank-rule or random arrival rule or recursive completion rule
(cf. O’Neill (1982)): RTB(N, E, c) = 1
n!
∑
σ∈Π(N) ρ(σ), where for all σ ∈ Π(N)
and p ∈ {1, . . . n}, ρσ(p)(σ) = max{min{cσ(p), E −
∑p−1
k=1 cσ(k)}, 0}. So an or-
dering σ determines a race to the bank, where the players arriving at the
bank receive their claim as long as there is still some money available. The
run-to-the-bank solution is the average over all such races.
• Adjusted proportional rule (cf. Curiel et al. (1987)): APROP (E, c) =
m(E, c) + PROP (E ′, c′), where mi(E, c) = max{E −
∑
j∈N\{i} cj, 0} de-
notes player i’s minimal right, E ′ = E − ∑i∈N mi(E, c) and for all i ∈ N ,
c′i = min{ci −mi(E, c), E ′}. First, each player receives his minimal right and
the remainder is divided using the proportional rule, where each player’s claim
is truncated to the estate left.
Every bankruptcy situation (N,E, c) ∈ BRN gives rise to a bankruptcy game vE,c ∈
TUN , where the value of a coalition S ⊂ N is given by




So vE,c(S) is that part of the estate that is left for the players in S after the claims
of all the other players have been satisfied.
A bankruptcy rule f is called game-theoretic if for all (N, E, c), (N, E, c′) ∈ BRN
such that vE,c = vE,c′ we have f(N, E, c) = f(N, E, c
′). Curiel (1988) shows that
f is game theoretic if and only if it satisfies the truncation property, ie, for all
(N,E, c) ∈ BRN , f(N, E, c) = f(N, E, c′) with c′i = min{ci, E} for all i ∈ N . Of
the rules discussed in this section, only PROP and CEL are not game-theoretic.
Some bankruptcy solutions turn out to coincide with well-known solutions of
the corresponding bankruptcy games. O’Neill (1982) showed that RTB(N,E, c) =
Φ(vE,c) for all (N,E, c) ∈ BRN . Similarly, the Talmud rule coincides with the nucle-
olus of the corresponding game (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) and the adjusted
proportional rule coincides with the compromise value (cf. Curiel et al. (1987)).
A nice survey on bankruptcy situations is provided by Thomson (2003).
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7.3 Bankruptcy situations with references
A bankruptcy situation with references (cf. Pulido et al. (2002)) is a 4-tuple
(N, E, r, c), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, E ≥ 0 is the estate un-
der contest, r ∈ RN+ is the vector of references and the vector of claims, c ∈ RN++, is
such that c(N) ≥ E. The claim vector c has the same interpretation as the claim
vector in standard bankruptcy situations, while r represents some exogenously given
reference point for the division of the estate. We assume that ri ≤ ci for every player
i ∈ N . We denote R = r(N) and C = c(N). The set of all bankruptcy situations
with references with player set N is denoted by BRRN .
Pulido et al. (2002) distinguish between two types of bankruptcy situations with
references: CERO bankruptcy situations (C ≥ E ≥ R ≥ 0) and CREO bankruptcy
situations (C ≥ R > E ≥ 0). They only analyse the CERO case, in which the
estate is sufficient to give each player his reference amount. As pointed out in
the introduction, in the CERO case the references can be interpreted as rights.
Basically, such a situation can be solved by first allocating this reference point and
then dividing the surplus E − R. Using this idea, Pulido et al. (2002) define
corresponding CERO bankruptcy games.
We consider both cases simultaneously, so in our context the references cannot
necessarily all be satisfied and can therefore not be considered as rights. Hence,
we take a different approach to solving such situations and defining appropriate
corresponding games. As a result, the analysis differs from Pulido et al. (2002) even
on the class of CERO situations.
In order to come to a solution we will have to make some assumptions on the way
in which the claims and reference point are used to divide the money. Obviously,
the claim and reference vectors should both be taken into account, but this can be
done in a number of ways. We first construct a new “demand” vector2, reflecting
both r and c. After that, a given bankruptcy rule f is applied to this new vector.
Throughout our analysis, we consider two approaches to constructing the com-
bined demand vector. For either approach we define a family of compromise solu-
tions and games, depending on the choice for f .
We assume that f satisfies complementary monotonicity (CM): for all S ⊂ N
2To avoid confusion, in the remainder of this chapter we will reserve the term claim vector
for the bankruptcy situation with references. The claims in the ensuing bankruptcy situation are
called demands, which we denote by the demand vector d ∈ RN+ .
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and d, d′ ∈ RN+ such that dj = d′j, for all j ∈ N\S and di ≤ d′i for all i ∈ S, we
have that fj(N,E, d) ≥ fj(N,E, d′) for all j ∈ N\S. Using an induction argument,
it is easily established that this is equivalent to the same requirement only for all
one-person coalitions S.
All bankruptcy rules mentioned in section 7.2 satisfy CM, with the notable ex-
ception of APROP , as is shown in Pulido (2001).
7.4 Compromise solutions
In this section, we define two (families of) compromise solutions for bankruptcy
situations with references. As stated in the previous section, we assume that first
the reference and claim vectors are combined into a new demand vector. But instead
of directly combining these two vectors, we determine, given the rule f , for each
player which combination leads to the highest payoff to him and which one to his
lowest payoff. This leads to an upper and lower bound for the allocation of the
estate. The compromise solution is then simply defined as the unique efficient convex
combination of these two vectors.
Geometrically, combining claims and references boils down to picking a point in
the hypercube Πi∈N [ri, ci]. We consider two possibilities. In our first approach, the
extreme approach, we consider the extreme points of this hypercube, ie, points in
which some players demand their reference amount and the others their claim. The
lower vector `f and the upper vector Lf are defined by
`fi (N, E, r, c) =
{
fi(N, E, (ri, cN\{i})) if ri + c(N\{i}) ≥ E,
E − c(N\{i}) if ri + c(N\{i}) < E
and
Lfi (N, E, r, c) =
{
fi(N, E, (ci, rN\{i})) if ci + r(N\{i}) ≥ E,
ci if ci + r(N\{i}) < E
for all i ∈ N . It follows from CM that (ri, cN\{i}) is the worst extreme point for
player i and that (ci, rN\{i}) is the best. If in a point the estate suffices to satisfy
all demands, then player i gets what is left by the other players, with a maximum
of his own claim ci.
In the following lemma, which we will prove in section 5, we show that `f and Lf
can indeed be considered as lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the division
of the estate.
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Lemma 7.4.1 Let (N, E, r, c) ∈ BRRN be a bankruptcy situation with references.
Then for the corresponding lower and upper vectors we have `f ≤ Lf and ∑i∈N `fi ≤
E ≤ ∑i∈N Lfi .
The extreme compromise solution γf : BRRN → RN is defined by
γf = α`f + (1− α)Lf ,
where α ∈ [0, 1] is such that ∑i∈N(α`fi +(1−α)Lfi ) = E. As a result of the previous
lemma, such α exists.
In our second approach, the diagonal approach, we consider the main diagonal of
the hypercube. The lower and upper vectors ¯̀f and L̄f are defined by
`
f
i (N,E, r, c) = inf
λ∈[0,1]
hf,λi (N, E, r, c),
L
f
i (N,E, r, c) = sup
λ∈[0,1]
hf,λi (N, E, r, c),
where for all i ∈ N and λ ∈ [0, 1],
hf,λi (N, E, r, c) =
{
fi(N,E, λr + (1− λ)c) if λR + (1− λ)C ≥ E,
λri + (1− λ)ci + fi(N, Eλ, dλ) if λR + (1− λ)C < E
with E
λ
= E− (λR+(1−λ)C) and dλ = c− (λr +(1−λ)c) = λ(c− r). Also in the
diagonal case, the vectors ¯̀ and L̄ can be considered as lower and upper bounds, as
is shown for the extreme approach in Lemma 7.4.1.
The diagonal compromise solution γ̄f is defined by
γ̄f = α ¯̀f + (1− α)L̄f ,
where α ∈ [0, 1] is such that ∑i∈N(α ¯̀fi + (1− α)L̄fi ) = E.
7.5 Bankruptcy games with references
In this section, we define for either approach a corresponding cooperative game. In
line with Pulido et al. (2002), we take a pessimistic point of view, so the definitions
of the characteristic functions resemble the ones for the lower vectors in the previous
section. Throughout the analysis, we assume that f is a CM bankruptcy rule.
We define the extreme game vf ∈ TUN by
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vf (S) =
{ ∑
i∈S fi(N, E, (rS, cN\S)) if r(S) + c(N\S) ≥ E,
E − c(N\S) if r(S) + c(N\S) < E
for all S ⊂ N . Note that if r(S) + c(N\S) < E, the ensuing problem is not a
bankruptcy situation and the players in S can obtain what is left by the players in
N\S.
As a result of CM, it immediately follows that (rS, cN\S) is the worst point for
S in the hypercube, so vf (S) actually represents the most pessimistic situation for
coalition S under the extreme approach. Although it is intuitively clear that this
should be the worst point for S, we need CM to ensure that it is actually so.3





i∈S fi(N,E, λr + (1− λ)c) if λR + (1− λ)C ≥ E,




) if λR + (1− λ)C < E
with E
λ
= E − (λR + (1− λ)C) and dλ = c− (λr + (1− λ)c) = λ(c− r).
In the second part of the definition the agents receive what is prescribed by the
weighted vector and the remainder Ēλ is distributed according to the rule f , using
the residual demands d̄λ. Note that if (N,E, r, c) is a CREO bankruptcy situation,
then in the definitions of both vf and v̄f only the first case arises.
As a result of CM, it is readily seen that the game vf is more pessimistic than
v̄f , ie, vf (S) ≤ v̄f (S) for all S ⊂ N .
The extreme and diagonal games corresponding to a bankruptcy situation with
references turn out to be exact. A game v ∈ TUN is called exact if for all S ⊂ N
there exists an x ∈ C(v) such that ∑i∈S xi = v(S). Driessen and Tijs (1985) show
that exactness is weaker than convexity and stronger than superadditivity.
Proposition 7.5.1 Let (N, E, r, c) ∈ BRRN be a bankruptcy situation with refer-
ences. Then the two corresponding games vf and v̄f are exact.
Proof: First, we prove exactness of vf . Let S ⊂ N and distinguish between two
cases:
1. If r(S) + c(N\S) ≥ E, then vf (S) = ∑i∈S fi(N, E, (rS, cN\S)). Consider
x = f(N,E, (rS, cN\S)), so x(S) = vf (S). It is easily checked that, because f
3Pulido (2001) shows that for the adjusted proportional rule, which is not CM, this is not the
case.
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satisfies CM, x ∈ C(vf ).
2. If r(S) + c(N\S) < E, then vf (S) = E − c(N\S). Let x ∈ RN be defined by
xi =
{
ci if i ∈ N\S,
ri + fi(S,E − c(N\S)− r(S), cS − rS) if i ∈ S
for all i ∈ N . Obviously, x(N) = E = vf (N) and x(S) = E−c(N\S) = vf (S).
Let T ⊂ N and distinguish between two cases:
(a) If r(T ) + c(N\T ) ≥ E, then vf (T ) = ∑i∈T fi(N, E, (rT , cN\T )) ≤ r(T ) ≤
x(T ).
(b) If r(T )+c(N\T ) < E, then vf (T ) = E−c(N\T ). Define T1 = T ∩(N\S)
and T2 = T ∩ S. Then,
x(T ) = c(T1) + r(T2) +
∑
i∈T2
fi(S,E − c(N\S)− r(S), cS − rS)




= E + c(T1)− c(N\S)− c(S\T2) + r(T2) + r(S\T2)− r(S)
= E + c(T1)− c(N\T2) = E − c(N\T ) = vf (T ).
Hence, x ∈ C(vf ).





λ∗(S). We distinguish between two cases:
1. If λ∗R + (1 − λ∗)C ≥ E, then x = f(N,E, λ∗r + (1 − λ∗)c) ∈ C(v̄f ) and
x(S) = v̄f (S).
2. If λ∗R + (1 − λ∗)C < E, then x = λ∗r + (1 − λ∗)c + f(N,E − λ∗R − (1 −
λ∗)C, λ∗(c− r)) ∈ C(v̄f ) and x(S) = v̄f (S).
Note that complementary monotonicity of f is not necessary to establish exactness
of v̄f . ¤
The next example shows that the games vf and vf need not be convex (see sec-
tion 3.2).
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Example 7.5.1 Consider the bankruptcy situation with references (N, E, r, c) ∈
BRRN with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, E = 12, r = (1, 2, 4, 7) and c = (3, 3, 5, 10). Taking
the CEA rule, we obtain
S {3} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vCEA(S) 3 5 51
2
7
vCEA(S) 3 5 6 7
Then,
vCEA({1, 3}) + vCEA({2, 3}) > vCEA({3}) + vCEA({1, 2, 3}),
vCEA({1, 3}) + vCEA({2, 3}) > vCEA({3}) + vCEA({1, 2, 3}).
Therefore, (3.1) is violated and vCEA and vCEA are not convex. /
Using exactness of vf , we can now prove Lemma 7.4.1.
Proof of Lemma 7.4.1 From complementary monotonicity of f , `f ≤ Lf readily
follows. For the second statement, first observe that `fi = v
f ({i}) for all i ∈ N .






vf ({i}) ≤ vf (N) = E.
If i ∈ N is such that ci + r(N\{i}) < E, then Lfi = ci ≥ fi(N,E, c). On the
other hand, if ci + r(N\{i}) ≥ E, then Lfi = fi(N, E, (ci, rN\{i})) ≥ fi(N, E, c).






i∈N fi(N, E, c) = E. ¤
The extreme compromise solution coincides with the compromise value of the
extreme game vf , as is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.5.2 Let (N, E, r, c) ∈ BRRN be a bankruptcy situation with references
and let f be a complementary monotonic bankruptcy rule. Then γf = τ(vf ).
Proof: First note that as a result of exactness, vf is compromise admissible.
Driessen and Tijs (1985) show that for each exact game v ∈ TUN , mi(v) = v({i})
for all i ∈ N . Hence, mi(vf ) = vf ({i}) = `fi . For the upper vector, we have




fj(N, E, (ci, rN\{i}))
= vf (N)− vf (N\{i})
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if ci + r(N\{i}) ≥ E and
Lfi = ci
= E − (E − ci)
= vf (N)− vf (N\{i})
otherwise. Hence, Lf = M(vf ). From this, we conclude that γf = τ(vf ). ¤
Similarly, one can prove the analogous result for the diagonal compromise solution.
Theorem 7.5.3 Let (N,E, r, c) ∈ BRRN be a bankruptcy situation with references





In Chapter 7 we presented the model of bankruptcy situations and extended this
model by adding an extra element, a vector of references. In this chapter, we take
a different view on bankruptcy problems and introduce the concept of issues.
Generally speaking, a bankruptcy model relates to a particular kind of allocation
problem. An allocation problem arises whenever a bundle of goods (resources, rights,
costs, burdens) is held in common by a group of individuals and must be allotted
to them individually. An allocation situation has two ingredients: the goods to
be distributed and the claimants amongst whom they are to be allotted. Young
(1994) introduced a general framework with the central concept of a “type” of a
claimant: “The type of a claimant is a complete description of the claimant for
purposes of the allocation, and determines the extent of a claimant’s entitlement
to the good”. A type of a claimant therefore involves a complete description of
the claimant in several dimensions or attributes. These attributes are accepted as
the benchmark against which allocations are to be judged and can take on many
forms, depending on the particular allocation situation at hand. Eg, the allocation
of public housing typically depends on such attributes as financial need, family size
and time spent on a waiting list. Looking from this general point of view, one can
say that the bankruptcy model deals with all allocation problems in which there is
one perfectly divisible good (money) to be allocated and the type of each agent can
be characterised by a single (monetary) claim on that good.
In a general rationing framework, Kaminski (2000) considers bankruptcy situa-
tions in which the type of each claimant is not one-dimensional, as is the case in
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O’Neill, but multi-dimensional. In the environment he presents, a type is a vector of
claims, the components of which have different legal statuses. As a result, different
priorities are assigned to the various components of an agent’s claim vector.
The model we present in this chapter, which is based on Calleja et al. (2001),
also characterises the types of the claimants in a multi-dimensional way by means
of a vector of claims. Contrary to Kaminski however, the multidimensionality of
claims is not the necessary consequence of some exogenously given priorities. Our
model is inspired by O’Neill’s representation of a standard bankruptcy problem in
terms of wills. In his context, a will is a document stating how much of the estate
should go to one particular person. Hence, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the claims of the agents and the wills. Furthermore, it is assumed that all
wills are equally “valid” and have the same legal status. The motivation for having
as many wills as there are claims is provided by the Talmudic scholar Ibn Ezra.
O’Neill hints at generalising Ibn Ezra’s approach, stating that “there is no reason
why the problem should be restricted in this way”. Indeed, why can’t a single person
be mentioned in more than one will or why should a will only mention one single
claimant? We model this kind of situation by considering multi-dimensional claims,
the components of which correspond to the wills.
In Young’s terminology, the type of a claimant is represented by his claim vector
and each will is an attribute. Leaving behind O’Neill’s story, we regard each claim
component as originating from a particular issue (of which a will is a special case).
An issue constitutes a reason on the basis of which the estate is to be divided. Cru-
cially, such a reason should be well founded and be accepted as such by all parties
involved and there should be no a priori discrimination between the issues.
To illustrate the terminology of our model, consider the following example. The
central government has to decide how to allocate the taxpayers’ money to various
public services. The system of government is such that it doesn’t allocate this money
directly to these services, but indirectly through various government departments.
Each department (agent/player) has a number of claims on the amount of money
available (estate), arising from those public services (issues) for which it has respon-
sibility. Some of these services are provided by just a single department (eg, tax
collection by the Department of Finance), while more departments may be respon-
sible for other services (eg, foreign trade by the Departments of Economic Affairs,
Foreign Affairs and Defence). If we were to add up all the claims of a department into
one single claim, an ordinary bankruptcy problem would arise. In this bankruptcy
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problem a rule can be applied to generate an allocation. As argued before, the
underlying issues should play a role in determining an outcome. If the departmen-
tal claims are combined, however, this crucial information is lost and hence, in our
model we take the distinction between the issues explicitly into account.
Another multi-dimensional extension of the bankruptcy model is provided by
Lerner (1998). In that paper, a pie is allocated amongst groups, not necessarily
disjoint, rather than users.
An interesting application of our model of multi-issue allocation situations can
be found in Wintein (2002) and Wintein et al. (2002), where so-called multiple
fund investment situations are considered. Given certain restrictions, players have
to decide in which funds they invest their capital. This results in a bankruptcy-like
model, which is solved using a linear production approach (cf. Owen (1975)). More-
over, an alternative way of looking at this type of investment problem is offered by
considering the funds as issues and translating the players’ investment opportunities
into claims.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, we introduce multi-issue
allocation situations and define two corresponding cooperative games. These games
are constructed from a pessimistic point of view, as are standard bankruptcy games.
In order to determine the value of a particular coalition, we let the players outside
that coalition decide in which order the issues are to be addressed.
One important assumption in our framework is that once we start paying out
money according to one particular issue, this issue must first be fully dealt with
before we move on to the next. Going back to O’Neill’s example, it seems natural to
execute wills completely in a consecutive way rather than satisfying parts of different
wills. But this still leaves some freedom within each issue: in our first game (called
Proportional game), we distribute the money within each issue proportional to the
claims in that issue, while in the second game (called Queue game), we take an even
more pessimistic view by allowing the players outside the coalition to choose also
the order in which the claims within each issue are satisfied.
The computation of the second of our multi-issue allocation games turns out to
be a less than straightforward combinatorial optimisation problem. In section 3, we
provide algorithms to determine the worth of coalitions in both approaches.
Properties of multi-issue allocation games are presented in section 4. The main
result is that the class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with the class of
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nonnegative exact games.
In section 5, we analyse run-to-the-bank rules as solutions for multi-issue alloca-
tion situations. These rules are based on the interpretation behind the method of
recursive completion for bankruptcy situations (cf. O’Neill (1982)). As the name
suggests, the players hold a race to the person or institution administering the estate.
Upon arrival, each player can choose an order on the issues that is most favourable
to him. By averaging over all possible orders of arrival, we obtain a run-to-the-bank
rule. One new aspect of this rule in our context, which is not present in the standard
bankruptcy context, is that a new player arriving has to take into account the effect
of his choice of order on the issues on the players already present. If they stand to
lose out because of this choice, the new player has to compensate them for this.
The two run-to-the-bank rules we introduce in this fashion differ in the way they
treat claims within each issue. The first one (the P-rule) divides the money assigned
to a particular issue proportionally, while the second one (the Q-rule) chooses an
“optimistic” order on the players. The two run-to-the-bank rules turn out to be the
Shapley value of the corresponding P-game and Q-game, respectively.
Finally, in section 6, we characterise both run-to-the-bank rules by means of (P-
and Q-)consistency. In the context of bankruptcy games, the term consistency has
been used for a number of different properties. Our definition of consistency is
similar to the one used by O’Neill (1982). It is based on the idea that applying a
solution concept to a particular problem and applying the same solution concept to
some specific subproblems and aggregating the solutions of these subproblems should
yield the same outcome. In order to properly define such a consistency property, we
extend the domain of a solution concept to a wider class of problems, ie, the class
of multi-issue allocation situations with awards. This extended class of situations
however is not our prime interest, but its purpose is solely a technical framework in
which O’Neill’s characterisation can be extended in a natural way.
8.2 The model
A multi-issue allocation situation is a triple (N, E, C), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the
set of players, E ≥ 0 is the estate under contest and C ∈ RR×N+ is the matrix
of claims. Every row in C represents an issue and the set of issues is denoted by
R = {1, . . . , r}. An element cki ≥ 0 represents the amount that player i ∈ N claims
according to issue k ∈ R. If a player is not involved in a particular issue, his claim
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corresponding to that issue equals zero.
Every bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) ∈ BRN gives rise to a multi-issue allocation
situation, where the issues correspond to the single-claim wills and C ∈ RN×N is
the diagonal matrix with the claims ci on the main diagonal.
With respect to the matrix of claims C, we assume the following:
• Every issue gives rise to a claim: ∑i∈N cki > 0 for all k ∈ R.
• Every player is involved in at least one issue: ∑k∈R cki > 0 for all i ∈ N .
• The allocation problem is nontrivial: ∑k∈R
∑
i∈N cki ≥ E.
For ease of notation, we define ckS =
∑
i∈S cki to be the total of claims of coali-







i∈S cki for all K ⊂ R, S ⊂ N . We denote the class of all multi-
issue allocation situations with player set N by MIAN .
As stated in the introduction, we make the basic assumption that once we are
paying out money according to one particular issue, this issue must first be fully
dealt with before we move on to the next. In addition, we consider two approaches
on how to handle the claims within each issue. As a result, we define two multi-issue
allocation games, a proportional game vP based on Assumption 8.2.1 and a queue
game vQ based on Assumption 8.2.2.
Assumption 8.2.1 If some money is allocated to the players on the basis of a
particular issue, the amount of money each of the players gets is proportional to his
claim according to that issue.
In order to define the proportional game vP , we first compute the maximum amount
the players in a coalition S ⊂ N can get when the issues are dealt with according
to Assumption 8.2.1. We do this by considering all orders on the issues, so let
τ ∈ Π(R). Now the players in S first address the first t issues completely, where t =
max{t′ | ∑t′s=1 cτ(s),N ≤ E}. The part of the estate that is left, E ′ = E−
∑t
s=1 cτ(s),N ,
is divided proportional to the claims according to issue τ(t + 1). So in total, the
players in S receive1
1In the boundary case E = cRN , we have t = n and E′ = 0 and we simply define fPS (τ) =
fQS (σ, τ) = cRS for all τ ∈ Π(R), σ ∈ Π(N)








The value of coalition S ⊂ N is the amount of money they can guarantee themselves
when the players in N\S are free to choose an order on the issues:
vP (S) = min
τ∈Π(R)
fPS (τ).
Since for each τ ∈ Π(R) we have fPS (τ)+fPN\S(τ) = E, this pessimistic point of view
for S is equivalent with saying that the players in N\S maximise their own payoff:
vP (S) = E − max
τ∈Π(R)
fPN\S(τ). (8.2)
The queue game vQ is based on Assumption 8.2.2.
Assumption 8.2.2 If a particular coalition allocates some money to the players
on the basis of a particular issue, this coalition can also decide in which order the
claims corresponding to that issue are satisfied.
To define the queue game, we first define an auxiliary function g(S, k, σ, E ′), which
describes how much money the players in S ⊂ N get according to issue k ∈ R if the
order on the players is σ ∈ Π(N) and the estate is E ′ with E ′ < ckN . The first q
players get their entire claim, where q = max{q′ | ∑q′p=1 ckσ(p) ≤ E ′}. The function
g is then defined by












ckσ(p) if σ(q + 1) /∈ S.
(8.3)
The computation of g(S, k, σ, E ′) is illustrated in the following example with five
players.
0 E ′ ck





















Coalition S consists of players σ(1), σ(3) and σ(4) and corresponds to the shaded
area. The estate E ′ is such that only the claims of the first three players can be fully
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satisfied (q = 3). Furthermore, σ(q+1) ∈ S, so (8.3) yields g(S, k, σ, E ′) = E ′−ckσ(2),
which is represented by the area to the left of E ′ that is not shaded, ie, the part of
the estate left that is not claimed by N\S.
Next, we compute the maximum amount the players in a coalition S ⊂ N can
get if the order on the issues is τ ∈ Π(R). As in the proportional case, the first t
issues are fully dealt with and the remainder E ′ is distributed according to some
order σ ∈ Π(N) on the players, using Assumption 8.2.2. So, in total the players in
S receive
fQS (σ, τ) =
t∑
s=1
cτ(s),S + g(S, τ(t + 1), σ, E
′),
where again, E ′ = E −∑ts=1 cτ(S),N . The value of coalition S is then, analogous to






or equivalently, using the identity fQS (σ, τ) + f
Q
N\S(σ, τ) = E,





Again, pessimism by the members of S boils down to letting the members of N\S
choose an order on the issues that maximise their payoff.
It is immediately clear that the optimal order on the players that coalition N\S
will choose puts themselves in front. So, (8.4) reduces to









cτ(s),N\S + min{cτ(t+1),N\S, E ′} (8.5)
with σ̂ ∈ Π(N) such that σ̂−1(N\S) = {1, . . . , |N\S|}.
8.3 Algorithms
In this section we present two algorithms to compute the proportional game vP and
the queue game vQ corresponding to any multi-issue allocation situation (N, E, C).
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8.3.1 Proportional game
Let (N, E, C) ∈ MIAN and let S ⊂ N be a coalition of players. The value of S,
vP (S), is computed in a number of steps:
1. Compute for every issue k ∈ R the proportion of the total of claims corre-





2. Take τ ∈ Π(R) such that τ−1(k) ≤ τ−1(`) whenever pk ≤ p`.
3. vP (S) = fPS (τ), where f
P
S (τ) is defined in (8.1).
8.3.2 Queue game
Let (N, E, C) ∈ MIAN and let S ⊂ N be a coalition of players. The value of S,
vQ(S), is computed in a number of steps:











2. If y∅ ≥ E then vQ(S) = 0, otherwise proceed.
3. Find I ⊂ R such that
(a) xI + yI ≥ E,
(b) xI ≥ xI for all I ⊂ R such that xI + yI ≥ E.
Next, find I ⊂ R such that
(a) xI + yI ≤ E,
(b) yI ≥ yI for all I ⊂ R such that xI + yI ≤ E.
4. Compute
vQ(S) = min{xI , E − yI}.
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To show that this algorithm works, first of all note that it follows from the definition
of fQ that vQ(S) depends only on the aggregate claim of coalition S within each
issue and not on the distribution of claims between the members of S.
The idea behind the algorithm is to represent all possible payoff profiles (x, y)
for all possible estates by paths in the payoff space (R2+), where x (on the horizontal
axis) is the payoff to S and y (on the vertical axis) the payoff to N\S. The aim is
to find the minimum possible payoff to S given the fact that the estate equals E.
The estate E is represented by the line x + y = E.
Coalition N\S has the freedom to choose an order on the issues. Now, forget the
actual amount of the estate for a moment and suppose the players in N\S choose
to address issues I ⊂ R fully and furthermore choose one other issue in R\I that
gives them their maximal payoff (without paying the claim of S according to that
last issue). This action leads to a payoff profile of (xI , yI). If the estate were to
equal xI + yI , the point (xI , yI) would represent a payoff profile which according to
Assumption 8.2.2 would be feasible for N\S to reach.
With each order on I we associate a path connecting (xI , yI) to the origin. Start-
ing with an estate of 0 (and hence, a (0, 0) payoff), we are going to increase the
estate to xI +yI , plotting the payoff profiles associated with all intermediate estates
(determined by the order on I) in the picture. From the origin, we start paying
out money to N\S according to the first issue in I, represented by a vertical line
segment. When the estate reaches the total claim of N\S corresponding to the first
issue, we start paying out to coalition S, represented by a horizontal line segment.
After the total claim associated with the first issue has been paid out, we continue
with the second issue in the order, and so on. When all issues I have been addressed,
we end with a vertical line segment representing the claim of N\S according to the
last issue. Typically, such a path looks as depicted in Figure 8.1. Note that some
horizontal or vertical line segments may be absent because of zero claims.
We draw such a path for every order on I. These paths represent all possible
payoff profiles that coalition N\S can reach for estates smaller than xI + yI if they
choose to address the issues in I first and put themselves in front within each issue.
Doing this for all I ⊂ R yields all feasible payoff profiles (provided N\S acts
optimally within each issue) for any order on the issues for all estates smaller than
the total of all claims. Note that every path associated with some set I $ R of
issues is part of a path connecting (xR, yR) to the origin.


















Figure 8.1 Figure 8.2
The value of coalition S is the x-coordinate of the leftmost intersection between
one of these paths and the line x + y = E. It is immediately clear that vQ(S) = 0
if y∅ ≥ E. Otherwise, take I and I as stated (which is always possible because of R
and ∅, respectively).
Typically, I and I are situated as depicted in Figure 8.2. By construction, there
is no I ⊂ R giving rise to a payoff profile (xI , yI) in either shaded area. Note also



















Figure 8.3 Figure 8.4
Now consider the paths associated with I. We claim that there can be no path
with a kink in the shaded area. Suppose that such a path exists, as indicated in
Figure 8.3, with such a kink at A. Consider all issues I∗ that are fully dealt with
up to point B.2 Then by construction, (xI∗ , yI∗) lies at or above point A. This
2In fact, we need the last point below A up to which all issues have been fully addressed. If A
is preceded by an issue in which S claims zero, this point may be between A and B.
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contradicts the fact that there is no I ⊂ R giving rise to a payoff profile in the
shaded area.
As a consequence, every path connecting (xI , yI) to the origin must cross the line
x + y = E to the right of (E − yI , yI) if xI + yI > E (the case depicted in Figure
8.3). The same holds for every path connecting any point above the line x + y = E
to the origin. Hence, vQ(S) ≥ E − yI . Furthermore, there is a path going through
(E − yI , yI), because N\S can guarantee themselves yI by addressing issues I first.
Therefore, vQ(S) = E − yI if xI + yI > E.
Similarly, if xI + yI < E, as depicted in Figure 8.4, every path intersecting the
line x + y = E must do so to the right of (xI , E − xI) and there is a path going
through this point. Hence, in this case vQ(S) = xI .
If xI + yI = E, both sets of arguments can be used. One should also note that
all these arguments still hold in case (xI , yI) or (xI , yI) lie on the line x + y = E
rather than below or above.
Summarising these cases, we obtain
vQ(S) = min{xI , E − yI},
as stated in the algorithm.
8.4 Properties of multi-issue allocation games
In this section we look at some of the properties that multi-issue allocation games
of both types possess. First, we prove that the worth of a coalition in the queue
game is smaller than the worth of that coalition in the corresponding proportional
game. This means that the queue approach is more pessimistic than the proportional
approach.
Proposition 8.4.1 Let (N,E, C) ∈ MIAN be a multi-issue allocation situation
with corresponding games vP and vQ. Then vQ(S) ≤ vP (S) for all S ⊂ N .
Proof: Let S ⊂ N and let τ ◦ ∈ Π(R) be an ordering on the issues where the




E ′ in (8.1). So, in particular, this is the case for τ ◦. But then
certainly, maxτ∈Π(R) f
Q
N\S(τ) ≥ fPN\S(τ ◦) and hence, vQ(S) ≤ vP (S). ¤
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As was the case for bankruptcy games with references in the previous chapter, multi-
issue allocation games turn out to be exact.
Theorem 8.4.2 Let (N, E,C) ∈ MIAN . Then both corresponding games vP and
vQ are exact.
Proof: Let S ⊂ N and let τ ◦ ∈ Π(R) and σ◦ ∈ Π(N) be such that fQS (σ◦, τ ◦) is
minimal. Define x = (fQi (σ
◦, τ ◦))i∈N . Then
∑





◦, τ ◦) ≥ minτ∈Π(R) minσ∈Π(N) fQT (σ, τ) = vQ(T ) for all coalitions T ⊂ N . So,
x ∈ C(vQ). Furthermore, ∑i∈S xi = fQS (σ◦, τ ◦) = vQ(S). Hence, vQ is exact. The
proof for vP is similar. ¤
In the proof of Theorem 8.4.2 we showed that (fQi (σ
◦, τ ◦))i∈N is a core element of
the queue game vQ for certain σ◦ ∈ Π(N) and τ ◦ ∈ Π(R). This property can be
extended to all orders on the issues, so for all σ ∈ Π(N), τ ∈ Π(R) we have
(fQi (σ, τ))i∈N ∈ C(vQ)
and similarly for the proportional game, for all τ ∈ Π(R),
(fPi (τ))i∈N ∈ C(vP ).
Theorem 8.4.3 Let v ∈ TUN be a nonnegative exact game. Then there exists
a multi-issue allocation situation (N, E, C) ∈ MIAN such that both corresponding
games vP and vQ equal v.
Proof: If |N | = 1, the result is obvious. Otherwise, define E = v(N) and take
for all S $ N, S 6= ∅ an xS ∈ C(v) such that ∑i∈S xSi = v(S). Interpret these
core elements as issues and gather them (as rows) in the (2n − 2)× n claim matrix
C. Because ckN = E for all k ∈ R, no issue is addressed partially and vP and vQ
coincide.
Now, let S ⊂ N . By construction, there is a row k′ ∈ R such that ck′S = v(S)
and because all issues are core elements of v, ckS ≥ v(S) for all k ∈ R. Hence,
vP (S) = minτ∈Π(R) fPS (τ) = mink∈R ckS = v(S). Therefore, v, v
P and vQ coincide.
¤
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From Theorems 8.4.2 and 8.4.3 we conclude that the class of multi-issue allocation
games coincides with the class of nonnegative exact games. Because not every four-
player exact game is convex, it follows from Theorem 8.4.3 that multi-issue allocation
games with more than three players need not be convex.
A well known property of a convex game is that its Shapley value belongs to
the core. Rabie (1981) shows that this does not hold in general for exact games.
However, Theorem 8.4.4 shows that the Shapley value of a nonnegative exact game
belongs to the core cover.
Theorem 8.4.4 Let v ∈ TUN be a nonnegative exact game. Then Φ(v) ∈ CC(v).
Proof: First, use Theorem 8.4.3 to construct a multi-issue allocation situation
(N, E,C) ∈ MIAN such that vP = v. Next, let i ∈ N . Then supperadditivity
implies vP (S) − vP (S\{i}) ≥ vP ({i}) = mi(vP ) for all S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S.
Furthermore,






























= vP (N)− vP (N\{i})
= Mi(v
P ).
Hence, the marginal contribution of i to every coalition S : i ∈ S is bounded by
mi(v
P ) and Mi(v
P ). Because the Shapley value is the average of these marginal
contributions, Φ(vP ) ∈ CC(vP ) and hence, Φ(v) ∈ CC(v). ¤
Sprumont (1990) shows that every convex game has a pmas (see section 4.2). This
does not hold for exact games, as is shown by the following example.
Example 8.4.1 Consider the multi-issue allocation situation with player set N =
{1, . . . , 4}, estate E = 22 and claim matrix
C =
[
6 6 5 3
12 0 2 6
]
.
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The corresponding queue game is as follows:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
vQ(S) 6 0 2 3 12 11 9 2 6 8 14 15 16 8 22
To show that vQ has no pmas, suppose (xS)S⊂N,S 6=∅ satisfies (4.1) and (4.2). Then
we subsequently have:
• vQ({1, 3}) = 11 and vQ({1, 3, 4}) = 16 imply x{1,3,4}4 ≤ 16− 11 = 5;
• x{1,3,4}4 ≤ 5 implies x{3,4}4 ≤ 5;
• x{3,4}4 ≤ 5 and vQ({3, 4}) = 8 imply x{3,4}3 ≥ 3;





The last statement contradicts (4.1) and hence, the exact game vQ possesses no
pmas. /
8.5 The run-to-the-bank rule
A multi-issue allocation rule is a function Ψ : MIAN → RN assigning to every
multi-issue allocation situation (N, E,C) ∈ MIAN a vector Ψ(N, E,C) ∈ RN such
that
∑
i∈N Ψi(N, E,C) = E (efficiency) and 0 ≤ Ψi(N, E,C) ≤ cRi for all i ∈ N
(reasonability). We define two rules, called run-to-the-bank rules, based on As-
sumptions 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. These rules are based on the run-to-the-bank rule for




















for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The vector ρP (σ) is interpreted as follows. To divide the
estate, a “race” is held between the players and they arrive at the person or institu-
tion administering the estate in the order given by σ. The first player that arrives,
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σ(1), can choose the order in which the issues are dealt with and receives his payoff
accordingly. Of course, he will choose that order τ ∈ Π(R) for which his payoff
fPσ(1)(τ) is maximal. Next, player σ(2) arrives and he is asked to do the same. How-
ever, if he chooses an order different from the first one, he has to compensate player
σ(1) for the difference between his settled payoff ρPσ(1)(σ) and his payoff according to
the new order. Taking this into account, the second player will pick that order that
maximises his own payoff minus the corresponding compensation payments. The
same procedure is applied to all subsequent players, each having to compensate all
his predecessors.




















for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The interpretation is similar to the proportional case. The
only difference is that the queue payoff function fQ is used rather than the propor-
tional function fP and that in accordance with Assumption 8.2.2, players also have
to specify an order γ on the players. It is immediately clear that it is optimal for
player σ(p), who arrives at the administrator at position p, to choose γ in such a
way that he himself and all preceding players, σ(1), . . . , σ(p − 1), whom he has to
compensate, are in front of the queue. This can be done by setting γ = σ.
Proposition 8.5.1 In (8.7), taking γ = σ is optimal.











In order to prove that both run-to-the-bank rules equal the Shapley values of their
respective corresponding games, we first relate them to the marginal vectors. For
this, we define for any order σ ∈ Π(N) the reverse order σ∗ ∈ Π(N) by σ∗(p) =
σ(n− p + 1) for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Lemma 8.5.2 Let (N,E, C) ∈ MIAN be a multi-issue allocation situation with
corresponding games vP and vQ. Then ρP (σ) = mσ
∗
(vP ) and ρQ(σ) = mσ
∗
(vQ) for
all σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof: We only prove the statement for the queue game; the proof for the pro-






















= E − min
τ∈Π(R)



























where the third equality follows from recursively substituting the formulas for
ρQσ(q)(σ). ¤
Theorem 8.5.3 Let (N,E, C) ∈ MIAN be a multi-issue allocation situation with
corresponding games vP and vQ. Then ρP = Φ(vP ) and ρQ = Φ(vQ).
Proof: This result follows immediately from Lemma 8.5.2 and from the observation
that {σ∗ |σ ∈ Π(N)} = Π(N). ¤
8.6. Consistency 119
8.6 Consistency
O’Neill (1982) characterised his recursive completion method (run-to-the-bank rule)
for bankruptcy situations by means of the property of consistency. A bankruptcy
rule f is called consistent if for every bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) the following
two procedures yield the same outcome:
1. Apply f to the whole bankruptcy situation (N,E, c).
2. For each player j ∈ N , consider the subsituation where this player j receives
his claim (truncated to the estate), min{cj, E}, and the other players N\{j}
divide the remainder of the estate E−min{cj, E} among themselves using the
original claims cN\{j} and the rule f . The solution of the original situation
(N, E, c) is then the average of the solutions of these n subsituations.
So, a bankruptcy rule f is consistent if for each bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) and








fi(N\{j}, E −min{cj, E}, cN\{j})

 ,
where the first term on the right hand side represents the payoff to player i if he
receives his truncated claim and the other terms correspond to the subsituations in
which the other players play this role.
In this section we generalise this result by O’Neill and characterise the propor-
tional and queue run-to-the-bank rules by means of consistency. Contrary to the
standard bankruptcy framework, however, we cannot simply give a player his claim
and send him away. Not only is it unclear what he should actually receive, but
more fundamentally, by omitting him from the situation, vital information on the
interdependency between the issues is lost.
To solve this, we extend our framework and broaden the domain of these rules
to a larger class of situations, namely multi-issue allocation situations with awards.
The idea behind this construction is that instead of sending a player away, we keep
him in and fix the payoff that he eventually receives (the award). We should stress,
that although this new class has a nice interpretation in itself, it is not directly
intended as an extension of multi-issue allocation situations, but as a (technical)
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framework in which the characterisation of the run-to-the-bank rule by O’Neill can
be generalised in a natural way.
A multi-issue allocation situation with awards is a 4-tuple (N,E,C, µ), where
µ ∈ RF represents some award vector to some specific coalition F ⊂ N , which
has already been agreed upon. The sum of these awards cannot exceed the estate,
so
∑
i∈F µi ≤ E. Furthermore,
∑
i∈F µi = E if F = N . Note that a multi-issue
allocation situation without awards is a special case with F = ∅.
A rule Ψ is a function assigning to every multi-issue allocation situation with
awards (N,E, C, µ) a vector Ψ(N, E,C, µ) ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N Ψi(N,E, C, µ) = E
and ΨF (N, E, C, µ) = µ. That is, for a rule in this environment it should hold that
every player in F gets exactly his award. Note that contrary to the situation without
awards, we do not impose reasonability3 on Ψ. On this new class of situations we
also define two run-to-the-bank rules. For this, we first fix an order on the players











σ ∈ Π(N) | ∀q∈{1,...,|F |} : σ(q) = γ(q)
}
and for all σ ∈ Πγ(N), ρP (σ, µ) ∈ RN is defined recursively by
ρPσ(p)(σ, µ) = µσ(p)
for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σ(p) ∈ F and










for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σ(p) /∈ F .
Note that the run-to-the-bank rule does not depend on the actual choice of γ.
This definition differs from the run-to-the-bank rule without awards (8.6) in two
respects: every player i ∈ F gets µi rather than the maximum expression in (8.6)
and the players in F have to be compensated (which is accomplished in an order
3To guarantee reasonability of the run-to-the-bank rules with awards as defined below, we would
have to make some unnecessary diverting assumptions. We just note that for the specific multi-
issue allocation situations with awards that are derived from a standard multi-issue allocation
situation using either run-to-the-bank rule, reasonability is satisfied.
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σ ∈ Πγ(N) by putting them at the front). Note that for F = ∅, the two definitions
coincide.







where for all σ ∈ Πγ(N), ρQ(σ, µ) ∈ RN is defined recursively by
ρQσ(p)(σ, µ) = µσ(p)
for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σ(p) ∈ F and







ρQσ(q)(σ, µ)− fQσ(q)(σ, τ)
]}
for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σ(p) /∈ F . Note that this definition generalises (8.8)
rather than (8.7). Proposition 8.5.1 can easily be extended to the situation with
awards, so letting each player choose an order on the players would result in an
equivalent definition.
For all i ∈ N\F and τ ∈ Π(R) we define the remainder functions


















where σ ∈ Πγ(N) is such that σ(|F |+ 1) = i. These remainder functions represent
the amount of money player i gets according to order τ , when he has to ensure that
every player j ∈ F gets µj. A rule Ψ is called P-consistent if for all multi-issue
allocation situations with awards (N, E,C, µ) and all i ∈ N\F we have














where µj ∈ RF∪{j} is such that µjF = µ and µjj = maxτ∈Π(R) rPj (τ). Ψ is Q-consistent
if for all (N, E,C, µ) and all i ∈ N\F
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with µjj = maxτ∈Π(R) r
Q
j (τ). The idea behind consistency in this context is as follows.
Let i be a player in N\F . Then the first term between parentheses is the amount
of money player i gets when he maximises his own payoff by choosing an order on
the issues, keeping in mind the players in F have to receive their awards. Next, let
j ∈ N\F, j 6= i. Now suppose that player j receives his maximal remainder. Then
a new situation arises where player j has been awarded some fixed amount. The
amount of money player i receives in this new situation is given by applying rule Ψ
on the old µ extended with the fixed award to player j. A rule is called consistent if
applying it directly yields the same outcome as averaging over all |N\F | situations
where one of the non-fixed player get their maximum.
Theorem 8.6.1 The proportional run-to-the-bank rule ρP is the unique P-
consistent rule and the queue run-to-the-bank rule ρQ is the unique Q-consistent
rule.
Proof: We only give the proof for ρP . The proof for ρQ goes along similar lines.


































































































































where Πγ,j(N) = {σ ∈ Πγ(N) | σ(|F |+ 1) = j} for j ∈ N\F .
Uniqueness of the P-consistent rule is proved by induction on the size of F . Assume
that rule Ψ is P-consistent. For F = N , Ψ(N, E,C, µ) = µ by definition. Next, (8.9)
completely determines the solutions of all situations with |F | = |N | − 1. Repeating
this procedure until F = ∅, we conclude that there is a unique P-consistent rule,
which is the proportional run-to-the-bank rule. ¤

Chapter 9
A composite MIA approach
9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we extended the bankruptcy model to encompass situations
in which the agents can have multiple claims on the estate, each as a result of a
particular issue. For such multi-issue allocation (MIA) situations we proposed an
extension of the run-to-the-bank rule1 as solution for this new class of problems.
As is the case for the original rule, this extended run-to-the-bank rule turns out to
coincide with the Shapley value of the corresponding multi-issue allocation game.
Contrary to bankruptcy games, however, multi-issue allocation games need not
be convex. Consequently, there exist multi-issue allocation situations for which the
run-to-the-bank solution is not a core element of the corresponding game. In this
chapter, which is based on González-Alcón et al. (2003), we extend the run-to-the-
bank rule in a different way, such that it always yields a core element.
Instead of considering the issues and the players combined, as in Chapter 8, in
this chapter we propose a two-stage extension, called the composite run-to-the-bank
rule. First, we explicitly allocate the estate to the issues (according to a marginal
vector), and then, within each issue the money is divided among the agents using
the standard run-to-the-bank rule. An alternative view on composite solutions is
given in Casas-Méndez et al. (2002).
Based on Aumann and Maschler (1985), we define the concept of (self-)duality for
multi-issue allocation situations and show that both the queue run-to-the-bank-rule
and the composite run-to-the-bank rule are self-dual. We characterise the com-
posite extension by means of the property of issue-consistency, which like P- and
1In this chapter, we only refer to the queue approach of the previous chapter.
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Q-consistency in section 8.6 generalises the consistency property that was first used
by O’Neill (1982).
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we define the composite ex-
tension of the run-to-the-bank rule and show that this rule always yields a core
element. In section 3, we define self-duality and prove that both extensions of the
run-to-the-bank rule satisfy this property. Finally, in section 4, we characterise the
composite run-to-the-bank rule by means of issue-consistency and we show that this
rule is estate monotonic.
9.2 The composite run-to-the-bank rule
In this section, we extend the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy situations to
the class of MIA situations. Contrary to the extension in section 8.5, the present
extension, which we call the composite run-to-the-bank rule, involves multiple runs
to the bank, once by the issues and within each issue by the players.
Throughout this chapter, we denote the bankruptcy game corresponding to the
situation (R,E, (ckN)k∈R) by vRE,C . We denote the vector (cki)i∈N for k ∈ R by Ck.
As stated in section 7.2, the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy games, RTB,
coincides with the Shapley value of the corresponding bankruptcy game and can
thus be expressed as














where x = mτ
∗
(vRE,C). The following lemma follows from Lemma 8.5.2.
Lemma 9.2.1 Let (N, E, c) ∈ BRN and σ ∈ Π(N). Then
mσ(vE,c) = ρ(σ
∗).
2Formally, in a bankruptcy situation all claims are positive (see section 7.2). As a result,
(N, xk, Ck) need not be a proper bankruptcy situation. In the analysis of this chapter, we can
ignore this and we can apply (7.1) to obtain a bankruptcy game.
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As a result of this lemma, the composite marginal vector mmτ,σ can be viewed as a
race to the bank, where the issues arrive in order τ and the players in order σ.
The set of all composite marginal vectors is a subset of the core of the corre-
sponding MIA queue game, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 9.2.2 Let (N,E, C) ∈ MIAN . Then
mmτ,σ(N, E,C) ∈ C(vQ)
for all τ ∈ Π(R), σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof: Let τ ∈ Π(R), σ ∈ Π(N) and let z = mmτ,σ(N,E,C). Let x = mτ∗(vRE,C)
and t = max{t | ∑tp=1 cτ(p),N ≤ E}. With xk as estate for issue k ∈ R, we have a
collection of bankruptcy situations {(N, xk, Ck)}k∈R. However, at most one of them
is a nontrivial situation: in the situations τ(1), . . . , τ(t) the estate equals the sum of
all the claims and in the situations τ(t+2), . . . , τ(r) the estate equals zero. Let y be
the marginal vector corresponding to σ of the only possible nontrivial bankruptcy




We can express vector z as




Let S ⊂ N . Then with E ′ = ∑i∈N yi, we have
∑
i∈S





= fQS (σ, τ) ≥ vQ(S).
Hence, z ∈ C(vQ). ¤
A general relation of inclusion between the set of marginal vectors of the queue game
and the set of composite marginal vectors cannot be established, as is shown in the
following example.
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The queue game associated with this situation is
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
vQ(S) 0 0 0 3 3 1 10
The sets of marginal and composite marginal vectors can be easily calculated. The
results are given in the following table.
σ ∈ Π(N) mσ
123 (0, 3, 7)
132 (0, 7, 3)
213 (3, 0, 7)
231 (9, 0, 1)
312 (3, 7, 0)
321 (9, 1, 0)
τ ∈ Π(R) σ ∈ Π(N) mmτ,σ
12 123, 132, 312 (9, 1, 0)
213, 231, 321 (5, 5, 0)
21 123, 213 (3, 7, 0)
132, 312 (3, 0, 7)
231 (0, 7, 3)
321 (0, 3, 7)
The table shows that m231(vQ) is not a composite marginal vector and that
mm12,213(N,E, C) does not belong to the set of marginal vectors of the game vQ. /











for all (N,E, C) ∈ MIAN . The mRTB rule can be interpreted as the result of two
races: first, the issues “run to the bank” for the money, and next, there are r races
among the players within each issue. As is the case for the RTB rule for bankruptcy
situations, the claims are satisfied as much as possible by the order of arrival.
The mRTB rule first takes the marginal vectors of the “issue game” vRE,C . As-
sociated with each marginal vector mτ (vRE,C) we have r bankruptcy games whose
estates are given by the components of the marginal vector. Next, we take for each
player the sum of the RTB solutions of these r situations. Finally, the average
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If we start with a bankruptcy situation (N,E, c) ∈ BRN and construct the corre-
sponding MIA situation (N, E,C) with the claims on the main diagonal of C, then
RTB(N,E, c) = mRTB(N,E, C). So, the composite run-to-the-bank rule is indeed
an extension of the run-to-the-bank rule. However, mRTB does not in general co-
incide with the Shapley value of the game. In fact, the mRTB rule is not even
game-theoretic, ie, two situations leading to the same game might yield different
outcomes.
The composite run-to-the-bank rule provides a way of obtaining an element of
the core of the corresponding queue game without calculating the characteristic
function. This is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 9.2.3 Let (N,E,C) ∈ MIAN . Then
mRTB(N, E, C) ∈ C(vQ).
Proof: In Proposition 9.2.2, we showed that every composite marginal vector lies
in the core. The mRTB outcome, being the average of these composite marginals
vectors according to equation (9.2), then also is an element of the core, which is a
convex set. ¤
As an alternative to the mRTB rule, another way to extend the RTB rule in a
two-stage way would be to apply the RTB rule twice:
∑
k∈R RTB(N, xk, Ck) with
x = RTB(R, E, (ckN)k∈R) = Φ(vRE,C). However, this solution can lie outside the core
of the corresponding queue game, as the next example shows.
Example 9.2.2 Consider the MIA situation (N, E,C) ∈ MIAN with N = {1, 2, 3},









The queue game associated with this situation is
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
vQ(S) 16 3 22 21 46 27 51
















< 3 = vQ({2}), this solution is not in the core of vQ. /
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9.3 Self-duality
For a MIA situation (N, E,C) we define D(S) = cRS, ie, the total claim of the
players in coalition S, and we define D = D(N). Recall that we assume D ≥ E. To
distinguish between the various games, we denote the queue game corresponding to
(N,E, C) by vQE,C .
The proof of the following lemma is partly taken from Wintein (2002).
Lemma 9.3.1 Let (N, E, C) ∈ MIAN . Then for all S ⊂ N ,
vQE,C(S) = v
Q
D−E,C(N\S) + D(S)−D + E.
Proof: Let S ⊂ N . To calculate the value of vQE,C(S), we must find an ordering
on the players σ ∈ Π(N) and an ordering on the issues τ ∈ Π(R) such that the
total amount assigned to coalition S, fQS (σ, τ), is minimal. Obviously, σ can be any
ordering in which the players in S are at the end.
In Figure 9.1 we represent all the claims of matrix C in the order indicated by τ
and σ, ie, cτ(1)σ(1), cτ(1)σ(2), . . . , cτ(r)σ(n). The claims associated with players in S are
shaded. The total claim is divided into two parts of lengths E and D − E, as the
figure shows. From the way in which σ and τ are chosen, the dark zone in the E
part is as small as possible, and it is precisely vQE,C(S).
cτ(1)σ(1) . . .
. . .
cτ(1)σ(n)
. . . . . .
. . . cτ(r)σ(n)
 -E  -D − E
Figure 9.1: Proof of Lemma 9.3.1
If we consider now the MIA situation (N, D − E, C) and we want to calculate
vQD−E,C(N\S), we must find σ′ ∈ Π(N) and τ ′ ∈ Π(R) such that the white zone in
the D − E segment is minimised. The length of this zone is indeed vQD−E,C(N\S).
Since this is in a sense the complementary problem of the first one, this minimum
is reached for σ∗ and τ ∗, ie, the reverse orderings of σ and τ .
On the other hand, we have that the E segment is the sum of its white and shaded
parts. The white part within E will be the total white zone D(N\S) minus the
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white zone in the D−E segment. The shaded part of E is vQE,C(S), as was indicated
above. So,
E = vQE,C(S) + D(N\S)− vQD−E,C(N\S).
From the equality D = D(S) + D(N\S), we conclude that the statement holds. ¤
The next lemma gives us the relation between the marginal vectors of the two queue
games with estates E and D − E.
Lemma 9.3.2 Let (N, E,C) ∈ MIAN . Then
mσ(vQE,C) = (cRi)i∈N −mσ
∗
(vQD−E,C)
for all σ ∈ Π(N).
Proof: Let σ ∈ Π(N) and p ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let i = σ(p) and let S be the coalition





E,C(S ∪ {i})− vQE,C(S).





D−E,C(N\(S ∪ {i})) + D(S ∪ {i})−D + E
−[vQD−E,C(N\S) + D(S)−D + E]
= D({i}) + vQD−E,C(N\(S ∪ {i}))− vQD−E,C(N\S)
= D({i})−mσ∗i (vQD−E,C).
From D({i}) = cRi the result follows. ¤
Following Aumann and Maschler (1985), given a rule f we can define its dual f ∗ by
using f to share not the estate E but the gap D−E. So, each player receives his claim
(the part he would receive if the estate were big enough) minus the corresponding
part of the losses:
f ∗(N, E,C) = (cRi)i∈N − f(N,D − E, C).
A rule is called self-dual if f ∗ = f . We show that both ρQ (defined by (8.8)) and
mRTB are self-dual.
Proposition 9.3.3 The ρQ rule is self-dual.
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Proof: Let (N, E, C) ∈ MIAN . Since ρQ coincides with the Shapley value of the























= (cRi)i∈N − ρQ(N, D − E, C).
This shows that ρQ is self-dual. ¤
As a result of the previous proposition, the RTB rule is self-dual for bankruptcy
situations as well, which was first proved by Curiel (1988).
Proposition 9.3.4 The mRTB rule is self-dual.
Proof: Let (N,E, C) ∈ MIAN . We denote by vRE and vRD−E the characteristic
functions of the games induced by the bankruptcy situations (R, E, (ckN)k∈R) and









































= (cRi)i∈N −mRTB(N, D − E, C),
where for the second equality we use Lemma 9.3.1 and for the third equality we use
self-duality of the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations. Hence, the mRTB rule is
self-dual. ¤
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9.4 Issue consistency and monotonicity
In this section we characterise the composite run-to-the-bank rule as a consistent
extension of the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations to multi-issue allocations sit-
uations. This so-called issue-consistency allows us to easily establish estate mono-
tonicity of the mRTB rule. See section 8.6 for a wider discussion on consistency.
A MIA rule f is called issue-consistent if for each MIA situation (N, E,C) ∈






[f(N, min{E, ckN}, Ck)
+f(N, max{E − ckN , 0}, C−k)], (9.3)
where C−k is the claim matrix C from which issue k has been deleted.
The first term of the summation in (9.3) applies the rule f to a one-issue allocation
situation (so basically a bankruptcy situation), while the second term applies f to
a MIA situation with r − 1 issues. So, successively applying this property allows
us to extend any bankruptcy rule to the class of multi-issue allocation situations.
Analogous to the characterisation in section 8.6, every bankruptcy rule has a unique
issue-consistent extension.
Theorem 9.4.1 The mRTB rule is the unique issue-consistent extension of the
RTB rule.
Proof: Let (N, E, C) ∈ MIAN . Then














































































mRTB(N, max{E − ckN , 0}, C−k),
where vR\{k} is the bankruptcy game associated with (R\{k}, max{E −
ckN , 0}, (c`N)`∈R\{k}). Hence, the mRTB rule is issue-consistent. Uniqueness fol-
lows from a similar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 8.6.1. ¤
Issue-consistency allows us to show that the composite run-to-the-bank rule is estate
monotonic. A MIA rule f is estate monotonic if for every pair of MIA situations
(N,E, C) and (N,E ′, C) with E ′ ≥ E we have
fi(N, E
′, C) ≥ fi(N, E,C)
for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 9.4.2 The mRTB rule is estate monotonic.
Proof: We show that the mRTB rule is estate monotonic by induction on the
number of issues r. If r = 1 then mRTB coincides with RTB and this rule is estate
monotonic on the class of banckruptcy games (cf. Curiel (1988)).
Next, assume that mRTB is estate monotonic for situations with r − 1 issues. Let






[mRTB(N, min{E, ck}, Ck)
+mRTB(N, max{E − ck, 0}, C−k)].
In the first term inside the brackets we basically apply the RTB rule to a bankruptcy
situation. So, by estate monotonicity of the RTB rule, this term increases if the
estate is raised. The second term is the application of mRTB to a (r−1)-issue allo-
cation situation, which by the induction hypothesis satisfies the estate monotonicity
property. Adding up all terms, we have that mRTB is estate monotonic. ¤
Chapter 10
Bankruptcy with a priori unions
10.1 Introduction
In many situations in which agents interact, they do so in groups. Cooperative game
theory studies such situations by taking into account what each particular coalition
of players can achieve on its own. These values of the coalitions are subsequently
taken into account in determining a fair allocation of the value of the grand coalition.
Often, however, some coalitions play a special role, in that they arise in a natural way
from the underlying situation. If these naturally arising groups form a partition of
the grand coalition, they are usually referred to as a priori unions (cf. Owen (1975)).
One interesting class of problems in which the role of a priori unions has been
studied is the class of bankruptcy situations (see section 7.2). In a bankruptcy sit-
uation, there is an estate to be divided among a number of players, whose total
claim exceeds the estate available. In many situations, these players can be divided
into a priori unions, based on the nature or cause of their claims. Eg, when a firm
goes bankrupt, the creditors can usually be grouped in a natural way by distin-
guishing between claims on the basis of outstanding bonds, equity or commercial
transactions.
The main focus in the bankruptcy literature is on finding rules assigning to each
bankruptcy situation an allocation of the estate, which satisfy some appealing prop-
erties. One natural way to analyse the class of bankruptcy situations with a pri-
ori unions is to extend well-known standard bankruptcy rules to this class. Eg,
Casas-Méndez et al. (2003) extend the adjusted proportional rule by considering
a two-stage procedure in which the estate is first divided among the unions, and
subsequently the amount that each union receives is divided among its members.
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In this chapter, which is based on Casas-Méndez et al. (2002), we present two
extensions of the constrained equal award (CEA) rule. The first extension involves
a similar two-stage procedure as in Casas-Méndez et al. (2003). We relate this
extension to the CEA solution of a corresponding TU game with a priori unions,
which is inspired by Owen (1977). We provide two characterisations of this two-
stage extension, inspired by previous results by Dagan (1996) and Herrero and Villar
(2002). The second extension of the CEA rule is based on the random arrival rule
introduced in O’Neill (1982) and it is characterised by a consistency property.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, we formally define the
class of bankruptcy situations with a priori unions and some related concepts that
are used throughout this chapter. In section 3, the problem of extending standard
bankruptcy rules is addressed and the first extension is presented. In section 4,
we provide the two characterisations of the two-stage extension of the CEA rule.
Section 5 contains the second extension and deals with the concept of consistency.
10.2 Bankruptcy with a priori unions
A bankruptcy situation with a priori unions is a 4-tuple (N, E, c,P) where (N, E, c)
is a standard bankruptcy problem and P = {Pk}k∈R is a partition of the set of
players into unions, R being the set of unions. We denote by BUN the set of all
bankruptcy problems with a priori unions with player set N .
A bankruptcy with a priori unions rule is a function ϕ : BUN → RN that assign
to each (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN a payoff vector ϕ(N,E, c,P) ∈ RN such that for all
i ∈ N , 0 ≤ ϕi(N, E, c,P) ≤ ci and
∑
i∈N ϕi(N,E, c,P) = E.
For (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN we define the corresponding bankruptcy situation among
the unions (R, E, cP) ∈ BRN , the so-called quotient problem, where cP = (cPk )k∈R
is the vector of total claims of the unions, so cPk =
∑
i∈Pk ci for each union Pk of
players. Note that (R, E, cP) is a well defined bankruptcy problem.
A cooperative game with transferable utility with a priori unions is a triple
(N, v,P) where (N, v) is a TU game and P = {Pk}k∈R is a partition of the set
of players. For (N, v,P), we define the corresponding TU game among the unions
(R, vP), the quotient game, by vP(L) = v(∪k∈LPk) for all L ⊂ R.
A bankruptcy situation with a priori unions gives rise in a natural way to a
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multi-issue allocation situation, where the issues correspond to the unions. In order
to analyse such situations, in Chapter 8 we define two corresponding games, the
proportional game and the queue game. In this chapter, we consider a variation
on the former: instead of dividing the estate proportional to the claims within the
final issue to be handled, we apply an arbitrary bankruptcy rule f to this problem.
Note that for all f , the resulting game is exact (which follows from the proof of
Theorem 8.4.2), but not necessarily convex.
The link with multi-issue allocation situations and corresponding games is illus-
trated in the following example, where for the definition of the CEA rule we refer
to section 7.2.
Example 10.2.1 Consider the 4-player bankruptcy problem (N,E, c) ∈ BRN with
E = 10 and c = (6, 2, 8, 5). Suppose players 1 and 2 form a union and players 3 and
4 another one, that is, P = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}.
This situation gives rise to the 4-player multi-issue allocation situation
(N, E,C) ∈ MIAN with E = 10 and
C =
[
6 2 0 0
0 0 8 5
]
.
Take S = {1, 3}. In order to determine vCEA(S), we first compute, for both τ ∈
Π(R), fCEAS (τ), the quantity that coalition S receives if the issues are handled in
order τ and the final issue is resolved using CEA:
τ fCEAS (τ)
(1, 2) 6 + CEA3({3, 4}, 2, (8, 5)) = 7
(2, 1) CEA3({3, 4}, 10, (8, 5)) = 5
So, vCEA(S) = minτ∈Π(R) fCEAS (τ) = 5. Similarly, taking T = {1, 4}, we obtain
vCEA(T ) = 5, vCEA(S ∪T ) = 8 and vCEA(S ∩T ) = 0. Hence, vCEA(S)+ vCEA(T ) >
vCEA(S ∪ T ) + vCEA(S ∩ T ). So, although vCEA is exact, it is not convex. /
10.3 Extending bankruptcy rules: a two-step pro-
cedure
In this section we consider a way to extend a game-theoretic bankruptcy rule to a rule
for bankruptcy situations with a priori unions. We use the CEA rule to illustrate
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this extension. We also connect our CEA solution for a bankruptcy situation with
a priori unions to the corresponding TU game with a priori unions.
In order to divide the total estate among the players, one approach is first
to divide the estate among the unions and second to divide the amount of each
union among the players in this union. Let f : BRN → RN be a game-theoretic
bankruptcy rule. We define the two-stage extension f̄ : BUN → RN as fol-
lows. Let (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN be a bankruptcy problem with a priori unions.
Define Efk = fk(R, E, c
P) for all k ∈ R and next, for all i ∈ Pk, k ∈ R, define
f̄i(N,E, c,P) = fi(Pk, Efk , (cj)j∈Pk).
The CEA rule for bankruptcy situations with a priori unions generalises the stan-
dard CEA rule for bankruptcy situations, in the sense that both CEA(N,E, c,PN)
and CEA(N,E, c,Pn) coincide with CEA(N, E, c), where Pn is the discrete parti-
tion Pn = {{1}, . . . , {n}} and PN is the trivial partition PN = {N}. Also note that
by construction, CEAk(R,E, c
P ,PR) = ECEAk for all k ∈ R. Since (R, E, cP ,PR) is
basically indistinguishable from (R,E, cP), we refer to both situations as the quo-
tient problem associated with (N, E, c,P).
The CEA solution of a bankruptcy situation with a priori unions coincides with
the CEA solution for the corresponding TU game with a priori unions, which we
are going to define next.
First, recall that the utopia vector of a game v ∈ TUN , M(v), is defined by
Mi(v) = v(N) − v(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N . This vector is used to define the CEA
solution of the game, which is defined for all i ∈ N by CEAi(N, v) = min{λ,Mi(v)},
where λ is such that
∑
i∈N min{λ,Mi(v)} = v(N).1 This solution divides the worth
of the total coalition, v(N), among the players in such a way that all of them obtain
the same amount with the restriction that no player can get more than his utopia
payoff. Note that for (N, E, c) ∈ BRN , we have CEA(N, E, c) = CEA(vE,c).
Now, let (N, v,P) be a TU game with a priori unions. The constrained equal
award solution of this game, CEA(N, v,P) is defined in two steps. First, the payoff
to each union Pk ∈ P equals CEAk(R, vP), ie, the constrained equal award solution
of the quotient game. In the second step, the payoff to each union is divided among
its players. To do this, we consider for every player i ∈ N his cooperation possibilities
with the players outside his union. A similar idea is used in Owen (1977), where a
1The CEA rule for TU games is only well-defined for a subclass of such games. If the game
is exact, then the CEA rule is well-defined. The same holds for the CEA rule for games with a
priori unions, which we define later on, where exactness of the underlying game is sufficient.
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modification of the Shapley value for TU games with a priori unions is defined. Let
Pk ∈ P and let i ∈ Pk. The “claim” of player i is defined as his contribution to the
coalition ∪`∈R\{k}P` ∪ {i}, that is, Mi(v,P) = v(∪`∈R\{k}P` ∪ {i}) − v(∪`∈R\{k}P`).
The constrained equal award solution of the game (N, v,P) for player i ∈ Pk, k ∈ R
is then defined by
CEAi(N, v,P) = CEAi(Pk, CEAk(R, vP), (Mj(v,P))j∈Pk).
The CEA solution of a bankruptcy situation with a priori unions coincides with the
CEA solution of the corresponding game (N, vCEA,P), as is shown in the following
proposition, where vCEA is the multi-issue allocation game obtained by applying the
CEA rule in the last issue.
Proposition 10.3.1 For every (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN we have that CEA(N, E, c,P) =
CEA(N, vCEA,P).
Proof: Let (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN . First, it follows of the definition of the game vCEA
(or indeed of vf for any bankruptcy rule f) that




for all L ⊂ R and hence, the games (R, (vCEA)P) and (R, vE,cP ) coincide. So,
CEAk(R, (v
CEA)P) = CEAk(R, vE,cP ) = CEAk(R, E, c
P) = ECEAk
for all k ∈ R.




CEAi(Pk, E, (cj)j∈Pk) if E ≤ cPk ,
ci if E > c
P
k ,
where for both ∪`∈R\{k}P` ∪ {i} and ∪`∈R\{k}P` any worst order on the issues starts
with issue k.
From the previous, we have
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for all i ∈ Pk, where for the second equality, observe that truncating i’s claim to
CEAi(Pk, E, (cj)j∈Pk) in case E ≤ cPk does not affect his payoff. This concludes the
proof. ¤
Using the associated bankruptcy game rather than the CEA multi-issue allocation
game with a priori unions yields a different outcome, as is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 10.3.1 Consider the 3-player bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) ∈ BRN with
E = 400 and c = (100, 100, 400). Suppose player 1 forms a union and players 2
and 3 form another one, that is, P = {P1, P2} with P1 = {1} and P2 = {2, 3}.
To find the CEA solution of the bankruptcy situation with unions (N, E, c,P),
we first consider the bankruptcy situation (R, E, cP) among the unions. We ob-
tain CEA(R, E, cP) = (100, 300) and then CEA(N, E, c,P) = (100, 100, 200). By
Proposition 10.3.1, we have that CEA(N, vCEA,P) = (100, 100, 200). To find
the CEA solution of the game (N, vE,c,P) we first consider the corresponding
game among the unions (R, vPE,c), which yields CEA(R, v
P
E,c) = (100, 300). Hence,
CEA1(N, vE,c,P) = 100. To determine the allocation of CEA23(R, vPE,c) to players
2 and 3, we compute the utopia payoffs M2(vE,c,P) = 0 and M3(vE,c,P) = 300.
Hence CEA(N, vE,c,P) = (100, 0, 300) 6= CEA(N, E, c,P). /
10.4 Characterisations of CEA
In this section we use the axiomatic method to support the two-stage procedure
presented in the previous section. We provide two different sets of axioms to char-
acterise the CEA rule, extending two previous characterisations of the CEA rule
for standard bankruptcy problems. Consider the following properties for a rule
ϕ : BUN → RN .
Composition (COMP): For each (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN , ϕ(N,E, c,P) =
ϕ(N, E ′, c,P) + ϕ(N, E − E ′, c− ϕ(N, E ′, c,P),P) for all 0 ≤ E ′ ≤ E.
This property considers the situation in which after the estate (E ′) has been
divided among the players, this estate is reevaluated and turns out to be a bigger
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amount (E). In these cases, we have two options. We can cancel the initial division
and apply the rule to the new problem, or we can preserve the initial division and
apply the rule to the increment of the estate by considering a new vector of claims,
taking into account the quantities already received. The composition property says
that both options should lead to the same result.
Path independence (PI): For each (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN , ϕ(N,E, c,P) =
ϕ(N,E, ϕ(N, E ′, c,P),P) for all E ′ ≥ E.
Here, the opposite situation is considered, one where the estate (E) is smaller
than the one initially considered (E ′). Then, we can apply the rule to the new prob-
lem or divide the new estate by taking the initial divisions as claim vector. Path
independence states that both ways of proceeding should result in the same payoffs.
Equal treatment within the unions (ET): For each (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN
and for each pair of players i, j within a union Pk ∈ P such that ci = cj,
ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ϕj(N, E, c,P).
This property requires that players of the same union with equal claims obtain
equal payoffs.
Quotient problem property (QPP): For each (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN and for each
union Pk ∈ P ,
∑
i∈Pk ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ϕk(R, E, cP ,PR).
In a bankruptcy situation with unions we can consider the associated quotient
problem where the unions negotiate about the division of the estate. After this, a
negotiation within every union takes place. The quotient problem property states
that the total payoff to the players of a union in the initial problem must equal the
payoff to this union in the quotient problem. Note that if ϕ is the two-step extension
f̄ of a bankruptcy rule f , then ϕk(R,E, c
P ,PR) = Efk = fk(R, E, cP).
Invariance under claims truncation within the unions (ICT): For each
(N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN and for every player i in a union Pk ∈ P such that ci >∑
j∈Pk ϕj(N, E, c,P), we have ϕ(N, E, c,P) = ϕ(N, E, c′,P), where c′j = cj for all
j ∈ N \ {i} and c′i =
∑
j∈Pk ϕj(N, E, c,P).
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Suppose the claim of a player is greater than the total quantity that his union
gets according to ϕ. Then ICT states that the outcome is not affected if we replace
the claim of this player by the total payoff to his union.
Sustainability of players within the unions (SUS): For each (N,E, c,P) ∈
BUN and for every player i who is sustainable within his union Pk ∈ P , ie,∑
j∈Pk min{ci, cj} ≤ ϕk(R,E, cP ,PR), we have ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ci.
This property establishes a protective criterion within each union in the sense
that small claims should be completely satisfied. The claim of player i is considered
sustainable within his union if the worth of this union in the quotient problem is
enough to pay each player in this union his claim, truncated to the claim of player
i.
Composition and path independence are in essence identical to the correspond-
ing properties for bankruptcy rules (cf. Young (1988) and Moulin (1987)). Equal
treatment within the unions is a weak version of the equal treatment property for
bankruptcy rules. Invariance under claims truncation within the unions and sus-
tainability of players within the unions are natural extensions of the corresponding
properties for bankruptcy rules to this context of a priori unions. Note that the quo-
tient problem property implies that the rule ϕ must involve some two-step procedure
to obtain the solution.
In the following theorem we present the first characterisation of the CEA rule.
This theorem is inspired by a similar result for the CEA rule for bankruptcy situa-
tions in Dagan (1996).
Theorem 10.4.1 The CEA rule is the unique rule for bankruptcy situations with
a priori unions that satisfies equal treatment within the unions, composition, the
quotient problem property and invariance under claims truncation within the unions.
Proof: First, we show that CEA satisfies these four properties. Equal treatment
within the unions and the quotient problem property follow immediately from the
definitions. To show that CEA satisfies the composition property, let Pk ∈ P and
let i ∈ Pk.
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Then
CEAi(N,E, c,P) = CEAi(Pk, ECEAk , (cj)j∈Pk).
Consider now 0 ≤ E ′ ≤ E. Then
CEAi(N,E
′, c,P) = CEAi(Pk, ECEA′k , (cj)j∈Pk),
with ECEA
′
k = CEAk(R, E
′, cP) ≤ ECEAk . Define c′ = c − CEA(N,E ′, c,P). Then
we have
CEAi(N,E − E ′, c′,P) = CEAi(Pk, CEAk(R,E − E ′, (c′)P), (c′j)j∈Pk).
Because the constrained equal award rule for bankruptcy situations satisfies com-
position (cf. Dagan (1996)), we have
ECEAk − ECEA
′
k = CEAk(R, E, c
P)− CEAk(R, E ′, cP)
= CEAk(R, E − E ′, cP − CEA(R,E ′, cP))
= CEAk(R, E − E ′, (c′)P),















′, c,P) + CEAi(Pk, CEAk(R, E − E ′, (c′)P), (c′j)j∈Pk)
= CEAi(N, E
′, c,P) + CEAi(N, E − E ′, c′,P),
where in the second equality we again use that CEA satisfies composition. Hence,
we conclude that CEA satisfies composition. The proof of invariance under claims
truncation within the unions follows similar lines.
To show the reverse, let ϕ : BUN → RN be a rule satisfying ET, QPP, COMP
and ICT. Let (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN and consider the quotient problem (R, E, cP ,PR).
Without loss of generality, assume that 0 ≤ cP1 ≤ . . . ≤ cPr . In Proposition 1 of
Dagan (1996) it is established that the constrained equal award rule is the only rule
for bankruptcy situations that satisfies the bankruptcy equivalents of ET, COMP
144 CHAPTER 10. BANKRUPTCY WITH A PRIORI UNIONS
and ICT. Since the quotient problem with PR is basically a bankruptcy situation,
it follows that ϕk(R,E, c
P ,PR) = ECEAk for all k ∈ R.
Now, we consider the first union P1 ∈ P . Suppose without loss of generality that
P1 = {1, . . . , n1} and that c11 ≤ . . . ≤ c1n1 .
Step 1. If 0 ≤ E ≤ rc11, then ECEA1 ≤ c11 and because of ICT, QPP and ET,
ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N,E, c,P) for all i ∈ P1.
If rc11 < E ≤ rc11 + rc11(1 − 1n1 ), then equality is established using COMP.
Next, COMP can be used for rc11 + rc11(1 − 1n1 ) < E ≤ rc11 + rc11(1 −
1
n1
) + rc11(1 − 1n1 )2. Repeating the same construction infinitely many times,
ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N,E, c,P) for all i ∈ P1 if 0 ≤ E ≤ rn1c11.
Step 2. If rn1c11 < E ≤ rn1c11+r(c12−c11), by COMP we have ϕ(N, E, c,P) = x+
ϕ(N, E−rn1c11, c−x,P), where as a result of Step 1, xi = ϕi(N, rn1c11, c,P) =
CEAi(N, rn1c11, c,P) = c11 for all i ∈ P1. Furthermore, E − rn1c11 ≤
r(c12− c11). So because of QPP (keeping in mind that between the unions we
have the CEA solution), ICT and ET we have ϕi(N, E − rn1c11, c − x,P) =
CEAi(N, E − rn1c11, c − x,P) for all i ∈ P1 and hence, ϕi(N, E, c,P) =
CEAi(N, E, c,P) for all i ∈ P1.
Using a similar repetitive procedure as in Step 1, we obtain ϕi(N, E, c,P) =
CEAi(N, E, c,P) for all i ∈ P1 if 0 ≤ E ≤ rn1c11 + r(n1 − 1)(c12 − c11).
Repeating the same arguments, we conclude ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N, E, c,P) for
all i ∈ P1 if 0 ≤ E ≤ rn1c11 + r(n1 − 1)(c12 − c11) + . . . + r(c1n1 − c1,n1−1) =
r(c11 + . . . + c1n1) = rc
P
1 . It then follows from ϕ1(R,E, c
P ,PR) = ECEA1 and QPP
that ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N,E, c,P) for all 0 ≤ E ≤ c(N).
Now, we consider the second union P2 ∈ P . We distinguish between two cases.
If E ≤ rcP1 , then we can use the same arguments as in the first union to obtain
ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N, E, c,P) for all i ∈ P2.
So, assume that E > rcP1 . Because ϕ satisfies COMP, we have
ϕ(N, E, c,P) = ϕ(N, rcP1 , c,P) + ϕ(N,E − rcP1 , c− x,P),
where x = ϕ(N, rcP1 , c,P). By the previous case, ϕi(N, rcP1 , c,P) =
CEAi(N, rc
P
1 , c,P) for all i ∈ P2. With the second term, ϕ(N, E−rcP1 , c−x,P), we
proceed as with the first union with estate E − rcP1 and claims c− x and we obtain
ϕi(N, E − rcP1 , c− x,P) = CEAi(N, E − rcP1 , c− x,P) for all i ∈ P2. Note that in
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the problem (N, E− rcP1 , c−x,P) all the members of P1 obtain zero. Because CEA
satisfies COMP, we have ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N,E, c,P) for all i ∈ P2.
By repeating the same argument for all the unions, the statement follows. ¤
Our second characterisation is based on Herrero and Villar (2002). In order to give
this result, we first present some lemmas.
Lemma 10.4.2 If ϕ : BUN → RN is a rule that satisfies path independence and
sustainability of players within the unions then for every (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN we
have that ϕk(R,E, c
P ,PR) = ECEAk for all k ∈ R.
Proof: Let ϕ : BUN → RN be a rule satisfying PI and SUS and let (N,E, c,P) ∈
BUN . Consider the associated quotient problem (R,E, cP ,PR). Theorem 1 in Her-
rero and Villar (2002) states that the constrained equal award rule is the only rule
for bankruptcy situations that satisfies the bankruptcy equivalents of path indepen-
dence and sustainability. From this, the statement readily follows. ¤
Lemma 1 in Herrero and Villar (2002) states that if a bankruptcy rule satisfies path
independence and sustainability, then it satisfies equal treatment of equals. In a
similar way we can establish the next result for a rule for bankruptcy situations
with a priori unions.
Lemma 10.4.3 If a rule for bankruptcy problems with a priori unions satisfies the
quotient problem property, path independence and sustainability within the unions,
then it satisfies equal treatment within the unions.
Now we can give our second axiomatic characterisation of the CEA rule.
Theorem 10.4.4 The CEA rule is the unique rule for bankruptcy problems with
a priori unions that satisfies path independence, sustainability of players within the
unions and the quotient problem property.
Proof: It is readily seen that CEA satisfies sustainability of players within the
unions and the quotient problem property. The proof for path independence follows
similar lines to the proof for composition and therefore we omit it.
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Next, let ϕ : BUN → RN be a rule for BUN satisfying QPP, PI and SUS and
let (N, E, c,P) ∈ BUN . Let Pk ∈ P . We have to show that ϕi(N, E, c,P) =
CEAi(N,E, c,P) for all i ∈ Pk. As a result of Lemma 10.4.2 and QPP, we have∑
i∈Pk = ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ECEAk . We use the following notation: nk1 = maxi∈Pk ci,
Nk1 = {i ∈ Pk | ci = nk1}, nk2 = maxi∈Pk\Nk1 ci, Nk2 = {i ∈ Pk | ci = nk2}.




k and because ϕ
satisfies SUS, ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ci = CEAi(N, E, c,P) for all i ∈ Pk.
Step 2. Suppose only the claims of the players in Pk\Nk1 are sustainable in Pk.
(If Pk = N
k
1 , then we can immediately apply ET.) Then ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ci
for all i ∈ Pk\Nk1 and as a result of ET (using Lemma 10.4.3), the members
of Nk1 all receive the same amount, which is at least n
k
2 because this claim is
sustainable. Using QPP, we obtain ϕi(N,E, c,P) = CEAi(N,E, c,P) for all
i ∈ Pk.
Step 3. Next, suppose only the claims of the players in Pk\(Nk1 ∪Nk2 ) are sustainable
in Pk. Let E
′ > E be such that ϕk(R, E ′, cP ,PR) is the minimum quantity
that sustains the claims of Pk\Nk1 within union Pk, which is possible because
of Lemma 10.4.2 and the basic properties of CEA. Let c′ = ϕ(N,E ′, c,P).
By Step 1, c′i = ci for all i ∈ Pk\Nk1 and because we chose E ′ minimal,
c′i = c
′
j for all i, j ∈ Nk1 ∪ Nk2 . Because ϕ and CEA satisfy PI, we have
ϕi(N, E, c,P) = ϕi(N,E, c′,P) and CEAi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N,E, c′,P)
for all i ∈ N . By Step 1, ϕi(N, E, c′,P) = CEAi(N, E, c′,P) for all i ∈ Pk
and hence, ϕi(N,E, c,P) = CEAi(N, E, c,P) for all i ∈ Pk.
Repeating this procedure, we obtain ϕi(N, E, c,P) = CEAi(N, E, c,P) for all i ∈
Pk. ¤
10.5 Consistent two-step rules
In this section we define the second two-step extension of bankruptcy rules to
bankruptcy situations with a priori unions. As in section 3, we use the CEA rule
to illustrate this new extension and hence we obtain a second extension of the CEA
rule for bankruptcy situations to bankruptcy situations with a priori unions, which
we call RACEA. We also introduce a property of consistency which we subsequently
use to characterise this extension.
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Let f : BRN → RN be a game-theoretic bankruptcy rule and let (N, E, c,P) ∈
BUN . We define the f -random arrival rule, RAf : BUN → RN , in the following
way:






fi(Pk, Eτ , (cj)j∈Pk)







The interpretation of this rule is similar to that of other solutions inspired by
ideas of random arrival (cf. O’Neill (1982)). Here, we assume that the claims of the
different unions are satisfied following a fixed order. If at the moment to allocate
money to a particular union, the remaining estate is not enough to satisfy its total
claim, we use the rule f to distribute the money available within this union. The
f -random arrival rule allocates to a player the average of the amounts he obtains
according to the previous procedure over all the possible orders on the unions.
Note that if P = Pn, then we have RAf (N, E, c,Pn) = RTB(N, E, c), that is,
in this boundary case, RAf coincides with the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy
problems for every bankruptcy rule f . If P = PN , then because f is game-theoretic
the f -random arrival rule coincides with the rule f .
In the next example, we illustrate the CEA-random arrival rule.
Example 10.5.1 We compute RACEA in the bankruptcy situation with a priori
unions of example 10.2.1. If the claims of the union P1 are satisfied first, then the
players obtain (100, 100, 200), whereas if the claims of the union P2 are satisfied first
the players obtain (0, 100, 300). Computing the average of the previous amounts,
we obtain RACEA(N, E, c,P) = (50, 100, 250). Note that RACEA(N, E, c,P) differs
from both CEA(N, E, c,P) and CEA(N, vE,c,P). /
Now, we define the property of consistency for bankruptcy with a priori unions rules
which resembles the property of issue-consistency described in section 9.4. A rule
ϕ : BUN → RN is consistent if for every (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN , for each union Pk ∈ P






′, (cj)j∈Pk ,PPk) +
∑
`∈R,` 6=k ϕi(N\P`, E−`, c−`,P−`)
]
,
where E ′ = min{E, cPk }, E−` = max{E − cP` , 0}, c−` = (cj)j∈N\P` and P−` is the
partition of the set N\P` induced by P .
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So, a rule is consistent if in a bankruptcy problem with a priori unions it allocates
to a player the average of what he gets when the rule is applied to the problem
restricted to his own union and the solutions of the r − 1 bankruptcy situations in
which the estate is the amount that remains when each of the other unions gets
its maximum. Note that if P = Pn, this definition of consistency corresponds to
O’Neill consistency as defined in section 8.6.
Let f : BRN → RN be a game-theoretic bankruptcy rule. We say that a
consistent rule ϕ : BUN → RN is f -consistent if for every bankruptcy problem
(N,E, c) ∈ BRN we have that ϕ(N, E, c,PN) = f(N, E, c). That is, a rule is f -
consistent if it is consistent and it coincides with f when the a priori unions structure
P is the boundary system PN .
The next theorem establishes, for a fixed bankruptcy rule f , the existence and
uniqueness of an f -consistent rule. This result extends the O’Neill result of existence
and uniqueness of a bankruptcy consistent rule (the run-to-the-bank rule).
Theorem 10.5.1 For each game-theoretic bankruptcy rule f : BRN → RN , the
f -random arrival rule RAf is the unique f -consistent rule for bankruptcy situations
with a priori unions.
Proof: Let f : BRN → RN be a game-theoretic bankruptcy rule. First we
show that the f -random arrival rule, RAf , is f -consistent. We know that for ev-
ery bankruptcy problem (N, E, c) ∈ BRN , RAf (N, E, c,PN) = f(N,E, c). So,
it remains to be shown that RAf is consistent. Let (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN and let
i ∈ Pk, k ∈ R. Define Eσ, E ′ and E−` as before and E−`,τ = max{min{cPk , E−` −∑
t∈R\{`}:τ−1(t)<τ−1(k) c
P
t }, 0} for all τ ∈ Π(R), ` ∈ R. Then,































fi(Pk, E−`,τ , (cj)j∈Pk)
]










RAfi (N\P`, max{E − cP` , 0}, c−`,P−`)
]
.
Hence, RAf is consistent and therefore f -consistent.
Uniqueness of the f -consistent rule follows from a similar recursive argument as in
the proof of Theorem 8.6.1. ¤
O’Neill (1982) shows that the random arrival (run-to-the-bank) solution of a
bankruptcy situation coincides with the Shapley value of the corresponding
bankruptcy game. The next theorem extends this result by O’Neill to our con-
text, in the sense that the RA-random arrival rule coincides with the Owen value
(cf. Owen (1977)) of the corresponding bankruptcy game with a priori unions. We
omit the proof, which follows a similar line to the proof of the preceding theorem.
Theorem 10.5.2 Let (N,E, c,P) ∈ BUN . Then
RARA(N, E, c,P) = Ow(N, vE,c,P).
Now, from the previous two theorems, we immediately obtain the following result.
Theorem 10.5.3 The only rule for bankruptcy situations with a priori unions sat-
isfying random arrival-consistency is the Owen value of the associated bankruptcy
games with a priori unions.
In Winter (1992) and Hamiache (1999), the Owen value is axiomatically charac-
terised on the class of cooperative games with a priori unions by using two different
properties of consistency. Note that in the current chapter, we characterise the Owen
value on the class of bankruptcy situations with a priori unions, using a different




A characterisation of the τ value
11.1 Introduction
Most game-theoretic solution concepts that have been proposed in the literature are
defined on the basis of or characterised by properties. These properties are usually
formulated in terms of individual payoffs and reflect notions like monotonicity and
rationality. For some values, there exist additional characterisations in terms of
geometry. The best-known example is the Shapley value, which is the barycentre of
the extreme points of the Weber set (taking multiplicities into account).
For some classes of games, there exist nice geometric expressions for the compro-
mise value. In particular, the compromise value is the barycentre of the core cover
in big boss games (cf. Muto et al. (1988)) and 1-convex games (cf. Driessen (1988)).
In this chapter, which is based on González-Diaz et al. (2003), we extend the
APROP rule for bankruptcy situations to the whole class of compromise admissible
games. This extended rule, which we call τ ∗, turns out to be the barycentre of the
edges of the core cover (taking multiplicities into account). Since this rule coincides
with the compromise value if, after normalising such that each player’s minimal right
equals zero, each player’s utopia payoff is at most the value of the grand coalition,
our main result immediately provides a characterisation of the compromise value on
this class of games.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we extend the APROP rule to
the class of compromise admissible games and define the barycentre ζ of the edges
of the core cover. In section 3, we state our main result and give an overview of the
proof, which consists of six main steps. Finally, in section 4, we prove our result.
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11.2 The τ ∗ value
The literature offers many different bankruptcy rules (see section 7.2) and hence,
indirectly, rules for bankruptcy games. One interesting question is how these can be
extended in a natural way to the whole class of compromise admissible games. In
this chapter, we consider the proportional rule and the adjusted proportional rule1.






for all (N,E, c) ∈ BRN and i ∈ N . The adjusted proportional rule APROP first
gives each player i ∈ N his minimal right mi(E, c) = max{E −
∑
j∈N\{i} cj, 0} and
the remainder is divided using the proportional rule, where each player’s claim is
truncated to the estate left:
APROP (E, c) = m(E, c) + PROP (E ′, c′),
where E ′ = E −∑i∈N mi(E, c) and for all i ∈ N , c′i = min{ci −mi(E, c), E ′}.
The compromise value can be seen as an extension of the PROP rule:




Note that it follows from the definition of compromise admissibility that the argu-
ment of PROP is indeed a bankruptcy situation.
Similarly, we can extend the APROP rule:




To simplify the expression for τ ∗, we show that the minimum rights in the associated
bankruptcy situation equal 0. Let v ∈ CAN , E = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v), c = M(v)−
















1The extension of the Talmud rule is discussed in Quant et al. (2003), while in Quant et al.
(2004) a more general framework is considered, including the run-to-the-bank rule, the constrained
equal award rule and the constrained equal loss rule.
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since mi(v) ≥ v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{i} Mj(v). Hence, mi(E, c) = max{E−
∑
j∈N\{i} cj, 0} =
0. As a result, we have
τ ∗(v) = m(v) + PROP (E ′, c′) (11.1)
with E ′ = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v) and c′i = min{Mi(v)−mi(v), E ′} for all i ∈ N .
It follows that for a game v ∈ CAN with Mi(v) −mi(v) ≤ v(N) −
∑
j∈N mj(v)
for all i ∈ N , τ ∗ coincides with the compromise value τ .
The extended rule τ ∗ turns out to be a kind of barycentre of the core cover,
which is the main result of this chapter. To define this barycentre rule ζ, we need
to introduce some more concepts. For a permutation2 σ ∈ Π(N), σi,j denotes the
permutation obtained from σ by switching players i and j. Two permutations σ and
σσ(p),σ(p+1) are called permutation neighbours. The set of permutation neighbours of
σ is denoted by Πσ(N).
The core cover is a polytope whose extreme points are called larginal vectors or
larginals. The larginal `σ ∈ RN corresponding to order σ ∈ Π(N) (cf. Quant et al.


















for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Note that two permutations that are neighbours yield larginals which are adjacent
extreme points of the core cover (possibly coinciding), which we subsequently also
call permutation neighbours.















2In this chapter, we use the term permutation rather than ordering for an element of Π(N)
3In the degenerate case where M = m, the core cover consists of a single point, in which case we
define ζ to be this point. Otherwise, there are at least two different larginals and the denominator
is positive.
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equals the sum of the Euclidean distances between `σ(v) and all its permutation
neighbours, divided by the common factor
√
2 to simplify later expressions. The
ζ value can be viewed as the barycentre of the edges of the core cover, taking
multiplicities into account.
To simplify the proofs later on by getting rid of the minimum rights and capping
the utopia payoffs, we first show that both τ ∗ and ζ satisfy the properties (SEQ) and
(RTRUNC). Two games v and v̂ are called strategically equivalent if there exists a
real number k > 0 and a vector a ∈ RN such that for all S ⊂ N ,
v̂(S) = kv(S) + a(S). (11.3)
A function f : CAN → RN is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence
(SEQ) if for all v, v̂ ∈ CAN such that for all S ⊂ N (11.3) holds for some k > 0, a ∈
RN , we have
f(v̂) = kf(v) + a.
It is well-known that the utopia vector M and the minimum right vector m both
satisfy (SEQ).
Proposition 11.2.1 The τ ∗ rule and the ζ rule satisfy (SEQ).
Proof: The proof for τ ∗ is straightforward and therefore omitted.
It readily follows from (SEQ) of m and M that `σ also satisfies (SEQ) for all σ ∈
Π(N). Let v, v̂ ∈ CAN be such that for some k > 0, a ∈ RN (11.3) holds for all





































= kζ(v) + a.
And so, ζ satisfies (SEQ). ¤
A rule f : CAN → RN satisfies the restricted truncation property (RTRUNC) if for
all v ∈ CAN with m(v) = 0 it holds that for all v̂ ∈ CAN with v̂(N) = v(N),
m(v̂) = 0 and Mi(v̂) = min{Mi(v), v(N)} we have f(v̂) = f(v). The idea behind
(RTRUNC) is that if a player’s utopia value (or, in bankruptcy terms, his claim) is
higher than the value of the grand coalition (the estate), his payoff according to f
should not be influenced by truncating this claim.
Proposition 11.2.2 The τ ∗ rule and the ζ rule satisfy (RTRUNC).
Proof: Let v ∈ CAN with m(v) = 0. Then (11.1) reduces to
τ ∗(v) = PROP (v(N), (min{Mi(v), v(N)})i∈N).
From this it immediately follows that τ ∗ satisfies (RTRUNC).
For the ζ rule, it suffices to note that truncating the utopia vector has no influence
on the larginal vectors. ¤
11.3 Main result
In this section, we present the main result of this chapter: equality between τ ∗ and
ζ on CAN . After dealing with some simple cases, we present a six step outline of
the proof, which we give in the next section.
Theorem 11.3.1 Let v ∈ CAN . Then
τ ∗(v) = ζ(v).
As a result of Proposition 11.2.1, it suffices to show equality for every game v ∈ CAN
with m(v) = 0. Next, we can use Proposition 11.2.2 and conclude that we have to
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In case there are only two players, equality between τ ∗ and ζ follows from M1(v) =
M2(v) = v(N).
If Mi(v) = 0 for a player i ∈ N , then we have τ ∗i (v) = ζi(v) = 0. Fur-
thermore, for each σ ∈ Π(N), the payoff to the players in N\{i} according
to `σ(v) equals their payoff in the situation without player i6 according to the
larginal corresponding to the restricted permutation σN\{i} ∈ Π(N\{i}), defined
by σ−1N\{i}(h) < σ
−1
N\{i}(j) ⇔ σ−1(h) < σ−1(j) for all h, j ∈ N\{i}. It is readily veri-
fied that also the total weight of each larginal (taking multiplicities into account) is
the same in the game with and without player i. Hence, we can omit player i from
the game and establish equality between τ ∗ and ζ for the remaining players.7
We establish equality between τ ∗ and ζ by combining the permutations in the
numerator and denominator in (11.2) into so-called chains. In the denominator,
these chains allow us to combine terms in such a way that the total weight can be
expressed as a simple function of M(v). In the numerator, we construct an iterative
procedure to find an expression for the weighted larginals, in which the chains allow
us to keep track of changes that occur from one iteration to the next.
The proof of Theorem 11.3.1 consists of six steps:
1. We first find an expression for the weight of each permutation. This is done
by introducing the concept of pivot and classifying each permutation in terms
of its pivot and its neighbours’ pivots.
2. Using the concept of pivot, we introduce chains, which constitute a partition
of the set of all permutations. The results of the previous step are then used
to compute the total weight of each chain.
4Note that the condition Mi(v) ≤ v(N) is necessary and sufficient to have Mi(v) =
maxσ∈Π(N) `σi (v). Only in this case, the utopia vector can be reconstructed from the core cover.
5The denominator is zero if and only if M(v) = 0 (= m(v)). In this degenerate case equality
between τ∗ and ζ is trivial and we therefore assume M(v) 	 0.
6Ie, the situation with player set N\{i}, utopia vector MN\{i}(v) and the same amount v(N)
to be distributed.
7Geometrically, the core cover, which lies in the hyperplane Mi(v) = 0, is projected onto a
space which is one dimension lower.
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3. We define a family of auxiliary functions f ij and gij, which are used to show
that each player “belongs” to the same number of chains. As a result, we use
our expression of the previous step to compute the total of all the weights, ie,
the denominator in (11.2).
4. In the numerator, we partition the set of chains on the basis of the first player
in each permutation. Within each part, we compute the total weighted payoff
to all the players. For the first player, this total weighted payoff can easily be
computed.
5. The expression for the payoffs to the other players is proved using an iterative
argument, varying the utopia vector while keeping v(N) constant. We start
with a utopia vector for which our expression is trivial and lower this vector
step by step until we reach M(v). In each step of the iteration, (generically)
only two chains change and using this, we show that the total weighted payoff
to each player who is not first does not change as function of the utopia vector.
6. Combining the previous three steps, we derive an expression for ζ and show
that this equals τ ∗.
11.4 Proof of main result
Throughout this section, let v ∈ CAN be such that |N | ≥ 3, m(v) = 0, M(v) > 0,









Since v is fixed for the remainder of this section, we suppress it as argument and
write M rather than M(v), etc. The weight wσ(v) is denoted by w(σ).
Step 1: pivots
Let σ ∈ Π(N). Player σ(p) with p ≥ 2 is called the pivot in `σ if `σσ(p−1) = Mσ(p−1),
`σσ(p) > 0 and `
σ
σ(p+1) = 0. The pivot of a larginal is the player who gets a lower
amount according this larginal if the amount v(N) is decreased slightly. In the
boundary case where Mσ(1) = v(N), v(N) cannot be decreased without violating
the condition Mσ(1) ≤ v(N). In this case, player σ(2) is defined to be the pivot,
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being the player who gets a higher amount if v(N) is increased slightly. Note that
m = 0 implies that
∑
j∈N\{i} Mj ≥ v(N) for all i ∈ N and hence, player σ(n) can
never be the pivot.
In the following example, we introduce a game which we use throughout this
section to illustrate the various concepts.
Example 11.4.1 Consider the game (N, v) with N = {1, . . . , 5}, v(N) = 10 and
M = (5, 7, 1, 3, 4). For this game, we have τ ∗ = ζ = 1
2
M . Take σ1 to be the identity
permutation, ie, σ1(i) = i for all i ∈ N . Then
`σ1 = (5, 5, 0, 0, 0)
and player 2 is the pivot. /
For a permutation σ ∈ Π(N), we define pσ to be the position at which the pivot8
is located. We define σL = σσ(pσ−1),σ(pσ) to be the left neighbour of σ and σR =
σσ(pσ),σ(pσ+1) to be the right neighbour of σ. It follows from the definition of pivot
that the left and right neighbours of `σ are the only two permutation neighbours
that can give rise to a larginal different from `σ.
Recall that the weight of `σ, w(σ), equals the sum of the (Euclidean) distances
between `σ and all its permutation neighbours. In line with the previous paragraph,












We classify the larginals into four categories, depending on the pivot in the left and
right neighbours. Let σ = (. . . , h, i, j, . . .) be a permutation with pivot i. Then the
four types are given in the following table:
Type Pivot in σL Pivot in σ Pivot in σR
PPP i i i
−PP h i i
PP− i i j
−P− h i j
We can now determine the weight of each larginal, depending on its type. Take
σ ∈ Π(N) to be the identity permutation and assume that `σ is of type PP− and
has pivot i. Then
8As with neighbour, we use the term pivot as property of a permutation as well as the corre-
sponding larginal.
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`σ = (M1, . . . , Mi−2, Mi−1, v(N)−
i−1∑
j=1
Mj, 0, . . . , 0),
`σ
L
= (M1, . . . , Mi−2, 0, v(N)−
i−2∑
j=1
Mj, 0, . . . , 0),
`σ
R
= (M1, . . . , Mi−2, Mi−1, 0, v(N)−
i−1∑
j=1

























Doing these calculations for all types and arbitrary σ ∈ Π(N), we obtain the follow-
ing weights:
Type w(σ)
PPP Mσ(pσ−1) + Mσ(pσ+1)
−PP ∑pσ+1k=1 Mσ(k) − v(N)
PP− v(N)−∑pσ−2k=1 Mσ(k)
−P− Mσ(pσ)
Example 11.4.2 With σ1 the identity permutation, we have (the player with ˆ is
the pivot):
σ1 = (1, 2̂, 3, 4, 5) `
σ1 = (5, 5, 0, 0, 0)
σL1 = (2, 1̂, 3, 4, 5) `
σL1 = (3, 7, 0, 0, 0)
σR1 = (1, 3, 2̂, 4, 5) `
σR1 = (5, 4, 1, 0, 0)











= 2 + 1
= 3.
Indeed, we have w(σ1) =
∑pσ1+1
k=1 Mσ1(k) − v(N) = M1 + M2 + M3 − v(N) = 5 + 7 +
1− 10 = 3, as the table shows. /
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Step 2: chains
A chain of length q and with pivot i is a set of q permutations Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} such
that
• (σm)R = σm+1 for all m ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1},
• i is the pivot in σm for all m ∈ {1, . . . , q},
• i is not the pivot in σL1 and σRq .
If q = 1, then it follows from the definitions of the four types that σ1 is of type −P−.
If q > 1, then σ1 is of type −PP , σm is of type PPP for all m ∈ {2, . . . , q − 1}
and σq is of type PP−. Observe that the set of all chains, which we denote by C,
constitutes a partition of the set of permutations Π(N).
Denoting by σ− the permutation on the n−1 players obtained from σ by removing
the pivot, we characterise the chains in the following lemma.
Lemma 11.4.1 Two permutations σ1, σ2 ∈ Π(N) are in the same chain if and only
if σ−1 = σ
−
2 .
Given the weights of the larginal vectors, depending on their type, we can easily
compute the weight of a chain Γ, which is simply defined as the total weight of its
elements, ie, w(Γ) =
∑
σ∈Γ w(σ).









k=1 Mσ1(k) − v(N) + Mσ1(p) + Mσ1(p+1)
w(σ2) = + Mσ1(p+1) + Mσ1(p+2)




w(σq−1) = + Mσ1(p+q−2) + Mσ1(p+q−1)
w(σq) = −
∑p−1
k=1 Mσ1(k) + v(N) −
∑p+q−2
k=p+1 Mσ1(k) +
w(Γ) = Mσ1(p) +
∑p+q−1
k=p+1 Mσ1(k)
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¤
We say that player i ∈ N belongs to chain Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} if i ∈
{σ1(pσ1), . . . , σ1(pσ1 +q−1)}, ie, if his position is not constant throughout the chain.
Alternatively, a player is said to belong to a chain if his utopia payoff contributes to
its weight. We define C(i) to be the set of chains to which i belongs. By P (i) ⊂ C(i)
we denote the set of chains in which i is the pivot and by P̄ (i) = C(i)\P (i) its
complement. For each Λ ∈ P̄ (i), we denote the permutation in Λ in which i is
immediately before the pivot by λbi and the permutation in which i is immediately
after the pivot by λai.
Example 11.4.3 Since player 2 is not the pivot in σL1 , σ1 is the first permutation
of a chain. This chain Γ consists of σ1, σ2 = σ
R
1 and σ3 = σ
R
2 , all having player 2 as




3 = (1, 3, 4, 5). Players 2, 3
and 4 belong to Γ and w(Γ) = M2 + M3 + M4 = 11. /
Step 3: denominator
In this step, we derive an expression for the denominator in (11.2). We do this by
showing that each player belongs to the same number of chains, ie,
|C(i)| = |C(j)| (11.4)
for all i, j ∈ N . If Mi = Mj, then this is trivial, so throughout this step, let i, j ∈ N
be such that Mi > Mj. We prove only one part of (11.4):
|P (j)|+ |P̄ (j)| ≤ |P (i)|+ |P̄ (i)|. (11.5)
The proof of the reverse inequality goes along similar lines, as will be indicated later
on.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 11.4.4 below is that |P (i)| ≥ |P (j)| and
|P̄ (j)| ≥ |P̄ (i)|. In Proposition 11.4.5 below we partner all the chains in P (j) to
some of the chains in P (i) and we partner all the chains P̄ (i) to some of the chains
in P̄ (j). We then show that for every chain in P̄ (j) which has no partner in P̄ (i),
we can find a chain in P (i) which has no partner in P (j). From this, (11.5) follows.
To partner the various chains, we define two auxiliary functions. First, we define
f ij:
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P (j)
f ij→ P (i)
∆ 7→ f ij(∆) = Λ
where ∆ = {δ1, . . . , δq} and Λ is the chain containing δi,j1 . Note that the function
f ij is well-defined: since Mi > Mj, player i is indeed the pivot in δ
i,j
1 and hence, in
Λ.
Similarly, we define the function gij:
P̄ (i)
gij→ P̄ (j)
Λ 7→ gij(Λ) = ∆
where for all Λ ∈ P̄ (i), ∆ is the chain containing λi,jbi .9
In the following lemma, we show that gij is well-defined, ie, that the chain ∆
thus constructed is indeed an element of the range of gij, P̄ (j).
Lemma 11.4.3 The function gij is well-defined.
Proof: Denote the pivot player in λbi (and hence, λai) by h. Observe that as
a result of Mi > Mj, player h cannot coincide with j. Distinguish between the
following two cases:
• i is before j in λbi:
λai = (. . . , ĥ, i, . . . , j, . . .) λ
i,j
ai = (. . . , ĥ, j, . . . , i, . . .)
λbi = (. . . , i, ĥ, . . . , j, . . .) λ
i,j
bi = (. . . , j, ĥ, . . . , i, . . .)
Since h is the pivot in λai, it immediately follows that h is also the pivot in
λi,jai . Player j cannot be the pivot in λ
i,j
bi , because i is before the pivot in λbi
and Mi > Mj. Combining this with the fact that h is the pivot in λ
i,j
ai , h is
also the pivot in λi,jbi . But then λ
i,j
ai belongs to the same chain ∆ as λ
i,j
bi . From
this, ∆ ∈ C(j), and because j is not the pivot in ∆, ∆ ∈ P̄ (j).
• j is before i in λbi:
9By λi,jbi we mean (λbi)
i,j , ie, the permutation which is obtained by switching i and j in the
permutation in Λ where i is immediately before the pivot.
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λai = (. . . , j, . . . , ĥ, i, . . .) λ
i,j
ai = (. . . , i, . . . , ĥ, j, . . .)
λbi = (. . . , j, . . . , i, ĥ, . . .) λ
i,j
bi = (. . . , i, . . . , j, ĥ, . . .)
Since h is the pivot in λbi, we immediately have that h is the pivot in λ
i,j
bi .
Because of this, the pivot in λi,jai cannot be before h. It can also not be after
h, because h is the pivot in λai and Mi > Mj. By the same argument as in
the first case, ∆ ∈ P̄ (j).
From these two cases, we conclude that gij is well-defined. ¤
For our partnering argument to hold, we need that the functions f ij and gij are
injective. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 11.4.4 The functions f ij and gij are injective.
Proof: To see that f ij is injective, let ∆, ∆̃ ∈ P (j) be such that f ij(∆) = f ij(∆̃).
By construction, i is the pivot in both f ij(∆) and f ij(∆̃), so i is the pivot in both
δi,j1 and δ̃
i,j
1 . Since by assumption these permutations are in the same chain, by
Lemma 11.4.1 we have (δi,j1 )
− = (δ̃i,j1 )
−. But since j is the pivot in both δ1 and δ̃1,
it follows that δ−1 = δ̃
−
1 . So, δ1 and δ̃1 are in the same chain and ∆ = ∆̃.
For injectivity of gij, let Λ, Λ̃ ∈ P̄ (i) be such that gij(Λ) = gij(Λ̃). Then λi,jbi and
λ̃i,jbi are in the same chain. By the proof of Lemma 11.4.3, j is just before the pivot
in both permutations and hence, λi,jbi = λ̃
i,j
bi . From this, we conclude λbi = λ̃bi and
Λ = Λ̃. ¤
From Lemma 11.4.4, we conclude
|P (j)| ≤ |P (i)|
and
|P̄ (i)| ≤ |P̄ (j)|.
With these inequalities, we can now apply our partnering argument to prove that
each player belongs to the same number of chains.
Proposition 11.4.5 Let i, j ∈ N . Then |C(i)| = |C(j)|.
164 CHAPTER 11. A CHARACTERISATION OF THE τ VALUE
Proof: If Mi = Mj, then the statement is trivial. Hence, assume without loss of
generality that Mi > Mj.
We only show (11.5). Let ∆ ∈ P̄ (j) be such that there exists no Λ ∈ P̄ (i) with
gij(Λ) = ∆. Denote the pivot in ∆ by h and distinguish between the following three
cases:
• h 6= i and i is after j in δbj:
δaj = (. . . , ĥ, j, . . . , i, . . .) δ
i,j
aj = (. . . , ĥ, i, . . . , j, . . .)
δbj = (. . . , j, ĥ, . . . , i, . . .) δ
i,j
bj = (. . . , î, h, . . . , j, . . .)
Of course, h is also the pivot in δi,jaj . If h were the pivot in δ
i,j
bj , then δ
i,j
aj and
δi,jbj would be element of the same chain Λ ∈ P̄ (i). But then gij(Λ) = ∆, which
is impossible by assumption. Since Mi > Mj, player i must be the pivot in
δi,jbj . The chain to which δ
i,j
bj belongs cannot be an image under f
ij, since it is
obtained by switching i and j in a permutation in which j is not the pivot.
Furthermore, two different starting chains ∆, ∆̃ ∈ P̄ (j) cannot give rise to one
single chain containing both δi,jbj and δ̃
i,j
bj , because both permutations are of
type PP− or −P− and there can be only one such permutation in a chain.
• h 6= i and i is before j in δbj:
δaj = (. . . , i, . . . , ĥ, j, . . .) δ
i,j
aj = (. . . , j, . . . , h, î, . . .)
δbj = (. . . , i, . . . , j, ĥ, . . .) δ
i,j
bj = (. . . , j, . . . , i, ĥ, . . .)
Again, it easily follows that h is pivot in δi,jbj and by the same argument as
in the first case, i must be pivot in δi,jaj . Also, the chain to which δ
i,j
aj belongs
cannot be an image under f ij and two different starting chains ∆, ∆̃ ∈ P̄ (j)
cannot give rise to one single chain containing both δi,jaj and δ̃
i,j
aj , because both
permutations are of type −PP or −P−. Moreover, the chains constructed in
this second case, containing δi,jaj , must differ from the chains constructed in the
first case, containing δi,jbj , as a result of the relative positions of h and j.
• h = i:
δaj = (. . . , î, j, . . .) δ
i,j
aj = (. . . , j, î, . . .)
δbj = (. . . , j, î, . . .) δ
i,j
bj = (. . . , î, j, . . .)
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Obviously, i is the pivot in both δi,jaj and δ
i,j
bj . So, these two permutations belong
to the same chain Λ ∈ P (i). Again Λ cannot be an image under f ij, and since
Λ = ∆, different starting chains give rise to different Λ’s. Finally, the chains
constructed in this case must differ from the chains in the first two cases,
because the new ones are elements of P̄ (j), whereas the chains constructed in
the first two cases are elements of C\C(j).
Combining the three cases, for every element of P̄ (j) that is not an image under
gij of any chain in P̄ (i), we have found a different element of P (i) that is not
an image under f ij of any chain in P (j). Together with Lemma 11.4.4, we have
|P (j)|+ |P̄ (j)| ≤ |P (i)|+ |P̄ (i)|.
Similarly, by taking Λ ∈ P (i) such that there exists no ∆ ∈ P (j) with Λ = f ij(∆),
one can prove the reverse inequality of (11.5). Combining the two inequalities, we
conclude |C(i)| = |C(j)|. ¤
Using the previous proposition, we can compute the total weight of all larginals.
Proposition 11.4.6
∑
σ∈Π(N) w(σ) = (n− 1)!
∑
i∈N Mi.
Proof: First note that for every chain Γ ∈ C, we have |Γ| = |{j ∈ N |Γ ∈ C(j)}|.
As a result of Proposition 11.4.5, we have
∑
Γ∈C |{j ∈ N |Γ ∈ C(j)}| = n|C(i)| for
all i ∈ N . But then, since ∑Γ∈C |Γ| = n!, we conclude that |C(i)| = n!n = (n−1)! for
all i ∈ N , so each player belongs to (n−1)! chains. Then the statement immediately
follows from Lemma 11.4.2. ¤
Step 4: numerator, first player
Now we turn our attention to the numerator of (11.2). For this, we partition the set
of chains into subsets with the same starting player:
Ck = {{σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ C | σ1(1) = k}.
Note that since player k is by definition never the pivot in σ1, he is also the first
player in σ2, . . . , σq. It is easily verified that {Ck}k∈N is indeed a partition of C.
For a chain Γ = {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ C, we define LΓ to be the weighted sum of its
corresponding larginals:






We compute the numerator in (11.2) by combining the permutations that belong




i for each player i ∈ N .
In this step, we consider the special case where i = k, while in the next step we
compute the payoff to the other players.
Lemma 11.4.7 For all i ∈ N , ∑Γ∈Ci LΓi = (n− 2)!Mi
∑
j∈N\{i} Mj.
Proof: In a similar way as in Proposition 11.4.5, one can show that |Ci ∩ C(j)| =
|Ci ∩ C(k)| for all j, k ∈ N\{i}. Analogous to Proposition 11.4.6, we then have∑
σ∈Π(N):σ(1)=i w(σ) = (n − 2)!
∑
j∈N\{i} Mj. Since player i always gets Mi at the
first position, the statement follows. ¤
Step 5: numerator, other players
In this step, we finish the expression for the numerator in (11.2) by computing∑
Γ∈Ck L
Γ
i for all i ∈ N, i 6= k. First, in a similar way as in Lemma 11.4.2, one can
compute the total weighted larginal for each chain, as is done in the next lemma.





w(Γ)Mj if s < pσ1 ,
(v(N)−∑pσ1−1k=1 Mσ1(k))Mj if j = i,
(v(N)−∑s−1k=1,k 6=pσ1 Mσ1(k) +
∑pσ1+q−1
k=s+1 Mσ1(k))Mj if Γ ∈ P̄ (j),
0 if s > pσ1 + q − 1.
Example 11.4.4 Of course, LΓ1 = w(Γ)M1 = 11 · 5 = 55 and LΓ5 = 0. For player 2,
the pivot, we have
LΓ2 = w(σ1)(v(N)−M1) + w(σ2)(v(N)−M1 −M3)
+w(σ3)(v(N)−M1 −M3 −M4)
= 3 · (10− 5) + 4 · (10− 5− 1) + 4 · (10− 5− 1− 3)
= 35.
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Indeed, this equals (v(N) − ∑pσ1−1k=1 Mσ1(k))M2 = (10 − 5) · 7, as stated in
Lemma 11.4.8.
For player 3, who belongs to Γ but is not the pivot, we have
LΓ3 = w(σ1) · 0 + w(σ2)M3 + w(σ3)M3
= 0 + 4 · 1 + 4 · 1
= 8,
which equals the expression in Lemma 11.4.8. For player 4, the computation is
similar. /
Lemma 11.4.9 For all i, k ∈ N, i 6= k, we have ∑Γ∈Ck LΓi = (n−2)!(v(N)−Mk)Mi.
Proof: We prove the assertion using an iterative procedure, varying the utopia
payoffs while keeping v(N) constant. We denote the utopia vector in iteration t by
M t and throughout the procedure, this vector satisfies all our assumptions. We first
show that the statement holds for M1 = (v(N), . . . , v(N)) ≥ M . Then we iteratively
reduce the components of the utopia vector one by one until we, after finitely many
steps, end up in M . For every M t, we show that for the corresponding (induced) set




i , equals (n− 2)!(v(N)−M tk)M ti .
Step 1
Take M1 = (v(N), . . . , v(N)). Then all the chains consist of one permutation, in
which the second player is the pivot. Player i gets 0 if he is after the pivot and
v(N) − M1k if he is the pivot. There are (n − 2)! chains in Ck in which the latter




i = (n− 2)!(v(N)−M1k )M1i .
Step t
Suppose the statement holds for utopia vector M t−1. If M t−1 = M , then we are
finished. Otherwise, there exists a j ∈ N such that M t−1j > Mj. We now reduce j’s
utopia payoff until one of the chains changes, or until Mj is reached.
A chain changes if in one of its permutations, the pivot changes. Obviously, this
can only happen if player j is the pivot or before the pivot. Because in the first
168 CHAPTER 11. A CHARACTERISATION OF THE τ VALUE
permutation of each chain the gap between what the pivot gets and his utopia payoff
is smallest, this permutation is the first to change. Denoting this gap corresponding
to σ ∈ Π(N) by γ(σ), ie,




the first chain changes when j’s utopia payoff is decreased by
γ = min{γ(σ1) | {σ1, . . . , σq} ∈ Ck, σ−11 (j) ≤ pσ1}. (11.6)
Assume for the moment that the corresponding argument contains one element and
denote its first permutation by σ̂.
If γ ≥ M t−1j − Mj, then decreasing j’s utopia payoff from M t−1j to Mj does not
result in any change in the chains. In this case, the statement holds for M tj defined




h for all h ∈ N\{j} and we proceed to step t + 1.
Otherwise, take M th = M
t−1
h for all h ∈ N\{j} and M tj = M t−1j − (γ + ε), where
ε > 0 is chosen small enough such that σ̂ is the only permutation in which the pivot
changes. In particular, the pivot remains the same in the second permutation of the
same chain and in the first permutations of all the other chains.
As mentioned before, σ̂ is the first in a chain, say Γ ∈ Ck. So, σ̂ must be either of
type −P− or −PP . Define s = σ̂−1(i) and distinguish between the two cases:
• σ̂ is of type −P−:
σ̂R is part of another chain, say ∆ ∈ Ck with length q. Then the players
σ̂(pσ̂ − q + 1), . . . , σ̂(pσ̂ − 1) and σ̂(pσ̂ + 1) belong to ∆. When the pivot
changes in σ̂, this permutation joins ∆, as type PP−, forming chain ∆∪{σ̂}.
Hence, chain Γ = {σ̂} disappears and the length of ∆ is increased by one, while
the other chains are not affected. So, it suffices to show that LΓ,t−1i + L
∆,t−1
i
as function of M t−1 equals L∆∪{σ̂},ti as function of M
t. Using Lemma 11.4.8,
we have:





















i (i is before ∆ ∪ {σ̂}).
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i (Γ ∈ P (i)),








i (i is “last” in ∆ ∪ {σ̂}).
























i (∆ ∪ {σ̂} ∈ P̄ (i)).
– s = pσ̂ + 1:














i (∆ ∪ {σ̂} ∈ P (i)).





i = 0 (i is after all three chains).
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It is readily checked that in all cases, LΓ,t−1i +L
∆,t−1




i as function of M
t.
• σ̂ is −PP :
σ̂R belongs to the same chain as σ̂. When the pivot changes in σ̂, this per-
mutation will form a new chain of length one. In the same manner as in the
previous case, we can show that the total weighted payoff to i as function of
the utopia vector in these two chains remains the same.




i = (n−2)!(v(N)−M tk)M ti . Proceed
to step t + 1.
We assumed that the minimal gap in (11.6) is obtained for a unique permutation,
σ̂. Suppose now that there exists another permutation, σ̃, with this minimal gap.
Because the utopia payoffs are assumed to be strictly positive, σ̃ cannot be in the
same chain (Γ) as σ̂, but must be the first permutation of another chain (Γ̃). It
readily follows from the construction that also the two corresponding “neighbouring”
chains ∆ and ∆̃ are different, and moreover, they differ from Γ and Γ̃. Hence, we
can consider the analysis in step t for σ̂ and σ̃ separately to prove the statement.
Finally, our procedure stops after finitely many steps, because in all the changes,
the pivot concerned moves towards the back of a permutation. ¤
Step 6: final
In this final step, we combine our previous results to prove the main theorem.
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Hence, τ ∗ = ζ. ¤
As stated in section 2, for the class of compromise admissible games in which,
after normalising such that the minimal rights vector equals zero, each player’s
utopia payoff is at most the value of the grand coalition, the τ ∗ value coincides with
the compromise value. As a result, Theorem 11.3.1 gives a geometric characterisation
of the latter on this class of games.
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Dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal onderwerpen uit de coöperatieve speltheorie.
Deze stroming binnen de economische wetenschappen heeft als doel om economische
samenwerking formeel wiskundig te modelleren (als een zogeheten spel) om zo tot
een “eerlijke” verdeling van de vruchten van die samenwerking te komen. Het is
duidelijk dat de vraag of en hoe economische agenten (bijvoorbeeld consumenten
of bedrijven) samenwerken niet los gezien kan worden van de vraag wat die samen-
werking uiteindelijk voor iedereen oplevert: in beide richtingen bëınvloeden de twee
analyses elkaar.
De meest populaire tak van sport binnen de coöperatieve theorie is het zoge-
naamde transferable utility (TU) model. Dit eenvoudige model heeft als centrale
eigenschap dat op het moment dat er iets verdeeld moet worden, de betrokken
agenten de te verdelen objecten gelijk waarderen. Dit is alleszins een redelijke aan-
name als de te verdelen pot alleen maar bestaat uit geld en de meeste TU-literatuur
richt zich dan ook op situaties waarin de vruchten van samenwerking op een door
alle betrokkenen aanvaarde manier uitgedrukt kunnen worden in geld.
Wanneer het fysieke goederen betreft die verdeeld moeten worden, of abstracte
goederen zoals bepaalde rechten, kan de waardering voor deze goederen door de
verschillende agenten uiteenlopen, en is het TU-model niet toepasbaar. Om dit
te ondervangen is een wat rijker model ontwikkeld dat uitgaat van nontransferable
utility (NTU).
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt het belangrijke begrip convexiteit. Kortweg heet een spel
convex als samenwerken met een grotere groep meer extra opbrengsten genereert
dan samenwerken met een kleinere groep. Als gevolg hiervan wil in een convex spel
iedereen met elkaar samenwerken, wat de analyse van zulke spelen vereenvoudigt.
Convexiteit voor TU spelen is al intensief onderzocht en heeft geleid tot veel be-
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langrijke resultaten. Voor NTU ligt de zaak wat gecompliceerder. De literatuur
biedt enkele uitbreidingen van de convexiteitsanalyse naar deze context, maar deze
zijn lastig te interpreteren en toe te passen. De bijdrage van dit proefschrift is een
systematische analyse van de verschillende vormen van convexiteit in het geval van
NTU.
Een gedeelte van de voorgaande analyse wordt toegepast in Hoofdstuk 4, waar
het begrip monotoniciteit centraal staat. Monotoniciteit is een breed begrip en
komt erop neer dat als er in een coöperatieve situatie een verandering optreedt
zodat de groep als geheel er beter op wordt, iedere agent apart daarvan ook moet
kunnen profiteren. Het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk behandelt deze problematiek
in zijn algemeenheid (in termen van een zogenaamde pmas) voor het NTU-geval.
Het tweede deel behandelt machinevolgordeproblemen. Stel hierbij een machine
voor, die een aantal taken moet uitvoeren die beheerd worden door verschillende
spelers. Deze spelers staan te wachten totdat zij aan de beurt zijn en willen zo
snel mogelijk geholpen worden. Omdat niet alle taken even urgent zijn, kunnen er
kosten bespaard worden door toe te staan dat bepaalde spelers van plaats wisselen,
waarbij de benadeelden natuurlijk voldoende gecompenseerd worden. In dit kader
wordt de zogenaamde uitvalmonotoniciteit gëıntroduceerd en onderzocht: op het
moment dat een bepaalde speler de wachtrij verlaat, zal de zaak zo geregeld moeten
worden dat iedere andere speler erop vooruit gaat, met daarbij de extra eis dat er
niet ineens een groepje spelers geprikkeld wordt om de samenwerking op te zeggen.
Voor eenvoudige gevallen blijkt dit altijd bewerkstelligd te kunnen worden, maar bij
wat complexere kostenstructuren blijkt dit niet altijd mogelijk.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over coöperatieve spelen waarin de communicatie tussen de ver-
schillende spelers onderhevig is aan restricties. Hierdoor kunnen bepaalde groepen
niet optimaal samenwerken en zal daar bij de modellering rekening mee moeten wor-
den gehouden. De belangrijkste vraag die hier wordt beantwoord heeft betrekking
op overerving: in hoeverre worden de eigenschappen (zoals convexiteit) waaraan een
bepaalde klasse van NTU spelen voldoet bëınvloed door de communicatierestricties
en waar moeten die restricties aan voldoen zodat het voor de verdere analyse geen
wezenlijk verschil maakt?
In de standaard coöperatieve theorie richt de analyse zich op de gevolgen van
samenwerking voor degenen die daadwerkelijk samenwerken. De gevolgen voor de-
genen die besluiten om niet mee te doen worden hierbij buiten beschouwing gelaten
met de gedachte dat die het verdelingsvraagstuk binnen de groep niet bëınvloeden.
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Een effect dat hierbij niet wordt meegenomen is dat deze zogenoemde spillovers
wezenlijke prikkels kunnen vormen voor spelers in de beslissing om al dan niet mee
te doen. Dit strategische aspect staat centraal in het spillovermodel, dat gepresen-
teerd wordt in Hoofdstuk 6. Dit nieuwe model wordt gëıllustreerd aan de hand van
een coalitieformatieprobleem en een netwerkprobleem.
Hoofdstuk 7 is het eerste in een reeks van vier hoofdstukken die in het teken staan
van bankroetproblemen. Bankroetprobleem is een algemene (ietwat misleidende) be-
naming voor het meest eenvoudige type verdeelprobleem: er is een hoeveelheid geld
beschikbaar die verdeeld moet worden onder een aantal spelers, die allen een gegeven
claim hebben op dit bedrag – denk hierbij aan een faillissement, waarbij de rest-
waarde van het geliquideerde bedrijf onder de schuldeisers moet worden verdeeld.
In het algemeen zal er meer geclaimd worden dan er beschikbaar is, zodat er aller-
lei criteria bedacht moeten worden op basis waarvan het geld eerlijk verdeeld kan
worden. De bijdrage in dit hoofdstuk heeft betrekking op referenties: naast de ge-
bruikelijke claims is er nog een apart referentiekader (bijvoorbeeld ten gevolge van
wet- of regelgeving) dat bij de verdeling in ogenschouw dient te worden genomen.
De voorgestelde oplossingsmethode is gebaseerd op een compromis-principe.
In Hoofdstuk 8 wordt een substantiële uitbreiding op het bankroetmodel gepre-
senteerd. In plaats van een enkele claim heeft iedere speler een heel scala aan claims
die gedifferentieerd zijn naar verschillende issues. Bij een failissement kan gedacht
worden aan claims op basis van openstaande obligaties, leverancierskrediet, opties of
andere financiële verplichtingen. Bij het verdelingsprobleem kan vervolgens rekening
worden gehouden met de aard van de verschillende claims. Voor het resulterende
model wordt een oplossing voorgesteld die gebruik maakt van het principe van consis-
tentie, wat erop neerkomt dat grote problemen in essentie op dezelfde wijze opgelost
dienen te worden als kleinere problemen. In Hoofdstuk 9 wordt een andere kijk op
dit multi-issue model gegeven, gebaseerd op een alternatief consistentie-idee.
In veel economische situaties kunnen de participerende spelers op natuurlijke
wijze onderverdeeld worden in onderling disjuncte groepen van spelers met dezelfde
karakteristieken. Hoofdstuk 10 behandelt bankroetsituaties waarin dit het geval
is. Aan de hand van een bekend oplossingsconcept voor standaard bankroetproble-
men wordt een aantal methoden gepresenteerd om met deze a priori groeperingen
rekening te houden.
Dit proefschrift besluit met Hoofdstuk 11, waarin een meetkundige interpretatie
van een veelgebruikte compromis-oplossingsmethode centraal staat. Dit verrassende
184 SAMENVATTING
theoretische resultaat heeft technisch heel wat voeten in de aarde en het overgrote
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